*2 BROWN, CLARK, Before CHARLES GEE, RUBIN, GARZA, REAVLEY, POL- ITZ, RANDALL, TATE, SAM D. JOHN- SON, GARWOOD, WILLIAMS and Circuit Judges.
TATE, Circuit Judge:
The sole issue
this court whether
before
employee injured
performing
ma-
while
petroleum exploration
rine
and extraction
drilling
work aboard a
vessel located off-
shore but on state territorial waters is en-
gaged
within
would have
covered before the
who
been
Long-
2(3) of the
meaning of section
amendment;
is,
who are
workers
Compen-
Harbor Workers’
shoremen’s
previously
waters as
“Act”), 33 U.S.C.
(“LHWCA”
Act
sation
defined.”
in 1972.
902(3), as amended
fully,
reasons to be set forth more
we
For
an am-
suit
in a
question arises
*3
Congressional
no
intent
to withdraw
find
a vessel defend-
against
workman
phibious
coverage
injured
of the Act
from those
injuries
resulting from
damages
ant
for
navigable
waters while
in what
ves-
The
negligence.
by the vessel’s
caused
employment”
was considered as “maritime
of its
the dismissal
appeals
sel defendant
purposes prior
for LHWCA
to the 1972
the workman’s
against
demand
third-party
We, therefore,
like
pan-
amendments.1
as the
insofar
indemnification
employer for
el, affirm the district court’s determination
employer’s
by
caused
injuries were
in
favor of the Act’s
of this mari-
whether
precise issue
The
fault.
injury.
time
the indemnifica-
from
employer is immune
by the
employer covered
an
Facts and Procedural Context
tion demand
employer
LHWCA;
is contended
it
following
The issue before us arises in the
immunity because its
this
be denied
should
context,
procedural
factual and
which is
maritime
injured by
although
employee,
fully
panel opinion:
in the
more
detailed
waters, was
in
a vessel
tort on
injured over
plaintiff
Boudreaux was
not in “maritime
nevertheless
navigable waters in the course of his em-
by
covered
the Act.
and thus not
employer (“Aquatek”)
His
was
ployment.2
decision,
court,
split
in a
panel
A
of this
specialty mineral-
performing
a contractor
involved was indeed
held that
the work
drilling barge.
work on a
Bou-
production
the mean-
employment” within
operator
sued the owner
dreaux
v. Ameri-
ing of the LHWCA. Boudreaux
(“AWI”)
negli-
drilling barge
of the
for its
Workover, Inc.,
(5th Cir.
way,
adjoining
customarily
or other
area
employer
loading, unloading,
used
an
repairing,
building
vessel).
or
Thus,
1969).
coverage. Congress
we will
intended to apply
F.2d 572
simple, uniform
conclude,
coverage.”
an
on the
of
employee
standard
Ford, supra,
83-84,
employment
100 S.Ct. at
waters in
course
his
Caputo
stressed
this “remedial
1972 revision’s “maritime em-
satisfies the
legislation
liberally
‘must be
construed in
test,
employment on the
ployment”
because
with
purpose,
conformance
its
and in a way
employment” within the
water is “maritime
incongruous
avoids harsh and
re-
meaning of the LHWCA both before and
”
post-1972
sults.’
decision,
Id.
third
It
satis-
after its 1972 revision.
therefore
supra (to
Ship,
Sun
fully
discussed more
waters)
(when injury
on the
fies
occurs
below),
in VI
involved an attempt, similar
1972 “status” test as well as the “situs”
present,
to the
expanded
to construe the
test.
coverage provisions
the 1972
revision as
here, by
limitation,
way
We must note
having
likewise somehow
the effect of over-
pre-1972
that no
LHWCA case that we
ruling interpretations
1927 Act that
could
involved the
of a
discover
were beneficial to
employees.
person
merely
took him
whose
rejecting
to
effort
deduce such an
fortuitously
to a maritime
transiently
intent
from the
(that
amendments
were
injured,
he
locus where
where other-
designed
expand coverage),
to
the Court
except
wise
for this isolated incident his
significant,
found to be
and indeed determi-
employer’s business was both land-based
native,
the absence in the
history
and unconnected with maritime-related em-
slightest
intimation of any intent
ployment.8
express
We
no
opinion
prior jurisprudential
affect
interpretations
issue
person,
of such a
(cid:127)with respect
pre-existing
coverage af-
posed by the facts before us.
