15 Haw. 76 | Haw. | 1903
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
(Perry, J., dissenting.)
This is in form a bill for the discharge of a trustee and' the appointment of a successor in the trust, but the substantial issue is between certain of the defendants as to whether the trust.has terminated or not. The suit was begun by the Et. Eev. Gulstan E. Eopert, Bishop of Panopolis, as trustee under a deed executed by the defendant Sumner, but during the hearing, the Bishop being, as was supposed, on his dying bed, the Circuit Judge, with the consent of all parties and upon the agreement that the Bishop’s account, showing a balance of $48,025, was correct, made a decree, accepting the Bishop’s resignation and discharging him from the trust, and a further decree appointing P. D. Iiellett, Jr., in his place, and expressly authorizing the latter to go on with the suit as if he were the original plaintiff, though no formal amendment appears to have been made substituting him as-the party plaintiff. The Judge ordered also, with the consent of all the parties, that.
The circumstances Avere, briefly, these: On February 7, 1895, Sumner made a lease, afterwards assigned to the Oahu Railway and Land Company, of certain land, bordering on Honolulu harbor, for 99 years at an annual rental of $5,500, at the same time giving in the lease an option to purchase the land at any time during the term of the lease for $100,000. A small portion of the land Avas reseiwed for 25 years. Sumner' Avas supposed to haA^e title to only one-lralf of the land, and his title to that Avas disputed by the government. On February 19, 3 895, Maria S. Davis filed a suit, as next friend of
The foregoing is a bare outline. It is unnecessary to go at length into the details as they appear in the voluminous evidence or as may be read between the lines, this latter being the part to which counsel particularly addressed themselves in their oral arguments, if not in their briefs.
The question is whether the trust has terminated, and it will therefore be necessary to set forth the relevant parts of the deed and will creating the trust. The deed (from Sumner to the Bishop and his successors in office) describes Sumner as. “a resident of Tahiti, at present temporarily in Honolulu” and recites: “Whereas, the party of the first part desiring that his property and interests in the Hawaiian Islands shall be in charge of some competent and disinterested person, and the party of the second part has kindly agreed to accept the trust and confidence in him hereinafter expressed.” The conveyance is expressed to be “in consideration of the premises and in order to effectuate such desire and agreement”, and is in trust “to collect all the rents and profits thereof and to pay thereout all taxes and other expenses incurred in respect of managing or attending to the same, together with any expenses incurred by the party of the second part for legal advice or services concerning the same or the management thereof, and to pay the balance thereof from time to time as received by the party, of the second part to the party of the first part during his. lifetime, and at his death to grant and convey said property and pay any of such unapplied income to such uses and purposes and to such persons as the party of the first part shall by his last Will and Testament, made and executed on the lYth day of September, A. D. 1898, name and appoint, and in default of such appointment, to such persons as shall by
“And in further trust and with power hereby expressly granted to the Trustee to make such leases and agreements of lease of the said property or any part or parcel thereof, upon such terms and conditions and for such rentals as the Trustee shall think proper, and to collect and give receipts for the rentals, and to collect all moneys now or hereafter due, payable and coming to the party of the first part within the Hawaiian Islands and to apply the same as above directed in respect of the income of said property.
“'And also, in trust and with power hereby expressly granted to the Trustee to adjust, compromise and settle all claims of every description now or hereafter made against the party of the first part, in such manner as the Trustee shall think fit and to bring such actions and proceedings in law or equity in respect of said property or any part thereof, or of any other rights or claims of the party of the first part, and to conduct the same to final judgment and execution or adjust, compromise and settle the same as the Trustee shall think fit;
“And in all respects to conduct and manage the said property and the matters -hereinabove mentioned as fully and effectually to all intents and purposes as the party of the first part could do.” The trustee accepted the trust.
