Plaintiff Steven V.B. Keller appeals from a belated judgment dismissing his Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act suit, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, § 905(b) (1993) (LHWCA), to recover damages for injuries sustained in a fall on board a maritime vessel owned by defendant-appellee United States of America. As appellant has not demonstrated — nor careful scrutiny disclosed — that the unprecedented decision-making delay in this case rendered the district court’s findings unreliable, we affirm the judgment.
I
BACKGROUND
In 1978, the United States Navy converted the U.S.S. ARTHUR M. HUDDELL, a World War II Liberty Ship, into a non-motorized barge for storing and transporting maritime cable purchased by the Navy from Simplex Wire and Cable Co. The retrofitted HUDDELL was towed to Simplex’s facility at Newington, New Hampshire, for cable loading in May 1979, where it remained moored for two years.
The cargo hold had been adapted to house several round tanks, recessed sixteen feet into the ’tween deck. Simplex hired temporary employees — known as cable loaders — to descend into these tanks from the ’tween deck for the purpose of winding the incoming *20 “wet” cable in concentric layers onto a spool. During the HUDDELL’s retrofitting, the Navy installed a nonremovable metal barrier around Tank 4 to prevent workers on the ’tween deck from falling into the tank. The barrier included two uninterrupted safety railings located at the top of an access ladder attached to the interior wall of the tank to permit access to and from the tank floor. In order to exit the tank, a cable loader would climb to the top rungs of the ladder, at which point three options were available for getting from the tank onto the ’tween deck floor: (1) holding onto a “grab bar,” which was attached to the ’tween deck floor and located six inches from the outside edge of the tank, then crawling forward and passing under the lower railing and between the vertical stanchions supporting the two railings; (2) stepping in a crouched position between the lower and upper railings of the barrier; or (3) climbing over the top railing located approximately five feet above the ’tween deck floor.
At the time Simplex hired Keller as a cable loader, he was a nonmatrieulating sophomore at the University of New Hampshire. On the night of November 4, 1979, Keller went to a bar, where he and his friends drank approximately 120-160 ounces (or two six-packs) of beer between 10:00 p.m. and 11:20 p.m. Keller reported for work at about 11:30 p.m., and was assigned to Tank 4 for the first time. He and several coworkers climbed down the ladder from the ’tween deck into Tank 4 without incident, where they loaded cable until 2:00 a.m.
When it came time for a work break, Keller climbed to the top of the ladder, and, according to coworker Rhonda Rossley, grabbed the lower safety railing with his left hand and placed his left foot on one of the two top rungs of the ladder. Then, as he began to raise his right leg, he fell backward, neither attempting to regain his purchase nor crying out, and plummeted to the tank floor sixteen feet below, landing on his head. When a Simplex foreman administered first aid, he detected the odor of alcohol. A blood-alcohol test taken at 3:00 a.m., some three and one-half hours after Keller had reported for work, revealed a .14 blood-alcohol level, well above the .10 prima facie blood-alcohol level for demonstrating that a motor vehicle operator is under the influence. See N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 262-A:63 (1963) (amended 1994, lowering limit to .08). Since the fall, Keller has remained amnesiac as to all events surrounding the accident.
Following a seven-day bench trial on Keller’s claims against the United States for negligently installing “unsafe” lighting and railings and an “unsafe” ladder in Tank 4, and for failing to warn Simplex workers of the potential danger,
see
33 U.S.C. § 905(b), the district court ultimately awarded judgment to the United States.
See Keller v. United States,
No. 81-549-SD,
TI
DISCUSSION
Three principal issues must be addressed. First, did the eight-year lapse between the bench trial and entry of final judgment deprive the trial court findings of the customary deference on appeal, or violate Keller’s constitutional rights to access to the courts and due process, see generally U.S. Const, amends. I, V? Second, did the district court make clearly erroneous factual findings, or fail to make required findings, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 52(a), regarding the alleged breach of the vessel owner’s “turnover” duties of care? Third, did the district court misdefine a vessel owner’s “continuing” duty to inspect or supervise cargo loading operations for developing hazards?
A. The Decision-making Delay
First, Keller claims that an unprecedented eight-year delay between trial and the entry of judgment, coupled with the trial judge’s failure to refresh his recollection through recourse to a complete trial transcript prior to making findings of fact, resulted in a violation of his constitutional right to
*21
“access to the courts” and to due process,
see
U.S. Const, amends. I, V;
Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts,
Keller concedes that neither
Chamberlin
nor
Femberg
concluded that prolonged decision-making delay,
per
se, requires vacatur. Nor has he cited authority for a
per se
rule fixing an outer limit on decision-making delay.
