KEITH HERRON v. CATHERINE L. SPECHT
NO. 2020-CA-0361-MR
Court of Appeals of Kentucky
JUNE 4, 2021
RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2021; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND KRAMER, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: Keith Herron appeals the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court denying his claim for an equitable interest in real property owned by his former girlfriend, Catherine Specht. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS
Keith Herron (Herron) and Catherine Specht (Specht) were in a relationship for some years and moved in together in 2009. In 2013, Specht
In the summer of 2018, Herron and Specht ended their romantic relationship but remained roommates, still residing in the home. The parties executed a handwritten contract wherein they agreed that Herron would continue living at the home and would repair certain conditions in the home in anticipation of Specht listing the home for sale. Once sold, Specht agreed all net proceeds of the sale would be split equally between the two parties.
The plan to continue to live together following the end of their relationship was unsuccessful and, a short time later, Specht served Herron with notice to quit the residence. In January of 2019, Specht obtained an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) against Herron following an altercation which became physical. As part of the EPO, Herron was ordered to remain away from the residence.
Soon after the issuance of the EPO and his expulsion from the home, Herron filed suit seeking enforcement of the contract the two had executed. After
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a trial court‘s findings of fact is “clearly erroneous” when acting as a trier of fact and the court‘s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
Because this is an appeal from a bench trial without a jury, the trial court‘s findings of fact are “not [to] be set aside unless clearly erroneous with due regard being given to the opportunity of the trial judge to consider the credibility of the witnesses.” Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1995) (citing CR1 52.01). Factual findings are not considered clearly erroneous if they are “supported by substantial evidence.” Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2005) (citations omitted). Appellate review of legal determinations and conclusions from a bench trial is de novo. Id. (citations omitted).
Goshorn v. Wilson, 372 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Ky. App. 2012).
Our review of a circuit court‘s findings of fact following a bench trial is to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous.
CR 52.01 . This rule applies with equal force to matters involving boundary disputes. Croley v. Alsip, 602 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1980).
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if unsupported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). Substantial evidence is defined as “that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994) (citations omitted).
Bishop v. Brock, 610 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Ky. App. 2020).
ANALYSIS
The trial court found that the parties had entered into a valid, enforceable contract. Commonwealth v. Morseman, 379 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Ky. 2012) (“The requirements generally associated with contracts are ‘offer and acceptance, full and complete terms, and consideration.‘“). Under the terms of the contract executed after they had ended their relationship and dated September 8, 2018, both parties were obligated to perform certain duties. The court found that under the terms of the agreement Herron was to pay the electric and water bills and tender to Specht an amount equal to the monthly mortgage payment, as well as perform repairs to a front wall and the bathroom, clean out the garage, hook up radiant heating, and replace the cover on the electric meter box. Once those repairs were completed, Specht agreed to list the home for sale and agreed to split the proceeds after paying off the mortgage with Herron, as long as the parties agreed on the sale price.
When a party to a contract abandons the agreement, the other party is released from any duty to perform.
In Dalton [v. Mullins, 293 S.W.2d 470, 476 (Ky. 1956)], the court noted that when one party refused to perform under a written contract, the other party “had the right to treat this action as a breach, to abandon the contract, and to depart from further performance on his own part and finally demand damages.” That is exactly the procedure TMG employed. Each party to a contract is entitled to the benefit of his bargain. Mostert‘s breach excused TMG‘s obligation to further perform under the Contribution Agreement, and therefore, Mostert was not entitled to summary judgment granting him judgment for the last scheduled installment payment on the Note.
Mostert v. Mostert Grp., LLC, 606 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Ky. 2020).
Herron was in breach of the contract when he stopped paying the bills he was contractually obligated to pay and failed wholly to conduct any repairs, which he contracted to undertake. Therefore, Specht was free to abandon the
If he had failed to substantially comply with the provisions of his agreement, when the company was not in default, the breach was the plaintiff‘s, and the defendant was justified in treating it as a discharge. Page on Contracts, § 1434; Johnson v. Tackitt, 173 Ky. 406, 191 S.W. 117 [(1917)].
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Robertson, 235 Ky. 425, 31 S.W.2d 701, 703 (1930).
Had Herron completed any of the work, he may well have been entitled to compensation for the accretion in value of the property attributable to his efforts. However, the evidence provided to the trial court indicates Herron completed none of the items he agreed to perform per the contract. “Although the court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff, it recognized that under a different set of facts sufficient to show the contract had been abandoned, recovery in quantum meruit for all of the work performed would be appropriate.” L.K. Comstock & Co., Inc. v. Becon Const. Co., 932 F. Supp. 906, 932 (E.D. Ky. 1993).
Herron is under the misapprehension that he “owned” the home because he paid bills while cohabitating in the residence for years before the execution of the contract. However, Specht was the sole legal owner. Only her name appears on the deed and only her name appears on the mortgage. Doubtless there are reasons that Herron‘s name appears nowhere on any legal documents
In Sebastian-Voor Properties, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 265 S.W.3d 190 (Ky. 2008), our Supreme Court set forth the following elements of equitable estoppel:
(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And, broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
Id. at 194-95 (quoting Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 25 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Ky. 2000) (quoting Electric and Water Plant Bd. of City of Frankfort v. Suburban Acres Dev., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1974))).
Cinque v. Lexington Vill., LLC, 609 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Ky. App. 2020).
CONCLUSION
We agree with the Campbell Circuit Court that Herron abandoned the contract when he wholly failed to perform as required in the bargained-for contract terms. Herron has also failed to forward a cognizable claim for any equitable interest in the property. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Campbell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
Mark Harris Woloshin
Newport, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert E. Bathalter
Alexandria, Kentucky