The will, referred to in the deed as executed the same day, was destroyed, as stated above, but its contents were proved in part as follows: In substance one-fourth of all the property, except the life interest, to the Bishop for the use of the church and the support of Saint Louis College, and then “All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, I give, devise and bequeath to the Bishop of the Homan Catholic Church in Honolulu, in trust to manage the said property and collect the income from the same, and pay the income thereof in equal moieties to William Sumner Ellis, John Sumner Ellis and Victoria Sumner Ellis, the children of my dear niece, Nancy Sumner Ellis, deceased, during their lives and the life of the
The property and the proceeds thereof now in question were part of the property covered by these items of the will.
Several contentions are made to show that the trust has terminated. The suggestion is made that by the terms of the trust deed itself this money should be paid to Sumner, for all the income is to be paid to him during his life and the deed provides further that the trustee is “to collect all moneys now or hereafter due, payable, and coming to the party of the first part within the Hawaiian Islands and to apply the same as above directed in respect of the income.” In view of our conclusion on another point, no opinion need be expressed upon this.
Another contention, much urged, is that the trust could be terminated by consent of all parties interested and was in fact so terminated when the $110,000 was distributed as above set forth. The proposition of law that the trust may be terminated by the consent of all interested seems to be conceded, but it is contended that such consent was not given in this case. Whether the Ellises, the Davises and the Bishop so consented in fact, we need not inquire at this point, nor need we say whether the
A third contention, which in our opinion is sound, is that the trust was revocable by Sumner under the circumstances without the consent of the other beneficiaries.
The Ellises contend that the trust could not be terminated either by the consent of all interested who are now in being and sui juris or by Sumner himself, although they 'were ready enough to participate in its spoliation to the extent of $62,000. If the trust is not terminable, they and all others who have shared in the trust fund should be required to restore it. No one has offered to do this, and it is doubtful how much of the $62,000 could be obtained on execution in case the trust should be held irrevocable, even if judgment should be obtained by the new trustee against the several participants. How far, in case the trust' were irrevocable, the trustee or his representa-
Courts have swayed somewhat from time to time and differed from each other in their opinions as to when a trust of this nature is revocable by the grantor. At times the view seems to have been taken that the mere omission of a clause of revocation or the mere neglect of counsel to call the attention of the grantor to the advisability of inserting such a clause, is sufficient to show mistake or undue influence and justify revocation, or will at least cast the burden on any one seeking to sustain the trust to prove that it was made deliberately and intelligently with an intention .that it should be irrevocable. But the better view at the present time seems to be that those are only circumstances to be taken into consideration with other circumstances and that the real question is whether the grantor intelligently and freely created the trust with the intention that it should not be revocable. Instructive series of cases upon this subject are found in England and Pennsylvania, the present view being set forth in the recent cases of Hall v.
If one intelligently and freely creates a trust of this character, although without consideration and although he is to retain the benefit himself for life, he cannot as a rule revoke it as against remaindermen. But under special circumstances, as shown by the cases above cited, such a trust is revocable, and in our opinion, such special circumstances exist in this case. Indeed, this would seem to be a particularly strong case as compared with many of the cases cited above.
We need not consider whether the deed, by referring to a will already made, though on the same day, makes it a part of itself, so as to prevent a defeat of the trust by a revocation of will afterwards; or whether the deed itself can be-revoked on the theory that, though in form a deed, it was really merely testamentary in character; or whether the failure of the trust to the extent of more than half the trust fund and the grantor’s deprivation of corresponding expected benefits, through undue influence or otherwise, might affect the question; or how far the trust was improvident in locking up for the rest of his life the greater part of the grantor’s property or in not leaving the way open to the grantor to make provision for the to him unforeseen and unsuggested contingency of his marrying again and having children; nor need we consider whether the evi-
It is undisputed that no clause of revocation was inserted, and there is no evidence that the advisability of inserting such a clause was called to Sumner’s attention in any way. These are generally regarded as important facts in connection with other facts in cases of this kind. In some instances such facts are shown by the very nature of the trust itself to be comparatively immaterial, as where the trust is created for the express purpose of protecting the grantor from his own intemperate and spendthrift habits, or where a woman in contemplation of marriage puts her property in trust for the express purpose of preventing her husband from getting control of it, for in such cases if the trust were revocable, its purposes could be defeated at any time, in the one case by the desires of the intemperate man or spendthrift overcoming him and in the other by the husband’s influence on the wife, and hence in such cases there is good ground to believe that the trust is intended to be irrevocable, at least so long as the reasons for it continue. But, where, as here, the creation of the trust is purely voluntary, without consideration, and for the grantor’s especial convenience and by a weak-minded aged man acting under much pressure, the case is different.