forded
the Act
employees injured
legislative purposes
turning
Before
waterfront
and seaward accidents.
of the 1972 revision of the
we must
719-22,
U.S. at
These interrelated. side which Caputo, Supreme edge Court observed where- water’s State acci- amendments, before “so long worse, as the 1972 as dent occurs. make To matters most on naviga- the work-related occurred Compensation State Workmen’s pro- laws ”* * waters and the worker was not vide inadequate. ble benefits which are class,12 narrowly S.Rep. a member of a defined 12.13 In explaining broaden- amendment, noted, 2(3), Before the 1972 the definition As the amended section as re- 2(4) simply provided: ported by section the Senate and House committees unchanged, “employer” employer “employ and enacted The term means an now defined any employees employed affirmatively, text, ee” of whose are see note full 6 for as employment, part, “any person engaged or in employment, maritime upon whole in maritime waters of the United including any longshoreman er,” . .. harborwork- (including any dry dock). States By (Emphasis supplied.) etc. amendment, 2(4) the 1972 section' provide explains as amended to definition: 12. The Court in footnote “this nar- “employer” employer rowly referring The term an means defined class” as employees employed whose LHWCA’s exclusion of the or master member employment, part, crew, in whole or in person engaged of a of a the master to upon waters of the United repair load or unload or a small vessel under (including any wharf, adjoining pier, States dry net, eighteen tons dock, terminal, building way, marine rail- States; noting United that these exclusions are way, adjoining customarily or other area (see retained the 1972-revised Act second employer loading, unloading, used paragraph above). of note repairing, building vessel). (Emphasis supplied.) regard, 13. In this the Committee further ob- 2(3), Prior to the amendment section served: 902(3), “employee” negatively defined U.S.C. apparent It is if the Federal benefit follows: structure embodied in Committee bill is en- “employee” The term does not include a acted, disparity there would be a substantial any vessel, *8 master of or member a crew of payable permanently in benefits longshoreman, depending to a disabled any person engaged by nor the master to which on side of repair any load or or unload small vessel edge occurred, the water’s the accident if eighteen tons net. permitted apply State laws are to continue to coverage The Act’s then resulted from an injuries occurring to on It is land. also to be “injury” employment, in the course of section cargo- noted that with the modem advent of 2(2), 902(2), “employer,” with an § U.S.C. techniques, handling such as containerization 2(4), 902(4), then defined in section 33 U.S.C. vessels, LASH-type and the of more use of employer, any meaning whose em- as ployees “an of longshoreman’s performed work on is employed employment, are in maritime land upon navigable than heretofore. part whole in or in waters S.Rep. (including any dry dock).” at 13. of United States coverage to withdraw was not intended areas extend to shoreside coverage to ing of in considered to be previously from those report navigable to adjacent purposes of employment” for that believes “The Committee stated: coverage. or LHWCA longshoreman to a payable compensation de- builder should repairman or ship a originated as Senate revision The 1972 of circumstance the fortuitous on pend draft of The committee Bill 2318. Senate on land or over injury occurred whether “employee,” sec- of an amended definition the Committee ... The intent of water. was enacted both 2(3) of the tion system to compensation a uniform permit change. explaining In Houses without otherwise be who would employees apply definition, the committee change in Senate activi- part of their this Act for new defi- report specifically noted sets report House 13. The S.Rep. at ty.” employees not exclude other nition “does similar substantially views in identical forth traditionally covered” supplied).14 (emphasis at 4707-08. language. H.R. report, committee S.Rep. at 16. The House explicit, states the new defini- although less addition, by the reason for engaged in any employee tion “includes 2(3), of the “mari- section amendment employment, any longshoreman or maritime “status”) require- (or time longshoring opera- person engaged