Cf. Ad Hoc Comm.,
There are sound reasons for abjuring a
per se
rule even in cases involving plainly excessive delay. In the first place,
ad hoc
appellate scrutiny is indispensable to the core determination whether delay rendered the decision unreliable. Secondly, it is highly doubtful that direct appellate review affords “an effective means of enforcing district court timeliness.”
See Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
Notwithstanding the eight-year interval between trial and judgment, for which we have been unable to glean adequate explanation, neither Keller nor the record on appeal suggests that the district court did not perform its decision-making responsibility with care. As Keller’s several requests to expedite the decision-making process acknowledge, the district court was in no sense indifferent to its responsibility to render a decision but encountered extraordinary docket pressures at the same time it was required to give precedence to its criminal caseload. See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1993).
Nor would we well serve the interests of justice, or the integrity of the decision-making process, were we to presume that the absence of a complete trial transcript rendered the district court incapable of determining matters relating to witness demeanor and credibility, or to recollect or reconstruct trial testimony, through other reliable means
(viz.,
trial notes, voluminous trial exhibits).
See Keller,
No. 81-549-SD, slip op. at 16 (“The court in the course of rendering its decision has reviewed all of the exhibits _”). After all, the responsibility incumbent on an appellant to substantiate a challenge to the sufficiency of trial court findings is not met merely with conclusory allegations
*22
that the trier of fact could not have recalled or reconstructed the evidence without a complete trial transcript. Moreover, this case does not require us to speculate as to the reliability of the trial judge’s findings, since a complete trial transcript is available for the purpose. Thus, as regards the claim that the trial judge’s findings themselves evince prejudice from the extended decision-making delay, we test Keller’s thesis as in any other case, by inquiring whether the findings were infected with “clear error” based on our own painstaking scrutiny of the entire trial record, including a complete trial transcript.
See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Holmes Transp., Inc.,
B. The Merits
The district court made seven findings central to the merits-related challenges advanced on appeal:
(1) Keller was a “longshore worker” to whom defendant owed a duty of “ordinary care,” under LHWCA section 905(b), 2 to provide a vessel in such condition that “an expert and experienced stevedore [would] be able to exercise reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety,” and a duty to warn the stevedore of any latent safety defects on the vessel not reasonably discoverable by an “expert and experienced” stevedore, Keller, No. 81-549-SD, slip op. at 9-10 (quoting Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. de los Santos,451 U.S. 156 , 166-67 [101 S.Ct. 1614 , 1621-22,68 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1981));
(2) Defendant’s expert witness, Jan Bijhouwer, relying on “applicable” maritime safety standards in formulating his opinion that the HUDDELL’s ladder design was “safe,” proved “more persuasive” than plaintiffs competing expert, id. at 13;
(3) No eyewitness observed the precipitating cause of the fall (e.g., whether Keller hit his head on a safety rail), id. at 11-12;
(4) Even if the design of the ladder deviated from “applicable” maritime safety standards in certain respects, there was insufficient evidence that these deviations caused Keller’s fall. No other accidents occurred on this ladder, despite the fact that no less than twelve persons climbed up or down the ladder under identical conditions immediately prior to and after Keller’s accident, id. at 13;
(5) Keller’s blood alcohol level of .14, see supra at p. 4, might have been a “significant [causal] factor” in the accident, Keller, No. 81-549-SD, slip op. at 15;
(6) If any design deviation constituted a potential “hazard,” such hazard was obvious (i.e., not latent), and could be “anticipate^]” by a stevedore “if reasonably competent in the performance of his work,” id. at 13-14; and
(7) Even if custom had required that defendant place a representative aboard the HUDDELL to monitor cargo loading, “a custom-generated duty to supervise and inspect does not transfer to the ship owner a duty to eradicate dangers reasonably known to and managed by the stevedore,” id. at 14.