If anything is clear in this case, it is that Sumner has never conceded for a moment that he was incompetent to manage his own property, although he acknowledges certain infirmities, such as defectiveness of eyesight and partial loss of memory, and even that -lie needs advice at times. If there is one thing that he has dreaded, it has been the imputation of insanity. No one has so much as sriggested that he is intemperate or a spendthrift. It was not his thought in executing the deed to protect himself from himself, or to provide for his relatives. His need of protection because of mental weakness may have weighed strongly with his sister and his attorneys at the time
If we look to the deed itself, we find in it much that, especially to a man like Sumner, aged and infirm and unfamiliar with law, would indicate that it was of a temporary nature and for his own convenience. It describes him as a resident of Tahiti, temporarily here; it recites that he desires his property and interests here to be in charge of some competent person and that the Bishop had kindly consented to act, and that the deed was made to effectuate such desire; it then proceeds, in declaring the trusts, to enumerate powers found in ordinary powers of attorney, ending with the provision that the trustee is “to conduct and manage the said property and the matters hereinabove mentioned as fully and effectually to all intents and purposes as the party of the first part could do.” It reserves to him the entire income for life, and then directs that the property shall go after his death to such persons as he shall by his will made the same day appoint, and in default of such appointment, to his heirs. It does not appear whether the will was made before, at the same time as, or after the deed, though we presume it .was part of the same transaction, but, especially if the deed and will were parts of the same transaction, why were not all the trusts inserted in the deed, if they were intended to be irrevocable ? A man like Sumner. would naturally suppose the will to be revocable, and the language of the deed also would seem to indicate that to a man like him. Further, the trustee was given no power to sell, and no power to invest the proceeds although the option for the purchase of the property had already been given. It was not at all unlikely that the option would be exercised at any time and the property covered by the deed of trust converted into money. If it were contemplated that the trust was irrevocable, it would seem that ordinary prudence would have called for the insertion of a provision in regard to the investment of the proceeds of the sale. If the deed was executed for the grantor’s own con-
If we look outside of the deed, there is little direct light, so far as the circumstances at the time of its execution are concerned. But inferences may be made. If, as suggested by counsel for the Ellises, Sumner was then, as found by the Circuit Judge at the time, non compos mentis, and has not since been restored sufficiently to ratify the deed, it ought not to stand in any event. If, as the Ellises allege in their answer, Sumner executed the deed because he was harassed, annoyed and distressed by the litigation in which his relatives were involving him, and in order to end the strife and friction with them, and avoid the humiliation, mortification and anguish of having the decree that he was insane affirmed by the Supreme Court, in other words, if, as the argument seems to be, he was ■ forced or blackmailed into executing the deed for the purpose of tying up his property for his relatives, this also is one of the strongest reasons, as shown by the cases, for holding the deed revocable. There is no doubt that Sumner was greatly annoyed by that litigation and that he deeply felt the humiliation of being declared insane. He was then 76 or 18 years old and at least somewhat weak-minded and easily influenced, and, considering the state of his mind in view of the litigation and the actions and conduct of his relatives, it looks very much as if he was practically forced into executing the deed, and these circumstances afford strong additional ground for holding the deed revocable.
