Keith v. LittleKeith v. Little
Mike Keith brought this action against his employer, Henry Little, to recover wages, statutory penalties and attorney‘s fees. After a triаl on the merits the district judge rendered judgment in Keith‘s favor for wages in the amount of $871.77 and attorney‘s fees of $250. Plaintiff appeals seeking an award of statutory penaltiеs and an increase in attorney‘s fees. We affirm.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether
This action arises out of the facts set out below.
Bеginning in February, 1980, appellant was employed by Little as an equipment operator at a rate of pay of $3.25 per hour. Initially, appellant was paid weekly on Friday afternoons either at defendant‘s home or at the jobsite.
In March, 1980, Little subcontracted to perform work on a government housing project. Because financing on the project was so tight, Little agreed to wait for payment from the general contractor, Glen Rowell, until the job was completed and aсcepted and Rowell was paid by the government.
This arrangement with Rowell required defendant to make a new agreement with his employees. It was agreed by Keith thаt he would not be paid during the term of the government project but that he would be paid his accrued wages when the project was accepted and defendant was paid by Rowell.
Little and his employees worked on the housing project throughout the summer of 1980. As agreed, Keith was not paid regularly but he did receive some advances and he was allowed to charge items to Little‘s accounts.
This arrangement was satisfactory until Keith came to believe that defendant had been paid for the housing project and had not paid him. Appellant then quit his job and made several demands for payment of the balance of his accrued wages less advances and charges. Little refused plaintiff‘s demands because he had not yet been paid for the project.
On September 15, 1980, Keith, through his attorney, made another demand for payment. Defendant did not respond to the letter but when he received payment for the housing project on September 18, 1980, he began trying to contact plaintiff directly. Though Little was unsuccessful in his attempt to contact Keith directly, he never attempted to contact Keith through his counsel. Defendant never paid Keith the wages due to him.
Keith brought this action on October 10, 1980, and Little answered on October 21, 1980. Later, defendant‘s counsel withdrew and defendant did not appear for trial on October 7, 1981. At that time the district judge rendered judgment in plaintiff‘s favor for wages of $871.77, penalties in the amount of $14,400 and attorney‘s fees in the amount of $1,000.
Defendаnt then again secured counsel and filed a motion for new trial. The motion was granted and the matter was retried on June 22, 1982. The district judge then rendered judgment in plaintiff‘s favor for wages of $871.77 and attorney‘s fees of $250. This appeal followed.
As
Concerning the application of § 631 et seq. this court has said:
“It is well-settled that these statutory provisions are сoercive or penal in nature, must be strictly construed, should not be extended beyond the plain wording of the statute, and must yield in interpretation and applicatiоn to equitable defenses.” Scallan v. Mark Petroleum Corporation, 303 So.2d 498 (La.App.2d Cir.1974), writ refused, 307 So.2d 370 (La.1975).
See Hays v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Com‘n, 165 So.2d 556 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ denied, 246 La. 855, 167 So.2d 672 (1964) (first circuit to same effect). The court still adhers to this rule. Haywood v. Salter, 421 So.2d 1190 (La.App.2d Cir.1982).
Mason v. Norton, 360 So.2d 178 (La. 1978), makes it clear that the decisive question as to the applicability of
In Mason the court considered the case of a painter employed at an hourly wage and paid weekly. The court of appeal found that the painter was not covered by the statute because his pay was not fixed at a specific amount per day, week or month. The supreme court disagreed finding that the statute referred to the pay period. The court stated, “Under the employment аgreement here, the plaintiff had a weekly pay period. Hence, he is covered by statute.”4 360 So.2d at 180.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Notes
LSA-R.S.23:631 provides—
A. Upon the discharge or resignation of any laborer or other employee of any kind whаtever, it shall be the duty of the person employing such laborer or other employee to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the еmployment is by the hour, day, week, or month, not later than three days following the date of discharge or resignation. Said payment shall be made at the place and in the manner which has been customary during the employment, except that payment may be made via United States mail to the laborer or other employeе, provided postage has been prepaid and the envelope properly addressed with the employee‘s or laborer‘s current address as shown in thе employer‘s records. In the event payment is made by mail the employer shall be deemed to have made such payment when it is mailed. The timeliness of the mailing may be shown by an official United States postmark or other official documentation from the United States Postal Service.
B. In the event of a dispute as to the amount due under this Section, the employer shall pay the undisputed portion of the amount due as provided for in Subsection A of this Section.
C. With respect to interstate common carriers by rail, a legal holiday shall not be considered in computing the three day period provided for in Subsection A of this Section.
LSA-R.S.23:632 provides—
Any employer who fаils or refuses to comply with the provisions of R.S.23:631 shall be liable to the employee either for ninety days wages at the employee‘s daily rate of pay, or еlse for full wages from the time the employee‘s demand for payment is made until the employer shall pay or tender the amount of unpaid wages due to such employee, whichever is the lesser amount of penalty wages. Reasonable attorney fees shall be allowed the laborer or employee by the cоurt which shall be taxed as costs to be paid by the employer, in the event a well-founded suit for any unpaid wages whatsoever be filed by the laborer or employеe after the three days shall have elapsed from time of making the first demand following discharge or resignation.