42 N.J. Eq. 100 | New York Court of Chancery | 1886
The bill states that John B. Miller, deceased, late of Madison, in the county of Morris, made and entered into a valid contract, in writing, with Jehiel K. Hoyt, upon the 25th of April, 1872, for the sale and conveyance by him to the latter, or to such company or individuals as might be named by said Hoyt, of certain land therein mentioned, for the price of $800 an acre and that on or about the 10th of June following, he made another like agreement, in writing, with Hoyt, for the conveyance to him, his heirs and assigns, or to such person or persons as he might designate, of the same property, on or before the 1st day of September then next, for the price of $39,392, to be paid, and which Hoyt thereby stipulated to pay, as follows: $100 upon the execution of the agreement and $4,900 on the delivery of the deed, the balance, $34,392, to be secured by the bond of the grantee or grantees, and his or their mortgage of the property; that the time for the delivery of the deed was, by another agreement, in writing, made on the 20th of August,
The only question presented for decision is whether, under the circumstances of the case, the contract of sale worked an equitable conversion of the land into money at the death of John B. Miller. That it would have done so, had the contract been en
A valid and binding contract of sale, such as a court of equity will specifically enforce against an unwilling purchaser, operates as a conversion. The cases in which the court has refused to decree that a contract for sale works equitable conversion, are those in which the contract was such as equity would not enforce. The counsel of the answering defendant insists that the decision in the case of Teneick v. Flagg, 5 Dutch. 25, is decisive of the question under consideration, and is adverse to the claim of the complainants. But it is to be observed that that was an action at law. Mrs. Attie Teneick had agreed to convey land to James Buckalew, and had received part of the purchase-money. He refused to accept the deed because of the pendency of an action of ejectment brought against Mrs. Teneick by other parties, to obtain possession of the land. She delivered a deed for the property to her agent, to be delivered by him to Buckalew upon