The evidence shows further, so far as it shows anything upon this point, that Sumner himself never regarded the deed as irrevocable. His actions have throughout harmonized with the theory that he believed it revocable. And there is much reason to believe that all the others directly interested, as well as their attorneys at the time of the distribution, thought so too. The Bishop, the trustee, apparently thought so. He not only paid out the greater portion of the trust fund to others on Sumner’s orders but he paid the balance of the money to Sum
The Ellises contend, among other things, that they are in a different position from that of the Davises, because the latter signed an express release of all further claim to Sumner’s property, when they received the $15,000 paid to them for themselves and their attorneys, while they, the Ellises, did not sign any such release. Erom this it is argued that whatever-
Another thing relied on to show that the Ellises did not intend to release their claims to the $48,025 is that at the last meeting, when the deal was consummated, Mrs. Buffandeau’s husband asked Sumner what he was going to do with the rest of the money and that he replied that the Bishop was still his trastee and that they would get the rest of it when he died, and that thereupon one of their attorneys jumped up and said, “that is .all we want to know, children, sign the deed” (meaning the deed to the Oahu Bailway and Land Company). It is not altogether clear just what was said then. The two Buffandeaus testified 'as above. The attorney testified that the question and answer by Buffandeau and Sumner were as above, but was .silent as to whether'he, the attorney, said anything. Mr. Oath-cart testified that Sumner replied “Oh, the Bishop is still trustee.” Sumner testified that he replied, “It is none of your business; that is my business.” One thing, however, does appear, that Sumner, then from 82 to 84 years of age, with all his infirmities and burdened with his trials, was there wrestling practically alone with his relentless relatives and their attorneys, and that when he was asked the question by Buffandeau, he became angry and apparently made whatever reply he did made, in desperation. Mrs. Buffandeau herself testified that
Under circumstances like these, courts hold that trusts of this nature may be revoked. It is unnecessary to say how far the case should be classed under any one head of equity juris--diction — such as mistake, fraud or undue influence. It looks very much as if it presented a compound of these and perhaps other ingredients, though, perhaps, not all in equal parts.
It is further contended that the decree cannot be affirmed in any event because of the want of necessary parties, to wit, the wives and children of the Ellises and the Saint Louis College. These, it is contended, are beneficiaries, with either vested or contingent interests, under the trust, and as such are necessary parties. This argument is based on the theory that the will must be given effect as a part of the deed even if it should
Now, as to the wives and children. There are, perhaps, a number of reasons why the decree should not be reversed, at least in toto, because these persons were not made parties. Several of these reasons will be stated. In the first place, conceding that the bill has technically some objects for which all persons interested should be made parties or at least be represented, yet most of these other matters were settled by decrees not now appealed from and are not in dispute and have turned •out to be of a somewhat incidental nature. The gist of the suit was whether Sumner should be required to pay the money back to the trustee. The suit was brought by the trustee, not by Sumner. The latter had the money. The obligation was on .the trustee and others contending the same way not only to see
The appeals are dismissed, the decree appealed from affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Circuit Judge for such further proceedings as may be proper consistent with this opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING OPINION OF
It may be assumed for the purposes of this case that a deed of trust irrevocable by the grantor alone may nevertheless be revoked by him if all of the beneficiaries consent and also that the evidence shows that the three Ellises, Maria S. Davis. W. Davis and the Bishop on hehalf of the Catholic Church and St. Louis College consented that this deed be revoked and the trust terminated. Still from such consent an effective revocation did not result for the Ellises, the Davises and the two institutions named were not the only possible beneficiaries under the deed. The provisions of the will made September 17, 1898, became, by the express terms of the deed, a part of the deed and this, too, whether the will was made before or after or concurrently with the execution of the deed. It is well settled that if a deed refers to a will for a statement of some of its provisions, the parts of the will so referred to thereby become a portion of the deed just as though they had been incorporated in the same instrument and thereupon take effect, not as a will, but as a part of the deed, that the Ellises, the Davisds and the Bishop are not the only possible beneficiaries under the terms of the trust as set forth in the will is made clear in the majority opinion; I concur in the views there expressed on that subject.
