585 So. 2d 1371 | Ala. | 1991
The plaintiff, Emmett C. Kelley, as the father of Michael Kelley, appeals from the dismissal of this action seeking damages under Ala. Code 1975, §
Emmett Kelley sued Ryals Services, Inc., alleging that it, through one of its agents, had unlawfully sold alcoholic beverages to his son, Michael, and that it was therefore liable in damages to him under §
"Either parent of a minor, guardian or a person standing in loco parentis to the minor having neither father nor mother shall have a right of action against any person who unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors to such minor and may recover such damages as the jury may assess, provided the person selling or furnishing liquor to the minor had knowledge of or was chargeable with notice or knowledge of such minority. Only one action may be commenced for each offense under this section."
The defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss the action, arguing that Michael, who was 19 years of age at the time of the alleged sale of alcoholic beverages to him, was not a "minor" within the meaning of §
The sole issue presented for our review is whether a person 19 years of age is a "minor" within the meaning of §
The plaintiff relies on Ala. Code 1975, §
"Notwithstanding the provisions of §
26-1-1 , it shall be unlawful for a person less than 21 years of age to purchase, consume, possess or to transport any alcohol, liquor or malt or brewed beverages within the state of Alabama.
". . . .
"Persons 19 years of age or older prior to October 1, 1985 are hereby exempt from the provisions of this section."
The plaintiff argues that his son was a "minor" within the meaning of §
The defendant contends that when Ala. Code 1975, §
After carefully reviewing the applicable statutory provisions, we must disagree with the defendant's contention that a person who has reached 19 years of age is no longer a "minor" within the meaning of §
"In [1907], the legislature enacted the Civil Damages Act as a provision of the 1907 Code of Alabama. Considering the tone of the times in which the statute was enacted as a provision of the Code and considering the statute on its face, we hold that the Civil Damages Act is a 'temperance' or 'prohibition' provision, intended to deter the sale of 'spirituous liquors' to minors, to deter the intoxication of the minor that would result from such a sale, and to provide a remedy for the aggrieved parties that the Act describes."
To hold as the defendant suggests would be totally inconsistent with the public policy objective established by the Legislature — to prevent the purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages by persons under the legal drinking age.
We note that in Espey, this Court, after reviewing the provisions of Title 28, held that the definition of "liquor" contained in §
"Furthermore, §28-3-1 itself limits its field of application to three provisions in Title 28: Title 28, chapter 3, the Alabama Table Wine Act, and the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code, §28-3A-1 et seq. Even within those provisions, §28-3-1 itself allows the definition to be modified if 'the context clearly indicates otherwise.' §28-3-1 . Accordingly, we find that §28-3-1 (15)'s definition of 'liquor' is not determinative of the definition of the term 'spirituous liquors' in the Civil Damages Act."
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a person under 21 years of age is a "minor" within the meaning of §
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX and SHORES, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the result.