157 N.Y.S. 1100 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1916
The facts upon which this judgment rests are simple. Defendant was the lessee of certain property in the city of Brooklyn under a lease which would expire by its terms on May 1, 1915. This lease was subject to a previously executed mortgage by the owner of the property to the present plaintiff. That mortgage was foreclosed and the plaintiff bought in the property. The defendant had been in occupation during all the time of the foreclosure action, paying the rent to a receiver, and as soon as plaintiff took possession of the property or acquired title thereto, which was on July 2,1914, he demanded from defendant the payment of the rent. Defendant hesitated for some time, under advice of his counsel, in consequence of a supposed claim, of the receiver, but that was afterwards cleared up and the defendant paid rent for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December, 1914, and January, 1915. At the end of January he moved out and has refused to pay the rent for the succeeding months between that time and May first, when the lease by its terms would expire. The Municipal Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This judgment the Appellate Term reversed (92 Misc. Rep. 201) and from its determination this appeal is taken.
The undisputed facts present atypical case of an attornment, by which the tenant held from the new owner upon the same terms as he previously held from the lessor. The act of attornment, evidenced by the payment of rent to the new owner and its acceptance by him, amounts to an acceptance of the new landlord by the tenant, and an acceptance of the tenancy by the landlord.
While it is true that under our present statutes the occasion seldom arises for the application of the doctrine of attornment (Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v. De Waltoff, 135 App. Div.
The respondent is quite in error in claiming that we may not affirm the judgment upon other grounds than those given by the justice who rendered it.' A correct decision will not be reversed on appeal merely because it was founded upon a wrong: reason, if it can be seen that the ground of the decision has noil misled a party to his injury. (Ward v. Hasbrouck, 169 N. Y. 407.)
In the present case there is no disputed question of fact, and. it would be absurd to order a new trial.
The determination of the Appellate Term is reversed and the judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs in this court and at the Appellate Term to the appellant.
Clarke, P. J., Laughlin and Smith, JJ., concurred.
Determination of Appellate Term reversed and judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs in this court and at the Appellate Term.