Assuming, however, that the question last discussed is presented by the pleadings, my conclusion is that the evidence utterly fails to show that the deed was obtained by any species of fraud whatever. In the first place, I take it to be clear that for the purposes of this case Sumner must be regarded as having been on September 17, 1898, and ever since and as being now mentally capable of contracting and of executing a deed or will. The decree of the Circuit Judge, made shortly prior to that date, declaring Sumner mentally incapable was, on appeal, vacated by the Supreme Court; and on October 13, 1903, a court of competent jurisdiction, in a direct proceeding, made a decree declaring him sane. None of the parties to this proceeding or their attorneys claim that he was at the time in question mentally incapable but, on the contrary, all of the attorneys claim in argument that he was mentally capable. In the second place, the general rule is that fraud is not to be presumed but must be proved by the party alleging it. There is, it is true, an exception, real or apparent, to this rule, in cases where a benefit has been obtained or an advantage gained by one who stands towards the giver or grantor in a relation of trust and confidence, as, for example, where the relation is that of sgent and principal, attorney and client, or guardian and ward. In such cases the law, recognizing the very great advantage possessed, by virtue of the relation and of the resulting confidence, by the agent over the principal, the attorney over the client, and the guardian over the ward, in dealings had between them, and in order the more readily to effect justice, does not permit the party having such advantage to retain the benefits unless the entire fairness of the transaction is proven by him. But the
The rule, then, and not the exception, applies in this case. The burden imposed by that rule upon Sumner has not been sustained. None of those who were present and took part in the transaction leading up to the signing of the deed or will give any testimony as to what was said or done at that ¡ ¡me. The only attempt to introduce such testimony was made by the attorney for the Ellises, but the testimony was excluded, on Sumner s objection, on the ground that the witnesses were his, Sumner’s, attorneys at the time and that the communications then had between them were privileged. This privilege, if it existed at all, was, it must be remembered, Sumner’s and not his attorneys’, and it was entirely competent for him to have waived it if light was indeed desired on the transaction. Having shut out this testimony, the best evidence obtainable on the
ls the deed revocable by Sumner alone? And hereunder,, first, is it testamentary in character ? In my opinion, it is not. “Whether an instrument is a deed or a will depends upon the-time when it is to take effect, rather than upon its form or manner of execution. A deed takes effect upon its delivery in the-grantor’s lifetime. A will takes effect from the death of the-testator.” — 2 Jones, Eeal Prop, and Conveyancing, 1230. This instrument was intended to take effect upon delivery and to" convey at once to the trustee the legal, title to the property subject to the trusts specified. The trustee was given-active duties to perform and it is necessary that he should have the title in-order to carry out the directions of the deed. If the language-of the deed means anything at all it means that the grantor placed it beyond his power to make after September 1Y, 1898, a will of the property covered by the deed. The use of the words “and in default of such appointment” is not an indication to-the contrary, for even in 1 he view that they show that the grantor reserved liberty to revoke thereafter the will of that date so-as to eliminate its provisions as provisions of the deed, the remainder of the context of the deed shows that the direction to-the trustee in the event of such revocation was to convey to-those who would be entitled by law in case of intestacy. But I think that the correct construction of the language used (“hat is, if the will was not made prior to or concurrently with the-deed) is that if the will should be actually made on September 1Y, 1898, its provisions should thereupon become incorporated by express reference as provisions of the deed and no attempted revocation of the will, subsequent to that date, could operate to eliminate those provisions from the deed although it might be operative as a cancellation so far as the disposition of property not covered by the deed is concerned. It is at least,
The contention that the nearest blood relatiyes mentioned in the will are only heirs of Sumner and that when a devise is made to heirs the latter take by descent and not by devise, and hence that this is merely a case of a reversion to Sumner, that the whole equitable title is in Sumner and that therefore he can revoke the deed without the consent of others, is sufficiently disposed of in the majority opinion. In that disposition I concur.