1. The Vessel Owner’s “Turnover” Duties of Care
a. Applicable Law
The definition of a vessel owner’s duties of care under LHWCA § 905(b) is a matter of law for the district court in the first instance,
see Elberg v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
As it pertains to Keller and Simplex, in its current incarnation the LHWCA is a strict liability statute. A longshore or harbor worker such as Keller, who incurs a work-related injury, may recover disability and medical compensation from the stevedore-employer
{viz.,
Simplex) even though the stevedore was not at fault. Conversely, an award of compensation under the LHWCA, such as Keller recovered from Simplex, is the longshore worker’s
exclusive
remedy against the stevedore-employer.
See
33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(a);
Williams v. Jones,
Until 1972, an injured longshore worker could sue the
vessel owner
on two distinct legal theories: negligence and breach of the warranty of “seaworthiness.” “Unseaworthiness” could be established more easily than negligence, simply by showing that some condition or appurtenance on board the vessel at the time of the accident was unreasonably hazardous, even if the stevedore-employer was the sole cause of the hazard.
See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
In 1972, the LHWCA remedial scheme underwent dramatic adjustment. Congress greatly increased the amount of compensation recoverable from the stevedore-employer, repudiated the warranty of “seaworthiness” as a basis for third-party actions against the vessel owner, required the injured longshore worker to prove negligence on the part of the vessel owner, and precluded a negligent vessel owner from obtaining indemnification from the stevedore-employer.
See
33 U.S.C. § 905(b);
supra
note 2. These changes were designed “to
shift more of the responsibility
for compensating injured longshoremen to the party best able to prevent injuries: the
stevedore-employer.” Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co.,
— U.S.—,—,
(i) The Vessel Owner’s “Duty of Safe Condition ”
First, the vessel owner’s “duty of safe condition” is met if the condition of the vessel when entrusted to the stevedore poses
no reasonably foreseeable
risk to any worker, even assuming a complete failure on the part of the stevedore-employer to monitor the vessel workplace for safety. On the other hand, because longshoring is particularly dangerous, in many respects inherently so,
see Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi,
Unlike the vessel owner, however, the stevedore is subject to detailed legislative and administrative prescriptions for affording its workers a “safe” workplace.
See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. § 941 (1993); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1918.1-1918.106, § 1918.25 (1993) (implementing regulations for “ladders”);
see also Scindia,
(ii) The Vessel Owner’s “Duty to Warn ”
The second sub-category of turnover duty is the “duty to warn” prior to turnover, which requires the vessel owner to
alert
the stevedore-employer to any latent or concealed defect including “any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment” which “are
known
to the vessel [owner] or
should be known
to it in the exercise of reasonable care” and which “would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations^] are
not known
by the stevedore[,] and would
not
be
obvious
to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work.”
Scindia,
Although Keller concedes that the trial court correctly quoted verbatim from the Scindia exegesis relating to these two turnover duties Keller, No. 81-549-SD, slip op. at 10-11, he argues that the court focused its factual inquiry exclusively on whether the defendant vessel owner owed Keller a “continuing” duty of intervention. See Brief for Appellant at 27. We cannot agree. Though neither the district court, nor for that matter the Scindia Court, used the term “turnover duty,” the district court focused directly on the two issues material to the pertinent inquiry: (i) “[c]entral to the issue of legal fault in this litigation is whether the [original design of the] ladder at issue was causally defective,” in light of “applicable safety standards” and other evidence proffered by Keller, Keller, No. 81-549-SD, slip op. at 13, and (ii) whether “the notice given by the presence of any such hazard” rendered it obvious, id. at 14. Thus, the district court clearly identified and applied the proper duty of care. We turn then to examine its factual findings.
b. Factual Findings on “Turnover” Duties
Keller asserts two challenges to the district court finding that the United States did not breach its turnover duties. First, he argues that the pivotal finding — that the testimony of Jan Bijhouwer, defendant’s expert witness on marine design, was “more persuasive” than the testimony of plaintiffs expert — is so conclusory that no evidentiary basis for the finding can be gleaned from the record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52 (“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law there-on_”) (emphasis added).
The crux of our
ad hoc
Rule 52(a) inquiry is whether the trial court findings are precise and detailed enough to enable effective appellate review.
See Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp.,
Keller next argues that the trial court’s findings
(e.g.,
that the ladder design was “generally safe,” or its hazardous features, if any, should have been obvious to the stevedore’s employees) were based upon inherently unreliable or inadmissible evidence, or its refusal to admit or consider competent evidence entitled to greater weight. Whether the defendant breached a duty of care is a question of fact, which we review only for clear error.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a);
Martinez v. Korea Shipping Corp.,
Under LHWCA § 905(b), the
plaintiff
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, both proximate causation and a breach of the applicable duty of care.