in other Both explicit. as coverage is not ment (including tions, any any harborworker lan- in identical reports do state legislative shipbreak- ship repairman, shipbuilder, apparent reference guage, er)” (emphasis supplied).15 not intend to does change: “The Committee engaged in who are not employees cover reports legislative These committee building a unloading, repairing, or loading, any thus do not reflect intention to purpose vessel, they are in an just because injuries the Act’s withdraw navigable waters used adjoining workmen, Boudreaux, area such as Likewise the Committee activity... . such waters in the course of extending coverage un- employer has no intention with an at least some of ment em- who are not part der the Act to individuals worked in whole or in employees whose i.e., employer, is an by person particular, leg- a who waters. ployed employees reports question of whose do not or even re- person at least some islative a Calbeck, supra, part holding in some in whole or fer to the engaged, injuries S.Rep. the Act’s extended to “all employment.” form of by employees 13; (emphasis supplied). sustained H.Rep. at 4708 waters,” at 1202— anal- Nevertheless, section section significant light “a omission in of the care reports explain ysis by which reports which the took to iden- changes, it becomes man- the reason for the [committee] tify Supreme Court cases to be over- change the 1972 opinion ifest in our ” Inc., Ship, See Sun 2(3), . . section turned .. “employee,” definition of an analysis 2(3), 2(3), S.Rep. change H.Rep. analysis change 15. See full 14. See full 4711: 16: (a) 2(3) 2(a) Subsection amends the definition of the section Section amended 2(3) “employee” “employee” any person term contained in section Act to define an present merely employment. the Act. The ex- The defi- definition in maritime any longshoreman “employee” specifically from the cludes definition of nition includes crew, any person oper- person engaged longshoring or master or member of a or other unload, load, harborworker, engaged by ations, including ship any or master to repair any ship repairman, shipbuilder small new subsection breaker. It vessel. The or retains this exclusion and states that traditional- does not exclude other 2(3) any employee engaged part ly term includes in mari- covered but retains that employment, any longshoreman “employee” other time excludes from the definition of masters, operations, person engaged longshoring persons engaged crew members or (including any ship unload, repair ves- harborworker load or the master to shipbreaker). *9 repairman, shipbuilder, eighteen (Empha- tons net. sels of less than supplied.) sis purposes to as upgrade It is fair “to at 2437. benefits” and at S.Ct. to U.S. think, coverage protect “extend to reading legisla- of the additional say, we that a workers,” (as S.Rep. at well as “resolve to specific and with reports, tive both overall the longstanding dispute over third-party reference to the by injured longshoremen” actions by abol- newly provided by the status test ishing (see 10) text at note the unseaworthi- 2(3), did not contem- to section amendment remedy ness and the vessel-indemnity Calbeck char- disturbing previous plate against stevedores, S.Rep. 2). at The thrust of LHWCA-covered acterization summary legislation is that the work- including amphibious as designed to coverage broaden and increase waters.16 injured navigable ers benefits.17 We cannot find that Calbeck’s thirty-five years In Calbeck ended well-accepted construction of the Act as judicial confusing and inter- unworkable injuries covering navigable waters was test that the Act pretations by simple its silently by a overruled remedial statute de- injuries on the waters signed to broaden coverage and “framed employers employed employees whose out of solicitude workers.” Sun on navigable one or workers to labor more Inc., 726,100 Ship, 447 U.S. at at 2439. supra, 447 at Ship, Sun waters. See so, To do as the Court observed in a similar 718,100 legislative at 2435. The context, “would blunt thrust of the 1972 no reports reflect dissatisfaction committee amendments, Congress’ and frustrate intent rule, readily not with this and it is credible to aid maritime laborers.” Id. years previous forty-five judicial that the culminating in interpretations Calbeck Jurisprudential III. Context of legislative- its were to be progeny