14 Me. 228 | Me. | 1837
After a continuance, the opinion of the Court was drawn up by
The first objection to the ruling of the Judge at the trial, is to the admission in evidence of the answer of Staples, a witness for the plaintiff, to the fourth cross-iqterrogatory. The interrogatory is, “ if you know any thing further, favorable to the defendant, state it as if particularly interrogated.” The answer is a statement of matters quite unfavorable to the defence ; and the argument is, that it should be suppressed as impertinent and uncalled for by the question. Where a question is put, calling for an answer to a particular point, or inquiring whether a certain thing did or did not occur, the answer should respond to the question, and if it does not substantially do so, it is not to be received. The witness is not at liberty to evade the question, by stating what is clearly not called for. 1 Sum. 454, Alsop v. The Com. Ins. Co. This is the general interrogatory frequently put, but which is always put at some risk, as the party necessarily submits to the judgment of the witness, what may be thought favorable to him. The witness
Another objection was to the answers of the same witness to the third direct interrogatory. The answers do not appear to be liable to the objection that they attempt to contradict, explain, or vary a written contract. What is said in relation to it must be regarded rather as describing it, than as contradicting, or varying it.
The plaintiff had been mate under Staples, with whom he made an adjustment of his wages up to January 21, 1832, when Staples ceased to be master. He was then requested by Whütredge, the defendant’s agent at Baltimore, to remain with the vessel and take charge of her in port; and he did so from that time to the 31st of March following, when Snow became master, and the plaintiff continued with him as mate. The shipping articles commencing on the 31st of March, that was the day originally designated by them as the time, when the wages of the plaintiff and others of the crew should commence. When the plaintiff was to be paid off he desired the 31st March to be erased, and the 21st Jan. to be substituted, so as to obtain his wages while acting as ship-keeper; and Snow consented to it and paid his wages for that period of time before he was master. The defendant filed the amount thus paid in set-off, and claimed to recover it back, on the ground that Snow had no
But although the objection may have been good, and may have been overruled, were not the instructions such, as occasioned substantial justice to be done between the parties ? Admitting the money to have been paid without authority, was the defendant upon the other testimony in the cause entitled to have it allowed in set-off against the plaintiff? ' It appears in the case, that the plaintiff actually and faithfully performed the service by the request of the defendant’s agent; and that he was justly entitled to the amount which Snow paid to him out of the defendant’s money without any competent authority. The defendant can recover it back only upon the principle, that in equity and good conscience he is entitled to do so. This ground wholly fails. Beside, to allow him to recover it back because paid without authority, would be only to subject him to a new suit; and to avoid circuity of action, the plaintiff being justly entitled to it, should be permitted to retain it. Justice having been done between the parties, there must be
Judgment on the verdict.