150 N.Y.S. 37 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1914
The defendant operated an electric lighting plant at Wad-hams. The current was carried to Westport by means of wires. At Westport the plaintiff rented a house and lot of Mr. Sullivan, back of which was an open field owned by Sullivan, over which the defendant had a right of way one rod wide for his wires and access thereto.
On June 13, 1912, the defendant’s servants were at work upon the line moving the transformer house, and at six o’clock, when they were ready to quit work for the day, the wire was suspended from an arm on the transformer house to a pole in
He was about thirty years of age, six feet two and a half inches high and was baggageman at the railroad station in the immediate vicinity. After the accident he found a small spot on the wire not insulated, near where his hand was. He swore on direct examination that he noticed a wire coiled up on the transformer house and said it was before the accident. On redirect examination the court asked the question: “You said something about having seen a coil of wire some place that night, where did you see that ? A. On the transformer
It was not unreasonable that persons might pass across the unfenced lands of Mr. Sullivan and go under the wires belonging to the defendant, and when he left his wires conveying a deadly current within four or five feet of the ground upon those unfenced premises, without any warning, it was an act of gross negligence.
Even assuming that plaintiff was a mere licensee, the danger was so great that the jury might have said that the negligence was sufficient to charge the defendant therewith.
Nor do I think the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. He was asked by his wife to examine to see whether the wires were insulated for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was danger to the children in playing thereabout. Confessedly the wires were insulated except that at one small point the insulation was worn off. It is a fact that that insulation was wholly insufficient to protect any one coming in contact with wires carrying so strong a current, but it does not appear that the plaintiff had knowledge that the insulation was insufficient; he swears that he did not purposely touch the wires but attempted to go under them and does not remember how he came to come in contact with them. With the apparent insulation, even if he had taken hold of the wire to lift it that he might go under, it would still be a question of fact whether he had not the right to assume that his act was safe, but without evidence that he purposely took hold of the wire it seems clear that it is for the jury to say whether under all the circumstances of the case the plaintiff acted with the care of an ordinarily prudent person.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the judgment of nonsuit was wrong and that the case should have been submitted to the jury.
All concurred, except Kellogg and Howard, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.