54 Pa. Super. 553 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1913
Opinion by
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecution of him by the defendant, upon a charge of larceny; he recovered a verdict and judgment in the court below and the defendant appeals. The circumstances which led to the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff were as follows: The plaintiff and defendant were both barbers, the latter being the owner of a shop and the former a journeyman. The defendant, in May, 1909, visited the shop where the plaintiff was employed and seeing a razor which the plaintiff had been using asked him where he had obtained it, and was told by plaintiff how the razor had come into his possession. The defendant then said, “That is a razor that was stolen from me,” whereupon the plaintiff uttered an exclamation of surprise. The defendant said, “I have made up my mind any time I find one of them razors in any one’s possession, that I would have him arrested.” The plaintiff then said to the defendant, “Mr. Jeffries, you don’t think I would do anything like that?” The defendant replied, “No, I don’t think that; but I always made up my mind whenever I found one of them razors, I would have the man arrested.” The defendant then called an officer and had the plaintiff arrested and went before a magistrate, on May 10, 1909, and made an information charging the plaintiff with having stolen a number of razors' and other property from the shop of the defendant, in Pitts-burg, on or about the tenth day of December preceding. The testimony would have warranted a finding that the plaintiff was not in Pittsburg but was in another state at the time the larceny was committed, and that the defendant knew that fact at the time he caused the arrest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was subsequently indicted for the alleged larceny and his trial resulted in an acquittal.
There was in this case no admission upon the part of the plaintiff that the razor or razors which the defend
The court, in response to the written requests of the appellant in his second, third and fourth points, instructed the jury that every public prosecution is presumed to have been begun and carried on in good faith and upon probable cause, and before the plaintiff could recover both want of probable cause for the prosecution and malice must be shown; and also, that if the defendant had reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by evidence sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent man in believing the plaintiff guilty of the offense, then there could be no recovery in this case. The excerpts from the charge which are made the subject of the second and third specifications of error were repetitions of these very instructions for which the appellant had prayed. The instructions were a correct statement of the general principles applicable to the case, the appellant had himself prayed for such instructions, and the repetition of them worked no injury to his case. The appellant had submitted five points requesting instructions, all of which, save that praying for binding instructions, were affirmed. The general charge was a correct statement of the principles of law applicable to this proceeding; if the appellant desired more specific instructions as to the applicability of those principles 'to the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case, he should have submitted a distinct prayer for such instructions. The comments of the learned judge of the court below upon the evidence, in so far as it was referred to, were entirely impartial, and the complaint that the charge was inadequate is not well founded.
The judgment is affirmed.