See Bjaranson v. Botelho Shipping Corp.,
Keller challenges the cornerstone finding by the district court: that Bijhouwer’s expert opinion was founded on a “persuasive” appraisal of “applicable” industry standards. The gist of Bijhouwer’s testimony was that *26 he personally inspected the Tank 4 ladder after Eeller’s fall, measured its dimensions, and climbed out of Tank 4 several times by pulling himself under the lower railing with the aid of the metal grab bar mounted in the ’tween deck floor. In twenty-four years as a marine surveyor, approximately five to ten percent of the vessels Bijhouwer had encountered were equipped with ladder-railing configurations similar to Tank 4. Bijhou-wer found the Tank 4 ladder “easy” to climb, and “perfectly safe.” He consulted two fixed-ladder safety standards governing “shipboard installation as opposed to land-based installation”: the Maritime Administration standard (MARAD) (1965) and the American Society for Testing and Materials standard (ASTM) (1983). In Bijhouwer’s opinion, both standards confirmed that the Tank 4 ladder-railing design met or surpassed applicable maritime safety standards. 3
Finding no merit in Keller’s other challenges to the district court’s credibility determinations, 4 we focus on two related contentions. First, Keller quarrels with the district court ruling that ASTM was an “applicable” industry standard. He points out that the ASTM was promulgated several years after Keller’s fall, for the purpose of facilitating inter-vessel exchangeability of component parts, rather than promoting safety concerns. And, because Bijhouwer conceded at trial that MARAD required an unobstructed gap in the Tank 4 railing, Keller contests the district court ruling that MARAD was an “applicable” industry standard and disagrees that the Tank 4 ladder substantially conformed with the MARAD design.
These contentions cannot withstand scrutiny. Keller does not explain why a maritime safety standard like ASTM would be wholly “inapplicable” .simply because it had been promulgated after the accident. In this context, “applicability” connotes no statutory or regulatory compulsion to conform with a particular standard. See infra note 5. Rather, “applicability” connotes mere relevance: that ASTM had some tendency to make it more or less likely that the defendant and Simplex would have regarded the ASTM norm as a minimum safety standard for the industry. There is no evidence that general maritime safety standards changed so dramatically between 1979 and 1983 that ASTM was rendered wholly immaterial as an indicator of 1979 industry safety practices, see Fed. R.Evid. 401, nor that ASTM was based exclusively on post-1979 data. Further, in response to Keller’s contention that ASTM’s purpose was merely to facilitate the interchangeability of component parts, we note Bijhouwer’s testimony that though the maritime standards he relied upon (including• ASTM) might not be exclusively safety-oriented, there were “safety-related aspects to all of [these industry] standards.” Thus, it was not clear error to find that ASTM possessed some probative value in determining industry safety practices in 1979.
Even if ASTM were deemed wholly “inapplicable,” however, it was but one of two independent maritime safety standards on which Bijhouwer relied. Keller therefore *27 would have had to hobble both the ASTM and the MARAD standards in order to prevail. Viewed as an enumeration of minimum safety recommendations for the industry, MARAD is conspicuously silent on many matters Keller considered pertinent to the defendant vessel owner’s duty of care, including any unequivocal recommendation that a gap be left in safety railings which extend around the top of a fixed ladder. Bijhouwer testified that MARAD recommended such a gap (or removable railings) only as needed to facilitate cargo loading via the deck on which the railings are located. Here, of course, the cable was not loaded into Tank 4 across the HUDDELL’s ’tween deck where the safety railings were located, but from the main deck, down through an upper hatch and into Tank 4. He further testified that MARAD recommends such an “access opening” only in “deck” railings near ladders, citing two plausible reasons that this would not indicate that a complete gap should have been left in the Tank 4 railings: (1) the MARAD provision refers exclusively to railings on the periphery of the main or weather deck of the vessel, not to railings on lower decks, like the ’tween deck; and (2) the undefined term “access opening” might reasonably mean any aperture through which a person could exit safely, such as the 27-ineh space under the lower railing on Tank 4. Bijhouwer’s testimony likewise was bolstered by OSHA regulations, which presumably impose a heightened obligation on the stevedore to provide its employees with a “safe” workplace. See 33 U.S.C. § 941. Yet even the OSHA standards do not discourage the ladder configuration found on Tank 4. See 29 C.F.R. § 1918.25. Thus, Keller failed to weaken Bijhouwer’s interpretation and application of MARAD.