intended Amendments to Act ly any mention of this altered without dras- jurisprudential The context in which the coverage tic to restrict of the Act. change 1972 amendments the Act were enacted view, only We are reenforced in this not plain person makes it that a who suffered reports as to the silence an injury that on navigable occurred intent, expla- such an but the consistent waters, such present plaintiff as the Bou- provisions new as “an nation for the exten- dreaux, was considered to be in “maritime areas,” S.Rep. coverage sion of to shoreside employment” for purposes of the Act. The 12, H.Rep. (emphasis at supplied). at 4707 quite recently Court has summarized this Report “Summary” The in its jurisprudential Ford, Senate context. See proposed legislation identifies its remedial 444 at and Sun Rather, designed parties, promulgate necessary the 1972 amendment was and to 16. admin- provide test when occurred in istrative reforms. newly provided extended shoreside locus the 1972 revision to exclude those expands bill The also of this employed in As maritime-related activities. injuries occurring contigu- Act to cover state, legislative reports in identical lan- longshore ship ous dock area related “Thus, guage: employed by a an individual repair work. work, person none whose longstanding The bill also resolves dis- part, whole or in is not pute third-party by injured long- over actions pier adjoining covered even if aon by providing may shoremen that such actions 13; S.Rep. H.Rep. waters.” brought against vessels on the basis of negligence, remedy but the based on unsea- addition, worthiness is eliminated. indem- “Summary” proposed legislation 17. The nity against stevedoring companies actions adopted ultimately LHWCA revi- prohibited. Agreements are between steve- S.Rep. sion is 1-2: set forth doring companies indemnify and vessels to principal purpose of S. 2318 is prohibited. the latter Longshoremen’s amend and Harbor Compensation up- Workers’ grade Act in order to (The paragraphs upward omitted deal with re- benefits, pro- extend vision the benefit structure and with admin- workers, provide specified tect additional changes.) istrative damages against cause of action for third *10 1044 character,” 718-19, yet “local in 100 Inc., 447 at U.S.
Ship,
state law.
thus amenable to relief under
at 2435-36.
S.Ct.
233,
Garcia, 257
Fuel Co. v.
U.S.
Western
Ford, id.:
succinctly stated
As
(1921);
89,
L.Ed. 210
Grant
42 S.Ct.
66
effort to
simply an
Act was
pre-1972
Rohde,
Ship
v.
257 U.S.
Smith-Porter
Co.
compensation
gap in workmen’s
fill
157,
469,
(1922).
42 S.Ct.
ployment,
only
can be seen
from the
IV.
Commentary
Post-1972
Jurispru-
see,
era,
of
e.g.,
Nalco Chemi-
decisions
dence
Shea,
Corporation
supra,
cal
Preliminarily,
view of the LHWCA
restrictive
commentators,
including the
view
Weyer
injuries on the actual water was
Black,
respected Gilmore
highly
Gilmore,
F.2d 957
haeuser Co. v.
exclude
Act does not
amended
denied,
1975),
cert.
have been
who would
anyone
(1976). Weyer
petroleum
“fortuitously”
workers are not
nor his activities at the time of the accident
water,
required
but are
located on
relationship
“had
direct
navigation
jobs,
of their
work there
the nature
or commerce.” Grant
Smith-Porter Co.
relationship.
substantial
Rohde,
469, 475-76,
(1922). However,
This result would
As
contrary
run
discussed
above,
clear
to determine whether the
Congressional intent under the 1972
status
satisfied,
necessary
test is
it is
amendments
include maritime
workers
examine
exchange
purpose
employee’s
the Act
nature
eliminat-
ing the
right
sue for
activities and to
unseaworthiness.
determine whether those
Ship,
v. Pennsylvania,
realistically significant
Sun
Inc.
activities had a
relationship
navigation
L.Ed.2d at
to 466. The LHWCA is
liberally
to be
con-
The “significant
commerce.
relationship”
*18
decisions,
these
and that
pur-
when the
therefore their in-
can be met
requirement
juries
coverage
were within the
of the Act.
is to
employee’s
activities
pose of
off-
commerce. Since
facilitate maritime
suggestion is
contempo-
Some
made that
discovery,
recovery,
drilling
shore
(or
—the
raneous 1972
action
rather
gas
natural
of oil and
and sale
inaction)
Congress
indicates that
did not
commerce, it fol-
maritime
sea bottom —is
oil-production
consider maritime
workers to
work
Pippen’s
purpose
lows
Act,
by
be covered
as amended in 1972.
commerce.