The deed on its face is irrevocable. Much stress is laid upon the fact that the deed recites that Sumner is a “resident of Tahiti, at present temporarily in Honolulu”, that “whereas the party of the first part desiring that his property and interests in the Hawaiian Islands shall be in charge of some competent and disinterested person * * * and in order to effectuate such desire and agreement” the grantor doth convey, etc., and that the trustee is authorized “in all respects to conduct and manage the said property and the matters hereinabove mentioned as fully and effectually to all intents and purposes as the party of the first part could do,” and it is argued that to a man like Sumner this language .would seem to indicate that the deed was revocable and that he would also suppose, naturally, the will to be revocable. So far as the probabilities go, the fact in all probability is that a formal instrument such as this, couched in legal language, would have conveyed to Suihiu.r’s mind, if left to him alone to read and study, very little, if any, light as to its meaning, and further that it was not left to him alone to read and study but that the substance and effect of the instrument was explained to him by others of greater intelligence and better versed in those matters. There is no reason
It is contended, however, that in view of the peculiar and exceptional circumstances of this case, it must be held that at the time of the execution of the deed Sumner understood and intended it to be revocable, that he executed it in its present form by mistake, and that therefore the court must now by decree declare that he has successfully revoked it and that the trust has terminated. The fact that the clause of revocation was omitted is one of the circumstances thus relied upon. Formerly in England and in Pennsylvania and perhaps some c:her States it was held that the omission of a clause of revocation from a deed such as this was of itself prima facie evidence of mistake and of the understanding of the grantor that the deed was revocable and that it was sufficient to throw the burden on the party seeking to sustain the trust to prove that the omission was not by mistake, but this view no longer prevails and it is now generally held that such omission is a mere circumstance which, like any other relevant circumstance, is to be considered and given such weight, one way or the other, Vo it may be entitled to upon all the evidence. This would seem to be as favorable a rule as those attacking the trust may well expect. The very essence of the inquiry is whether the omission was by mistake or understandingly, and to say that because the clause was omitted that is any evidence tending to show that it was omitted by mistake seems to me to be at least a happy method of solving the difficulty. But let it be assumed that the modern rule is good and that the circumstance of the omission may be considéred. Still, “the question of the right to revoke a voluntary trust resolves itself into a question of intention, and the proper subject for inquiry in this, as in every
The deed on its face does not, as I think, contain sufficient evidence of an intention to make it revocable to throw the burden upon those seeking to sustain the trust to show by other evidence that such was not in fact the intention. The circumstances shown by the extrinsic evidence and the inferences derivable from the facts so proved lead me irresistibly to the conclusion that the deed was, at the time of its execution, actually intended to be irrevocable. The motive, too, for the grantor’s taking such a course appears. Sumner was an old man, weak-minded and easily influenced. Within at least the four or five years next preceding September, 1898, he had made a number of foolish and improvident business transactions and had been taken advantage of by unscrupulous and designing persons who had secured and for the time being possessed his confidence. ITad those transactions been permitted to stand, his property would have been in large part consumed thereby and the rest would soon have followed in a similar way. By various judicial proceedings instituted by her for the purpose, his sitter, Maria S. Davis, caused the most important of those transactions to be set aside and the property to be restored to its owner and put an end to the influence of those with whom he had been dealing. While he was capable of being easily influenced to his detriment he was also capable of being persuaded, though at times with much difficulty, of the mistakes he had been led to commit and of the real character of his supposed friends. Finally, in 1898, came the guardianship proceedings and the decree of the Circuit Judge placing him under guardianship. That decree was rendered on June lY, 1898, and Maria S. Davis’ consent to its reversal and her discontinuance were given in writing on September 19, 189S, two days after the execution of the deed. From these facts the most natural and the strong inference is that he was advised and influenced, not unduly, but properly and legitimately to make such a deed for