To the extent that the technical aspects of’MARAD invited expert interpretation, the district court was entitled to rely on Bijhouwer’s testimony, especially since Keller tendered no persuasive counter-interpretation:
Compliance with the customs and practice of an industry, while relevant and admissible[,] is not necessarily due care. It may, however, be evidence of due care and when relied on by the fact finder “his findings will not be lightly disregarded unless there is a particularly strong showing of the unreasonableness of the customary practice.”
1 Martin J. Norris,
The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries
§ 9:5, at 453 (4th ed. 1990) (quoting
Cia Maritima Del Nervion v. James J. Flanagan Shipping Corp.,
Keller concedes that van Dissell relied on three land-based safety standards, or at least on safety standards not intended for applications distinctively maritime in nature: Department of Defense Military Standard Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities, MIL-STD-1472 (1970); American National Standards Institute’s (ANSI) Standard Safety Code for Fixed Ladders (1956 & 1974); and OSHA Standards for Fixed Ladders, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.27 (1975). 5 In general, differentials between land-based and maritime design and safety codes are necessitated by the *28 unique spatial and weight constraints on working maritime vessels. The van Dissell benchmarks undoubtedly set more stringent safety specifications than the MARAD model, and thus were relatively “safer,” but Scin-dia inquires only whether Simplex could have anticipated that the vessel owner would consign a vessel with these heightened land-based safety specifications. By contrast, Bijhouwer testified that shipyards commonly consult standards, such as MARAD, in designing and constructing merchant vessels; rather than the more generalized military specifications like MIL-STD-1472; and, further, that he had encountered the Tank 4 ladder configuration in at least five to ten percent of the merchant vessels he had surveyed.
Second, Keller attacks, as internally inconsistent and inherently implausible, the Bijhouwer testimony that the 27-inch space
beneath
the lower safety railing on Tank 4 afforded an adequate “access opening” according to MARAD. Bijhouwer testified on deposition that a minimum vertical gap of twenty-five inches beneath the lower railing would be a “safe” “access opening” for exiting Tank 4. At trial, however, Bijhouwer conceded that the grab bar, which was 4¿é inches high, was set into the ’tween deck floor six inches from the ladder and the rim of Tank 4. Confronted with this configuration — indicating an actual clearance of
22%
inches — Bijhouwer nonetheless stated that the grab bar posed no hazardous interference. He explained that there would remain at least a 26-inch clearance
directly beneath
the lower railing where it passed over
the six-inch ledge of the tank,
and that this clearance was needed only to accommodate the height of the climber’s body as he placed his knee up onto the tank ledge.
6
In that position, the climber would attain
maximum
vertical posture (measured from stooped head/shoulders to knee), at which point his body would flatten out to less than twenty-five inches as he pulled himself
forward
and
through
the narrower opening between the top of the grab bar and the lower railing.
7
While Keller characterizes these movements as dangerously acrobatic, it is well recognized that longshore workers are called upon to cope with uncomfortable, cramped positions in the close confines of a vessel.
See, e.g., Bjaranson,
According to Bijhouwer, therefore, the Tank 4 ladder incorporated at least one
*29
“safe” method of egress compatible with MARAD (i.e., “under” the lower safety railing); hence, the vessel owner had not provided Simplex with an “unavoidably” hazardous ladder.
See Teply,
Keller further contends that the trial court erred in finding that any potential risks attending the use of the Tank 4 ladder were “obvious.” He relies on (i) Bijhouwer’s testimony that it would be “reckless” for Simplex employees to attempt to exit Tank 4 by passing between the two safety railings or “over” the top railing, and (ii) evidence that Simplex employees continued to use both these methods after turnover. Keller argues that this latent design “defect” generated the independent turnover duty that the vessel owner warn Simplex or its longshore workers of the hidden danger. This contention, too, is flawed.
First, Keller incorrectly assumes that by adopting Bijhouwer’s testimony that MAR-AD and ASTM were “applicable” safety standards, the trial court likewise necessarily credited Bijhouwer’s expert opinion
(not
based on MARAD) that it would have been reckless to utilize the two other methods of egress. On the contrary, however, the court did not adopt that portion of the Bijhouwer testimony but went on to note instead that Keller had proffered no evidence of
any
design defect
whatsoever
in the Tank 4 ladder; for example, that
any
accident had ever occurred on the ladder when persons other than Keller used these two alternate methods under substantially similar conditions (wet, cold, artificial lighting).