maritime
was to facilitate
failure,
placed upon Congress’s
Reliance is
was
Pippen’s work
purpose of
consideration,
Since
after
to enact
the “Tower
desig-
its
perform
to enable the vessel
bill”, the “Marine Petroleum Workers’ Com-
drilling
since
nated task —offshore
However,
Act of 1971”.33
pensation
assum-
—and
was,
addition,
directed at
ing legislative
the work
intent could be deduced from
commerce, we are
facilitating
Congress’s
maritime
failure to enact
legisla-
related
per-
tion,
work
to conclude that
no such inference could be
compelled
drawn here.
realistically sig-
had a
The Tower bill was intended to
by Pippen
extend
formed
coverage
petroleum
LHWCA
to all marine
relationship to maritime com-
nificant
workers;
primary purpose,
extractive
its
Thus, Pippen
merce.
however,
relegate
was to
to the LHWCA
of his
employment at the time
compensation remedy those oil workers as-
injury.
signed as “members of the crew” to mova-
Or,
panel majority
as summarized
barges
ble
and thus
greater
entitled to the
Boudreaux,
at 466:
damages
afforded
the Jones
see
ruling
Pippen
dispositive
is
The
Robison,
Company
Offshore
AFFIRMED.
applied
Pfeiffer
is therefore to be
to
exclude
nonmaritime only on
GEE,
Judge, with
GAR-
Circuit
whom
newly
adjoining
piers,
included
areas —
WOOD,
joins, dissenting:
Judge,
Circuit
wharfs, and
so on. Thus
semantic leger-
panel
At the time of the
in this
decision
test
demain
dual
is
Pfeiffer
effec-
appeal,
prepared
December
I
tively
application
cabined in
to
narrow
stating
length why
filed a
some
I
dissent
fringe
“adjoining
areas” added
thought
panel
views
expressed
1972 amendments.
opinion were
incorrect. Boudreaux
v.
hold,
my view,
to
largely
So
is
Workover, Inc.,
American
664 F.2d
reverse the principles laid down in Pfeiffer
1981). Judge
opin-
469-80
Tate’s
Supreme
by the
Court —a bold stroke in-
sufficiently
ion for
en
banc court
holding,
deed.
In so
we stand alone among
panel
similar
his for the
that I
small
see
major
us,
maritime
But
circuits.
repeat
occasion
what I
here
said there.
these,
each
one
degree
clarity
then, moreover,
22,1982,
Since
on February
another,
requires
has
held
“status”
the Supreme
granted
Court
certiorari
coverage that
the work being done at the
Associates,
Churchill v. Perini
River
North
cert,
of a
time
nature traditionally
(2d
1981),
ty represented —as the dictates of reason— sister circuits—and panel to show in the sought
as I have contrary of to the
dissent cited above—are today. I therefore majority’s decision it, pretermitting from
respectfully dissent since the matter will
further discussion by the Court.
shortly be settled America, UNITED STATES Carnes, Dallas, P. Tex., Michael for de- Plaintiff-Appellee, fendants-appellants. Harrison, Christian Asst. Atty., U. S. Tyl- er, Tex., plaintiff-appellee. Butler, Judy John BUTLER Defendants-Appellants. 81-2320
No. Summary Calendar. RUBIN, Before JOHNSON GAR- WOOD, Judges. Circuit Appeals, Court United States Circuit. Fifth RUBIN, B. Judge: ALVIN Circuit July A husband and wife were convicted of conspiring to and of manufacture manu- 25,1982. Rehearing Aug. Denied P2P, facturing a controlled substance. The
husband also on two convicted counts telephone using in furtherance of the conspiracy. They assert that evidence was improperly admitted trial at their and that suppressed improperly evidence was con- Finding their sentencing. sidered at merit, neither contention we has affirm. many points Our resolution of wife, raised husband and John and Butler, is of no Judy precedential value and only parties. is of interest It has manuscript been issued to them in form. Our discussion of point they one raise precedential value and it forth is set below. judge The Butlers contend that the trial considering sentencing erred in the fruits of an unconstitutional search made at a at which they farmhouse