Again, is it natural to suppose that his sister, who had spent the better part of three years in litigation of an extremely disagreeable nature, in the endeavor to save and protect his property and who had obtained the decree (although appealable) of a court of competent jurisdiction placing his property under the control of a guardian, would have yielded all of the advantage so gained by acquiescing in the execution of a deed which Sumner would have the power to revoke at any time, within three months as effectually as after five years? On the contrary, it seems to me that the very strong inference is that she would not have done so and that she gave up the benefit of the judicial proceedings only because by another method equally effective although milder in form the property had been placed beyond the power of Sumner to lose. _ If it be said that she knew that she could bring new guardianship proceedings at any time if he should revoke the trust, the obvious answer is that that is unreasonable. One who, especially a woman, had just gone through the details of such a contest in court, is not at all likely to abandon results actually obtained for any .arrangement of wholly uncertain duration or to consent to renew the contest when that course can be avoided. It is suggested in this connection that the inference is that Maria S. Davis desired and understood the trust to be revocable because it was to her interest that it should be, there being practically no provision in the will for her benefit. But it does not appear that she knew at the time what the contents of the will were and the evidence does show that Sumner was averse, even during the negotiations of 1902, to making known those contents. (Incidentally, this explains why not all the terms of the trust were inserted in the deed itself.) Moreover, I am satisfied from the evidence that, whatever were her motives in the litigation of 1902, Maria S. Davis was, in the proceedings of 1895 to 1898 and in her conduct towards her brother at that time,
The point is made that the Davises, the Ellises, the Eishop and the attorneys, as well as Simmer, all showed by their conduct in the events of 1902 and more particularly by the acceptance of portions of the trust fund, that they understood that the trust was revocable. Assuming that the Ellises so understood the matter in 1902, that throws no light on the question of what Sumner understood in 189S, for they are not shown to have taken any part in the transaction leading up to the execution of the deed and their understanding in 1902 must have been based upon hearsay or upon their own construction of the instrument or that of their attorneys if they consulted any. Similarly of the attorneys. They were not present, in 1898. Their opinions have value as those of men learned in the law, but not as evidence of the actual occurrences of 1898 or of the belief produced by those occurrences in Sumner’s mind. The Bishop, too, is not shown to have been present in J898. Eor aught that appears to the contrary, he was merely offered the trust and accepted reluctantly as an accommodation to the old man. Moreover, the evidence shows, as it seems to me, that he concurred in the payments made out of the trust fund because, as he thought, all the beneficiaries were consenting, and delivered the remainder of the trust property to Sumner because of a mistake on his part as to the legal effect of the Circuit Judge’s order (in October, 1902,) dismissing the petition for the appointment of a guardian and declaring Sumner sane. When shown by Sumner a newspaper article to the effect that the $50,000 had been left in trust for the Ellis heirs, the Bishop said: “That is not true, because, you know, Mr. Sumner, you have been discharged by the court and now you are a free man- and you can do what you like.” As to Sumner himself I doubt very much whether in 1902 the thought ever occurred to him that he could revoke the deed without the consent of the beneficiaries until it was suggested to him at the trial by one of his attorneys. The Davises had brought pro
The averment in the answer of the Ellises that Sumner, “being greatly harrassed, annoyed and distressed by the several suits and proceedings hereinbefore referred to and being advanced in years and greatly broken by bodily infirmities and desiring to end his remaining years in peace and without strife and friction with those who were bound to him by ties of blood and to avoid the humiliation, mortification and anguish of having the said order declaring him to be an insane person affirmed by said Supreme Court in which an appeal from said order was then pending” executed the deed, is not, as seems to be contended, the equivalent of an admission that he was forced -or “blackmailed” into executing the deed for the purpose of tying up his property for his relatives, and is not inconsistent with the claim that the deed was executed freely and under.standingly.