See, e.g., McKinnon v. Skil Corp.,
Second, even if the district court had agreed with Bijhouwer’s assessment of the risks attending the two alternate methods of egress, Bijhouwer never intimated that those methods posed hazards not readily foreseeable by Simplex.
Scindia,
Relying on the fact that he was never in Tank 4 prior to the night of the accident, Keller wrongly presumes that obviousness and latency are measured by what a relatively inexperienced longshore
worker
might observe. Instead, the
Scindia
standard turns primarily on what an “experienced” stevedore, like
Simplex,
reasonably would be expected to notice. By the same token, if the district court correctly found that even Simplex longshore
workers
reasonably could be expected to recognize any such defects, it surely follows that their more experienced
*30
stevedore-employer should have discovered the defects during the course of its extended two-year stewardship of the HUDDELL.
See Bjaranson,
Next, Keller contends that the district court improperly considered his blood-alcohol level at the time of the accident, since the doctrine of pure comparative fault would not permit contributory negligence to
defeat
Keller’s LHWCA claim, but only to abate damages.
See Johnson,
Similarly, in a section 905(b) action, the trial court may assess the quality of the vessel owner’s rebuttal evidence where the longshore worker failed to demonstrate a vessel “defect” 8 and where the vessel owner has proffered “substantial” evidence of the longshore worker’s intoxication. Here, the trial court’s consideration of the blood-alcohol level followed directly upon its observations concerning Keller’s failures of proof: (1) the absence of persuasive expert testimony that the Tank 4 ladder design was so inferior to anticipated safety standards that the defendant vessel owner could not entrust the equipment to the stevedore’s able charge; and (2) the absence of evidence of other accidents on the ladder under substantially similar conditions. In this context, we interpret these trial court observations as an acknowledgment not only that Keller utterly failed to carry his burden of proof but that the only credible evidence of possible causation (i.e., Keller’s heavy drinking earlier in the evening and his high blood-alcohol level one hour after the fall) in no respect implicated the defendant vessel owner. See supra note 8.
Keller further claims that but for two items of evidence which the district court improperly ignored or excluded, we would be compelled to conclude that the district court committed clear error. First, the district court excluded the deposition testimony of eyewitness Rhonda Rossley, who expressed the opinion that Keller had hit his head on a railing prior to the fall. Nonexpert-opinion testimony is permitted only if “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of
*31
the fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 701.
See Swajian v. General Motors Corp.,
We review a Rule 701 ruling only for manifest abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Paiva,
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this was a
bench trial,
in which the trial judge would not only determine the admissibility of the evidence but serve as the ultimate trier of fact. The Rule 701 admissibility determination turns on whether the inference drawn by the nonexpert lay witness would be
“helpful
to ... the determination of the fact in issue.” Thus, having considered the
entire proffer,
the trial judge excluded the Rossley opinion testimony because the court found no sufficiently reliable basis for the speculative inference on which it was based. Not only do we agree, but nothing would have
required
the trial judge, as trier of fact, to credit the Rossley opinion had it been admitted in evidence, especially since she possessed no particular skill or experience which would have assisted the trial court’s fact-finding insight.
Cf., e.g., Soden v. Freightliner Corp.,
Finally, Keller contests the exclusion of evidence that Simplex cut out the two railings on the Tank 4 ladder one day after the accident, as proof that the original ladder design constituted an “unreasonably” dangerous condition. Keller suggests that this evidence was admissible notwithstanding Rule 407, which requires the exclusion of subsequent remedial repairs by the defendant only, not by nondefendants like Simplex.