were manufactur- ing a controlled A motion substance. suppress granted because affidavit fendant’s criminal- record were materially obtain the search warrant did not made to potential it is untrue. Although cause. doubt- Id. for factual inac probable show suppressed curacy present, evidence these ful that situations is not however, differed presentence reports revealed in the where a fourth amendment viola substantially testimony admitted tion is concerned. Additionally, as Lar trial, judge noted, stated explicitly the district ios court courts have been hesitant to exclusionary rule thought inap- he extend the exclusionary rule to situations *21 he plicable and that would consider where the deterrent value is less than that suppressed evidence. See, in the actual trial a e.g., case. Calandra, 338, United v. States 414 U.S. v. Verdugo United rely Butlers The 348-52, 613, 620-22, 94 S.Ct. 561, 38 L.Ed.2d 599, (9th 1968), 610-13 Cir. States, 402 F.2d (1974) (refusing 571-73 to apply exclusion denied, 925, 931, cert. 397 90 25 ary presented rule to evidence grand jury (1969), which the Ninth Cir L.Ed.2d Houltin, proceeding); United v. States it improper judge cuit held for the trial 1027, (5th Cir.), F.2d 1032-33 (expressing Verdugo such evidence. The court consider doubt exclusionary whether rule should be not, however, lay did down a blanket rule applied testimony coconspirators un situations; rather, required for such it grants der immunity police where weighing of case-by-case potential de learned their knowledge illegal from police effect on In terrent misconduct. denied, wiretaps), 826, cert. 439 U.S. Verdugo blatantly was unconsti search (1978). Therefore, L.Ed.2d tutional and one count of the two-count the district court not did err under these indictment was dismissed once motion considering suppressed circumstances in suppress granted. The court distin sentencing evidence for purposes. guished an earlier case which resentenc ing required there because reasons, For judgments these are AF- evidence, independently adduced, admissible FIRMED.
on the same The also facts. court noted deterrent effect use of
exclusionary rule at sentencing would be
minimal if a conviction were obtained with suppressed.
out the evidence The Ninth judge
Circuit later held
trial
did not
considering
abuse
his discretion
at sen HOME LIFE
COMPANY,
INSURANCE
tencing
suppressed
evidence
to a
due
tech
YORK, Plaintiff-Appellee
NEW
nical flaw in a search warrant’s underlying
Cross-Appellant,
Larios,
v.
affidavit. United States
640 F.2d
(9th
1981).
941-42
Cir.
EQUITABLE EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
permitted
We have
broad inquiry
INC., Defendant-Appellant
sentencing
into a defendant’s back
Cross-Appellee.
Barnett,
ground, United
States
F.2d
(5th
No.
Cir.),
denied,
80-3874.
cert.
Gonzalez, (5th 1981), F.2d July prior appeal, convictions overturned Rehearing 25,1982. Aug. Denied Ochoa, United States v. 1981). Ochoa, we noted that a sentencing judge may prior not consider
convictions obtained without counsel assumptions
where of an uncounsélled de- GEE, GARZA,
Before RUBIN and Cir- Judges. cuit RUBIN, ALVIN B. Circuit Judge: single This case turns on a question of law: is an employer liable for the fraudu- misrepresentations lent of his employee made to further the employee’s peculations while apparently acting for the employer in the course of the employer’s business? Our jurisdiction being founded on diversity, as *22 surrogate judges Louisiana we conclude that Louisiana courts would visit responsi- bility on the employer, we, and therefore, affirm judgment of the district court finding the employer Finding liable. the district court did not allow the party third the full measure damages of due, however, we reverse and remand for the entry judgment larger amount owing. we find I.
