24 Ga. App. 155 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1919
Lead Opinion
The controlling question in this case is whether the defendants were guilty of simple larceny as charged in the indictment, or whether they were guilty of larceny after trust only. It is contended by their counsel that under the evidence adduced the only offense of which they could have been legally convicted was larceny after trust. Both of the defendants were employed by the firm of Cefalu & Company, engaged in the “green grocery” business. One of the defendants, Hampton, was employed by the firm about 8 o’clock on the morning of January 31, 1919, to drive their delivery wagon. After making one delivery to a local hotel he returned to the store with the mule and wagon. About 10:30 o’clock on the same morning he was again entrusted with the mule and wagon and sent out to deliver other groceries. This time he did not return to the store, and the mule and wagon were
The intent with which an act is done is peculiarly a question of fact for determination by the jury; and although a finding by the jury that the accused had the intent to commit the crime charged may be supported by evidence which is exceedingly weak and unsatisfactory, the verdict will not be set aside on that ground. Johnson v. State, 9 Ga. App. 409 (3) (71 S. E. 507).
Hnder the foregoing rulings we think that the facts of the instant case authorized the jury to find that when the defendant Hampton obtained possession of the mule and wagon to make the second trip for his employers he had formed the intent to appropriate the property to his own use, and that the other defendant, Kelley, conspired with him, and that they were both guilty of simple larceny.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of affirmance on the ground that, under the law of Georgia, “horse stealing shall be denominated simple larceny. . . The offense shall, in all cases, be charged as simple larceny, but the indictment shall designate the nature, character and sex of the animal, and give some other description by which its identity may be ascertained.” Penal Code, §§ 153, 154. The indictment in this case charges the defendant with simple larceny for that he “did wrongfully, fraudulently and privately take, steal and carry away with intent to steal the same one sorrel horse mule and wagon, of the value of one hundred dollars,’'’ etc. The evidence showed that the defendants were guilty of horse stealing, and therefore supported the indictment.
The excerpts from the charge of the court, if error, were harmless.