See Raymond v. Raymond Corp.,
At best, subsequent remedial measures are considered marginally probative of prior negligence. See John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 283, at 174-75 (1979). In this case, moreover, defendant could have capitalized on the very same evidence to demonstrate that Simplex was expected to make such structural alterations to the HUDDELL without first consulting defendant, and that defendant was entitled to rely on Simplex, as a reasonably competent stevedore, to take such preemptive measures provided Simplex deemed them necessary for its employees’ safety. See also infra note 11. Under the Scindia delineation of turnover duty, therefore, this evidence was at least a “wash” for Keller, and actually may have helped defendant more than Keller. For these reasons, we conclude that the exclusion of this evidence was at most harmless. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61 *32 (erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless if it “does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). 10
2. Post-Turnover Duties of Intervention
Leaving no ground unturned, Keller argues that the court erred in ruling that the defendant did not breach its
post-turnover
duties: to supervise and inspect the HUD-DELL during cable loading and to intervene and remedy any hazardous condition that
developed following turnover. See Scindia,
A vessel owner’s duty of care normally ceases once it has discharged its “turnover” duties and the stevedore-employer’s cargo operations have begun. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has suggested three settings in which an owner
might
remain under some “continuing” duty to monitor, supervise, or inspect the vessel for hazards
developing
after stevedoring operations commence. First, the vessel owner might remain under such a duty were it to retain actual physical control or custody of a portion of the vessel, or participate in stevedoring operations.
Scin-dia,
Keller’s “continuing duty” claim was founded on the contention that the defendant vessel owner had either actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition
during
cable loading operations. However, he does not suggest that the basic
structure
or
design
of the Tank 4 ladder
changed
after cable loading began
(e.g.,
ladder rungs displaced, loosened or fractured). Therefore, the defendant could have breach
*33
ed no
continuing
duty of care to Keller, since the district court supportably found that the Tank 4 ladder configuration created no “unreasonable” hazard
ab initio. See Scindia,
Keller intimates that the relevant “change” or “development” which would have been discovered had defendant met its alleged continuing duty to monitor and intervene was the failure of Simplex cable loaders to use the Tank 4 ladder in the intended manner. Thus, Keller would interpret the district court ruling — that “a custom-generated duty to supervise and inspect does not transfer to the ship owner a duty to eradicate dangers reasonably known to and managed by the stevedore” — as holding that a vessel owner can never be duty-bound to intervene once an on-board danger (the risk that longshore workers might resort to the “over” and “between” methods of egress) becomes “obvious” to the stevedore.
We cannot subscribe to Keller’s reasoning. First, as already noted, we discern no indication that the trial court credited evidence that the two alternate methods of exiting Tank 4 were not reasonably safe. Second, even if the district court had found these other methods of egress “unsafe,” initially the vessel owner could rely on Simplex to manage such “obvious” defects, unless and until it appeared that Simplex’s decision not to take remedial measures (warnings or railing removal) was “obviously improvident” under the circumstances. Keller conceded, however, that Simplex, which plainly had actual or constructive notice as to how its long-shore workers were exiting Tank 4, never received an employee complaint about the Tank 4 ladder and that no accident ever occurred on the ladder either before or after the Keller incident. Thus, evidence presented by Keller did not begin to establish defendant’s actual knowledge of the alleged “hazard” on the part of the defendant vessel owner, let alone any obvious improvidence on the part of Simplex. For the same reason, even if the defendant vessel owner had been under a contractual or custom-generated duty to monitor and intervene, Keller failed to establish a breach. 11
Ill
CONCLUSION
Given the exacting standards of care incumbent upon a stevedore under the LHWCA, and the supportable trial court findings, we are left with nothing approaching a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Holmes Transp., Inc.,
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
Notes
. Among other things, Keller alleged that (1) the ladder rungs were wet, slippery, worn, and irregularly spaced; (2) the metal railings protruded so as to make it likely that a climber would strike his head; and (3) no warning of these protrusions was posted on the ladder.
. Section 905(b) provides in pertinent part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this Act caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person ... may bring an action against such vessel as a third party ..., and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.... The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
. Minor measurement "deviations” between MARAD-ASTM and Tank 4 included, inter alia: the facial width of ladder rungs (slightly over 14 inches; standard 14 inches); rungs (1% inches by % inch; standard % inch by % inch); and toe clearance behind rungs (5 inches at sides, 14% inches in middle; standard minimum 5 inches).
