Keleher v. Putnam, 60 N.H. 30

Keleher v. Putnam

60 N.H. 30 | N.H. | 1880

A county commissioner has no authority over insane persons by virtue of his office. The right of personal liberty is subject to some exceptions necessary to the common welfare of society. At common law a private citizen, without warrant, may lawfully seize and detain another in certain cases. It is justifiable to hold a man to restrain him from mischief. It is lawful to interfere in an affray which endangers the lives of the combatants. Other instances are enumerated in Colby v. Jackson,12 N.H. 526. Under the right of self-defence it is lawful to seize and restrain any person incapable of controlling his own actions, whose being at large endangers the safety of others. But this is justifiable only when the urgency of the case demands immediate intervention. The right to exercise this summary remedy has its foundation in a reasonable necessity, and ceases with the necessity. A dangerous maniac may be restrained temporarily until he can be safely released, or can be arrested upon legal process, or committed to the asylum under legal authority. But not every insane person is dangerous. Nothing can be more harmless than some of the milder forms of inanity. Nor is it any justification that the defendants were actuated by a desire to promote the plaintiff's welfare. The right of personal liberty is deemed too sacred to be *32 left to the determination of an irresponsible individual, however conscientious. The law gives these unfortunate persons the safeguards of legal proceedings and the care of responsible guardians. Davis v. Merrill,47 N.H. 208; 22 Monthly Law Rep. 385; 6 South. Law Rev. (N.S.) 568; 3 Am. Law Rev. 193; Ray Insan., ss. 614-619. The legislature has established appropriate forms of proceeding for ascertaining their mental condition, imposing upon them, under the supervision of public functionaries, the restraint necessary to protect them from the imposition of others, and subjecting them to such treatment as may restore their reason. If the plaintiff requested to be taken to Lawrence, she revoked the license by resisting the removal. The instructions given to the jury were erroneous. The question was, whether the plaintiff's removal was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of the case. Cooley Torts 176-179; Addison Torts, c. 12, s. 2.

Verdict set aside.

STANLEY, J., did not sit: the others concurred.