As to improvidence. The deed made practically no provision for any future wife or child of the grantor after the latter’s death. Ample provision is made for such wife or issue during Sumner’s lifetime in that all of the income is reserved to him for that period. Sumner’s wife, Ninito, had died only a few months prior to the execution of the deed. While there was still a possibility of his re-marrying and having issue, there
The fact that a large portion, more than one-half, of the trust fund has passed out of the control of the trustee at the request or with the consent of Sumner, appeals to me, not as a reason for passing the remainder into Sumner’s control, but as strong evidence of the continued existence of the necessity for protection from himself which, as I believe, prompted the creation of the trust in the first instance.
Further discussion of the conduct and motives of the Ellises, the Davises and the attorneys in the transactions of October, 1902, and comments thereon are here omitted because, except as above pointed out, those matters seem to me to be immaterial and irrelevant in a consideration of the issues involved in this case. If the recent payments or any of them were made under mistake or obtained by undue influence or fraud of any other kind, that might be good ground for setting aside those payments but does not tend to show that in September, 1898, there was airy mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence or other species of fraud; and if the court finds that the deed has not been successfully revoked and is of the opinion that the trust should not be terminated, it should not order the money paid
As to the authorities, in none of the more recent cases,, as I understand them, whether in England or in Pennsylvania or in any other State, is it held that upon facts such as I have found in this case equity will either enforce a revocation by the grantor or itself terminate the trust. If any of them do so hold, I decline, with respect, to follow them. Rich’s Appeal and Fredericks Appeal and other similar decisions have been distinguished and limited in later Pennsylvania cases to such an extent that there is very little, if anything, left of the extreme doctrines there laid down. “Generally the cases in which voluntary settlements have been set aside have been where there have been fraud or imposition in their procurement; where the design had been to give the settlor full enjoyment of his property for life, with power of testamentary disposition, and at the same time to protect it from his creditors; where the instrument was in itself or in connection with other instruments testamentary in character; -where the intention to make the instrument revocable clearly appeared; where the purpose of the settlement had failed; or where the trust created was merely a naked one. The rule is that a voluntary settlement will be sustained and enforced in favor of the' beneficiaries, unless it is shown that it was procured by fraud or imposition, or executed under misapprehension of the facts or of the law.” — Potter v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 199 Pa. St. 360, 365 (1901), approved in Kraft v. Neuffer, 202 Pa. St. 558, 565 (1902). “Settlements like that before us, reserving a present interest in the creator of them, and carrying a future benefit or bounty to other designated parties, are very usual. If fairly made and carried into effect, uninfluenced by fraud or circumvention, they cannot be subsequently impeached, as is shown, among other determinations, by our own case of Ruth v. Reese, 13 Ser. & R. 434.” — Greenfield’s Estate, 14 Pa. St. 489, 501. See, generally, Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. St. 531; Merriman
The point is' made, but- evidently not much relied oar, that the proceeds of the land sold to the Oahu Railway & Land- Company of which the fund in court is a part, is payable to Sumner under the provision of the deed that the trustee is to “collect all moneys now or hereafter due, payable and coming to-the party of the first part within the Hawaiian Islands and to-apply the same as above directed in respect of the income of said property.” Construing the instrument as a whole, I am of the opinion that that clause was not intended to apply to a transaction such as that in question. The purpose of the deed' and the motive for its execution strengthen this view.
In my opinion the deed cannot be revoked by Sumner alone- and the court should not now terminate the trust. No sufficient reason is shown why it should be terminated and there is a strong reason why it should be continued. Its purpose has not failed. The weakness against which it was intended to afford protection is certainly not less now than it was at the inception of the trust and is perhaps greater. The prayer of the bill for the appointment of a new trustee should be granted and the-fund in court should be paid over to such trustee.