. For example, Bijhouwer testified that a person who was exiting Tank 4 for the first time might be able to do so “blindfolded.” Keller characterizes this testimony as patently incredible, especially in view of other testimony that Tank 4 was "more difficult” to exit than the tanks on other vessels (e.g., the FURMAN) then moored at Simplex. On redirect, however, Bijhouwer clarified that the ladder and grab bar combination installed in Tank 4 was so well designed that, after one trip up, a climber could use it "blindfolded.” Bijhouwer's redirect testimony would enable a reasonable inference that Simplex, once it became acquainted with the Tank 4 configuration following turnover, was in no sense disabled from informing its employees about at least one safe method of exiting the tank. Moreover, the fact that other witnesses testified that the Tank 4 ladder was "more” difficult to climb did not compel a finding that it was defective, since (1) these lay witnesses testified to their personal experiences only, not to safety design; and (2) this inapposite comparison (i.e., “more difficult" as opposed to "too difficult”) would not show that the Tank 4 ladder was "unsafe,” only that other Navy ships moored at Simplex had "safer” ladders (i.e.; exceeded applicable maritime safety standards).
. Keller did not contend that these OSHA standards
directly
applied to defendant. Therefore, even a failure to comply with the OSHA standards would not entitle Keller to claim negligence
per se.
And in fact, the OSHA standards were not directly applicable to defendant, because (1) they do not pertain to maritime employment of longshore and harbor workers,
cf.
33 U.S.C. § 941; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1918.1-1918.106; and (2) they regulate only the obligations of
employers, see Martinez,
. Keller argues that the method of egress endorsed by Bijhouwer was unmanageable because the climber would have to place his knee on a narrow coaming that raised % inches at the edge of the tank, which Bijhouwer conceded would "cut" into the climber's knee. In fact, however, Bijhouwer testified that a climber could place his knee "momentarily” between the coaming and the grab bar, not on top of the coaming. When asked if the coaming would then "dig[ ] into your knee," Bijhouwer simply responded that “[y]ou can feel the coaming.”
. Keller likewise relies on Bijhouwer’s admission that at the time he first formulated his opinion that the ladder design was safe, he had not considered the actual conditions (e.g., wet, cold, artificial lighting) in Tank 4 on the night of the accident. Nevertheless, when asked at trial, Bijhouwer testified that those conditions did not alter his opinion as to the safety of the ladder design. He explained, for example, that even though Keller was wearing heavy clothing at the time, the clearance beneath the lower safety railing would be adequate for a climber emerging from the tank, because clothing might catch on the railing only as a climber was backing into the tank, not as he was pushing forward.
. Given the
Scindia
standard, evidence of Keller's high blood-alcohol level cannot be wholly divorced from the threshold question whether a defective design rendered the Tank 4 ladder "unreasonably” dangerous. A written policy forbade Simplex workers from reporting to work intoxicated. Thus, Keller’s blood-alcohol level would be relevant to whether the ladder constituted an "unreasonably” dangerous condition, since the vessel owner, in turning over the Tank 4 ladder, reasonably could rely on compliance with the stevedore’s policy on intoxication.
See Johnson,
. Although a medical doctor testified that Keller sustained an eye injury which could have been consistent with the Rossley inference, given that Keller also suffered head trauma when he landed head-first on the tank floor sixteen feet below the 'tween deck the doctor could not testify that such an inference was compelled.
. Keller catalogues various documentary exhibits which he contends were improperly excluded. We find no error. For example, Exhibits 10, 21, and 65 were proffered to establish the contents of the contract between Simplex and defendant. This issue was mooted by the finding that the Tank 4 ladder did not constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition.
See infra
Section II.B.2 & note 11. Exhibits 34 and 34A were largely cumulative of evidence already admitted and any noncumulative portions were provided in the van Dissell testimony.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 61 (harmless error); Fed.R.Evid. 403 (governing admission of "cumulative” evidence). Finally, Exhibit 73 — a mock-up of a portion of the Tank 4 ladder, used for demonstrative purposes at trial — was excludable due to failure to lay a proper foundation for es admission.
See Rogers v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
. Keller argues that the contract between defendant and Simplex unambiguously provided that defendant, not Simplex, would bear primary responsibility for ongoing "safety” inspections and modifications to the HUDDELL's work areas following turnover. Keller points to a contract provision barring Simplex from making unilateral structural alterations to the HUDDELL. From this premise, he contends that Simplex was compelled to use the Tank 4 ladder in existence at turnover. We do not agree. First, contrary to the trial court's alternate finding, this argument presumes that the ladder was "unsafe.” Second, the contract contemplated that Simplex would bear the primary role in determining whether modifications were needed, even if defendant was to be consulted before “major” modifications were undertaken. In any event, this contention falls far short of demonstrating a contractual duty on the part of the vessel owner to monitor in the first instance.
