23 Me. 192 | Me. | 1843
The opinion of the Court was drawn up by
This is a writ of entry demanding possession of lot numbered 60 in the town of Orono. The deeds of conveyance introduced by the demandant will be sufficient to establish his title, unless the operation of one of them can be defeated by proof, that the grantor was disseized at the time of making that conveyance. The tenant contends, that the testimony introduced by him should have that effect, and also that it should establish his right to the improvements by virtue of a possession and improvement of the lot, under the provisions of the statute. It shews, that he entered upon the lot as early as the year 1819, made improvements, and continued to live upon and occupy it exclusively to the time of the trial. The demandant and the tenant, as the jury have found, entered into a written contract of two parts on October 25, 1832, by which the one agreed to sell and the other to purchase the lot upon certain terms therein stated. The counsel for the tenant contends, that he had acquired a right to the improvements before he entered into that contract; that the fee and the improvements had become distinct claims or titles; and that he might admit, that he did not own the fee, and contract to purchase it, without surrendering any of his rights or acting inconsistently. And the inference is drawn, that the contract in this case was one of that description. The fault of the argument may perhaps be in an erroneous inference. It is admitted, that the case of Knox v. Hook, 12 Mass. R. 329, was correctly decided, because the first entry upon the land was made under a contract to purchase it. The opinion states, “ now a person, who has made a contract with the proprietor to purchase, and has entered in pursuance of such contract, cannot be said to hold the lands by virtue of a pos
It is further contended, that the demandant did not acquire any title under the conveyance made to him, on October.13, 1829, from Hall J. Kelley, because the grantor had been, before that time, disseized by the tenant, who about three years afterward, and while continuing that possession, admitted the title of the demandant, contracted to pay him for it, and has since occupied the land as his tenant at will. After such an occupation for so many years, he proposes to dispute his landlord’s title. That is inadmissible. His contract explains the character of his previous possession, as well as puts it out of his power to raise the objection.
Exceptions overruled.