Home Life (“Home Insurance Company Life”) provided group medical benefits in- surance for the employees of Eq- Equipment uitable Company (“Equitable,” now Equitable Inc.). Shipyards, As is cus- tomary in administering group such poli- cies, Equitable provided the insurance ad- ministrator prepare and handle claims. performed These duties were Equita- employee, ble Bernard Sciambra. Equita- ble employees who made claims under the group medical filled out and signed the employee portion of the claim them, supplied form asked their physi- sign cian to part form, another of that and required attached supporting documents, Redf- & Simon, Peragine, Smith Brian, such as expense medical They bills. sub- Orleans, Jr., Brian, New eam, Morgan A. mitted the documents to pro- Sciambra for cross-appellee. defendant-appellant La., cessing. for It was duty Sciambra’s to verify Herman, Herman, employee-claimant covered, Herman & Russ M. Herman, Shelley Orleans, La., sign employer portion form, C. New and Coughlin, City, Thomas F. New York forward the regional form to Home Life’s plaintiff-appellee cross-appellant. There, office claims in Atlanta. Home processed any liability Life, further to Home but personnel alternatively claims
Life’s drafts, claim, against sought indemnity and Seiambra. prepared payment Upon them mail to Seiambra. returned trial, After a bench the district court Life’s receiving draft from Home At- judge judgment rendered Life in Home office, it to delivered lanta Seiambra $34,706.63 against the amount of Seiambra claimant. Equitable, Equitable against and and for mixture of Equitable submitted a valid Seiambra like amount. Seiambra Home Life. expressly negligence claims to exonerated of in hir- and fraudulent variety ing supervising in a and bogus claims were contrived of Seiambra altering only portions failing activity, to learn his fraudulent ways involved documents, solely such as cast supporting exag- but was on the basis of valid vicarious conclusions, in- gerating facts and liability. medical length and unit
creasing the
of time
rates
II.
involved,
documents,
fabricating
of cost
signatures
physi-
of claimants and
forging
Article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil
perpetrator
sole
cians. Seiambra was the
equivalent
Code sets forth the Louisiana
claims.
In these
the fraud on some false
respondeat superi-
rule
common law
cases,
claims,
when
altered valid
Seiambra
provides
or.
part:
That article
in relevant
were completely
the claimants
unaware of
employers
Masters and
are answerable
fraud,
pocketed the pro-
his
Seiambra
for the damage
occasioned
their ser
instances, however,
Sciam-
ceeds.
most
overseers,
vants
in the exercise of the
conspired with the claimant. When
bra
they
functions in which
are employed.
*23
payment
Home Life’s
draft on a fraudulent
(West 1979).
La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 2320
arrived,
the signa-
claim
obtained
Seiambra
consider, therefore,
We need
only whether
co-conspirator,
draft,
of
ture
his
cashed the
the harm Seiambra
visited
Home was
split
money
and
the
with the named claim-
“occasioned ...
in the exercise of the func
ant.
tions in which
employed.”
[he was]
Equitable’s
When Home Life
pre-
raised
Lewis,
In LeBrane
(La.
v.
1. One Louisiana
court has
Whether
was
inci-
[act]
setting
four-part
performance
employ-
LeBrane
as
forth
test
dental
to the
employee
duties;
acting
determine whether
was
ee’s
scope
employment:
(3)
employ-
within the
Whether
the act occured on the
premises;
er’s
and
(1)
primarily
Whether
act
tortious
(4)
during
Whether
it occurred
the hours of
employment-rooted;
employment.
2320, LeBrane,
article
cer- ment
defined
conduct was
fraudulent
Sciambra’s
Miller,
to his
place
and
Equitable
in time
liable for his
connected
tainly
judge
court
The district
employment.
conduct.3
claims
fraudulent
that 90% of the
found
holding accords with
result
This
Equita-
job-site, on
at the
concocted
were
Wiseman,
(La.Ct.App.
Riley
So.2d
was also
conduct
Sciambra’s
ble’s time.
held
em-
1981). There the court
duties
to his
causally related
agency
liable for the
ployer-insurance
found,
judge
district
Equitable. As the
damage resulting from the
of bo-
issuance
were accom-
claims
of the fraudulent
90%
employee:
gus performance
bonds
its
Equita-
with
through
plished
collaboration
employee’s
personally
“although
actions
fraud-
Most of the
employee-claimants.
ble
motivated,
closely
were so
interwoven with
exaggerations
of essen-
ulent claims were
employer’s
his
can be said
business
it
can it be said that
Nor
tially valid claims.
risk
fairly
to be ‘a
of harm
attributable
“motivated
conduct
Sciambra’s
”
employer’s
(quot-
business.’
Id. at 387
entirely ex-
considerations
purely personal
Co.,
ing Mays v. Pico Fin.
