696 N.E.2d 637 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1997
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Common Pleas Court dismissing her intentional tort action against her employer. We reverse.
Most of the specific facts in this case are not relevant to this appeal. We therefore provide only a brief synopsis of the underlying factual scenario. Appellant, Patricia Keith, was employed as a silk screen printer by Spectrum Sportswear, Inc., one of the appellees in this case. On approximately March 21, 1994, Keith sustained an injury while operating a screen printing machine during the course of her employment. On March 20, 1996, Keith filed a complaint as a result of this incident. She alleged in her complaint that the machine she was operating at the time she was injured was damaged and defective, and that appellees were aware of its condition and deliberately failed to repair it. She also alleged that appellees were aware, to a substantial certainty, that operation of the machine in such a condition could result in injury to the operator.
Appellees moved to dismiss the case for the reason that Keith failed to file her complaint within the one-year statute of limitations provided in R.C.
It is the legislative and case history governing intentional torts by employers that is of key importance on this appeal. For this reason, we begin with a review of that history, indicating the relevant legislation and court decisions that provide the basis for our conclusion in this case.
In 1913, Section
R.C.
In 1993, the Ohio legislature again enacted statutes specifically dealing with intentional torts committed by employers. R.C.
Less than one month after Keith's injury, however, on April 8, 1994, the Ohio Supreme Court declared R.C.
In the lower court, the judge agreed that "if R.C.
It is our conclusion that the trial judge would have been correct in this determination were it not for the fact that the original versions of the statutes were declared unconstitutional prior to their repeal and reenactment. Once found unconstitutional, a statute can no longer apply to cases pending under it. Appellees argue, and we acknowledge, that Keith did not clearly make this argument at the trial level. However, the savings provision of R.C.
Applying the above history to the case before us, it is true that at the time Keith was injured, the relevant statutory remedy provided a one-year statute of limitations. However, because this statute was effectively found unconstitutional during the pendency of this case, and considering the precedent set by Hunter, Malatesta, and Anderson, the original R.C.
Appellees argue that because Keith filed her complaint alleging a violation of the original R.C.
The lower court dismissed Keith's claim as barred by the one-year statute of limitations existing at the time her cause of action arose. Because that statute has been effectively rendered unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court, the precedent of Hunter, Malatesta, and Anderson leads us to conclude that Keith's claim should instead be counted among those filed under the broader R.C.
Judgment reversed.
DICKINSON, P.J., and REECE, J., concur. *34