Plaintiff appeals from the Superior Court order (Cumberland County) affirming the Commission’s determination that plaintiff is ineligible for two weeks of unemploymеnt compensation benefits. Plaintiff argues that because he relied on inaccurate information given by a Commission employee, the Commission should be estopped from declaring him ineligible solely because he acted on that misinformation. Plaintiff also urges us to hold that thе Superior Court erred by denying his motion to present additional evidence to that court. We hold that the record contains insufficient evidence to support plaintiff’s estop-pel theory and, further, that the Superior Court did not err by denying plaintiff’s motion. We affirm.
In August of 1979 plaintiff was receiving unemployment compensation benefits. He was required to report each Thursday to file his claim for benefits for the previous week. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(1) & (2) (Supp.1983-1984) (eligibility dependent on filing claim in accordance with Commission regulations); Commission Rules, ch. 3.1(F)-(L) (effective August 3, 1981).
Due to the death of his fаther in Arizona, plaintiff left Maine on Friday, August 24, 1979. He returned to Maine on Friday, September 14, 1979, and on that same date he attempted to apрly retroactively for 3 weeks of benefits. Because plaintiff had failed to report on 3 consecutive Thursdays (August 30, September 6 and Seрtember 13), a Commission deputy denied him benefits for the weeks ending August 25, September 1 and September 8.
Plaintiff appealed the deputy’s decision to the Appeal Tribunal pursuant to 26 M.R. S.A. § 1194(2). After hearing, the Tribunal affirmed the deputy’s decision. Pursuant to section 1194(3), plaintiff then appealed tо the full Commission, which affirmed the Appeal Tribunal without hearing.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition in Superior Court for review of the Commission’s decision. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 1194(8) аnd 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002 (1979). After hearing, the Superior Court denied plaintiff’s appeal as to the weeks ending August 25 and September 1, but sustained his appeal as to thе week ending September 8. The court relied on Commission Rule 3.1(L)(2) which permits retroactive filing by an otherwise qualified claimant “[i]f the claimant hаs good cause for his failure to make his claim on his assigned report day and files such claim within 7 days of such assigned report day.” Plaintiff’s retroactive filing
I.
At the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal, plaintiff argued that he became ineligiblе for benefits because he relied on inaccurate information given by a Commission employee. Plaintiff testified that while he was in Arizona, he asked a friend back in Maine to call “the employment office” for him and explain that he was unable to report as usual. An unidentified Commission employee, he testified, told his friend that failure to report would be no problem under the circumstances. Plaintiff asserts that the Commissiоn should be estopped from declaring him ineligible because he relied on the information given to his friend.
Evidentiary matters which arise in hearings bеfore the Appeal Tribunal are governed by the Maine Administrative Procedures Act. 26 M.R.S.A. § 1194(8) (Supp. 1983-1984). The Act provides in relevant part that:
1. Rules of privilege. Unless otherwise provided by statute, agencies need not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts, but shall observe the rules of privilеge recognized by law.
2. Evidence. Evidence shall be admitted if it is the kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons are accustomed tо rely in the conduct of serious affairs. Agencies may exclude irrelevant or unduly repetitious evidence.
5 M.R.S.A. § 9057(1) & (2) (1979). Plaintiffs testimony regarding the phone conversation is not inadmissible on hearsay grounds because the Maine Rules of Evidence do not apply in administrative hearings; the issue is whether the double hearsay “is the kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct оf serious affairs.”
The Commission employee with whom plaintiff’s friend spoke was never identified and thus this person could not be called to testify аbout what she said during the phone conversation. Plaintiff’s friend did not testify either. Moreover the record contains no suggestion as to the exact content of the inquiry made to the Commission employee. Plaintiff was not a witness to the critical conversation and thus his testimony, in the absеnce of any corroborating evidence, does not satisfy the requirements of 5 M.R.S.A. § 9057(2). Cf. Heal v. Maine Employment Security Commission,
Plaintiff concedes that he did not report on August 30th and September 6th. He was thus ineligible for benefits for the two weeks at issue. 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(1) & (2). See also McKenzie v. Maine Employment Security Commission,
II.
Plaintiff filed a motion in Superior Court seeking permission to present evidence to that court regarding his friend’s cоnversation. On appeal he argues that the denial of his motion constitutes error.
The entry shall be:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
Notes
. Section 11006(1)(B) provides in relevant part that:
The reviewing court may order the taking of additional evidence before the agency ... if application is made to the reviewing сourt for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown that the additional evidence is material to the issues presented in the review, and could not have been presented or was erroneously disallowed in proceedings before the agency.
Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff's motion could be treated as a motion to present further evidence before the Appeal Tribunal, that motion was properly denied. Plaintiff made no showing that he could not have presented his evidence to the Tribunal at the original hearing, nor does the record support a finding that he was prevented from presenting such evidence. Cf. Smith v. Maine Employment Security Commission,