38 Mo. App. 543 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1889
Nellie Keener, the plaintiff, and lawful widow of George Keener, deceased, brought her action against the Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen, to recover the sum of two thousand dollars, being the amount of a “beneficiary certificate” to which George Keener was entitled, and which was issued to him by the lodge, by reason of his being a member
It appears that deceased and plaintiff, Nellie, were lawfully married at the city of St.-Joseph, in 1874, and lived- together for a period of some ten years, when he became acquainted with Katie Burke, who is the same person who interpleads here as Katie Keener. That from thence on, until his death, in 1888, with possibly short periods of intermission, they lived together in an unlawful, illicit and licentious way. At the same time,
The circuit court found the facts substantially as they are herein stated, but rendered judgment for plaintiff Nellie, the lawful widow of deceased. Do the facts authorize the judgment % Our oijinion is, they do not. The member of the lodge has no interest in the fund. It is not assets of his estate. He has simply a power of appointment, and only those can become beneficiaries, whom he has appointed. Bacon on Benefit Societies and Life Ins., sec. 237. So, then, when we find the fact that Nellie Keener was not the individual to whom deceased directed the fund to be paid, it follows, as of course, that she, not having been appointed, cannot receive it. But it does not follow that the interpleader should receive it.
The beneficiaries oí a fund, coming from these benevolent associations, must be of the class named in the law which brings the association into being, and the appointee must be one of that class. Grand Lodge v. Elsner, 26 Mo. App. 108; National M. A. A. v. Gonser, 43 Ohio St. 1; American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580; Daniels v. Pratt, 143 Mass. 216; Presbyterian M. A. F. v. Allen, 106 Ind. 593; Bacon on Benefit Societies, secs. 244, 252. By section 972, Revised Statutes, 1879, such societies or associations may provide “for the relief and aid of the families, widows, orphans, or other dependents of their deceased members,
I would not restrict dependents to those whom one may be legally bound to support, nor, yet, to those to whom he may be morally bound, but the term should be restricted to those whom it is not unlawful for him to support. It is not lawful to support a woman knowingly occupying the illicit relation in which inter-pleader places herself. And while it may be true that deceased supported interpleader, and that she depended upon him for support, yet, the object of his support, and the consideration rendered him by her, is abhorrent to morals and law, and is subversive of society at large. The law could not have been intended for the protection of such a person, nor aim to bestow a reward on such conduct.
It is contended that she falls under the designation of “families.” The foregoing remarks are alike applicable to this contention. Interpleader was not of deceased’s family, as contemplated by the statute.
It is insisted that the association is the only party which can take advantage of these objections, and, as it is making no objection to the payment, the judgment must be in favor of interpleader. But this would be permitting the association to do indirectly, what the law has forbidden it to do directly. The corporation, as an association, has its existence from the law, and it has no power to raise funds, or to pay them over to any other than those contemplated by the law. Bacon on
In speaking of a matter of this nature, the supreme court of Wisconsin says: “The fact that the association has paid the money into court, instead of paying it directly to the widow, to avoid litigation with other claimants, can make no difference as to the rights of the persons claiming the same. If the appellant could not have recovered this money in a direct action against the association, he cannot recover it in this action. The association not having, for prudential reasons, paid the money to the party entitled thereto, the court must see that it is paid out as directed and required by the rules and regulations of the society * * *. The money having been paid into court, the court must now determine who is the proper person to receive it, * * ” Ballou v. Giles, 50 Wis. 614.
We have been cited to two cases as holding views contrary to the above. One of Story v. The Williamsburg M. M. B. A., 95 N. Y. 474, is not in conflict. The case concedes that the by-law of the association may have contemplated only the lawful widow as the beneficiary, but that such was not a limitation on the power of the company recognizing as a beneficiary one, whom the deceased had designated as holding to him the relation of wife. The plaintiff, in that case having lived
The other case cited is from New Hampshire (15 Atlantic Rep. 125), and is contrary to the views we have exx>resséd. But the reasons we have advanced appear not to have been suggested in that case, and we are so fully pursuaded that the decision is unsound, that we are not inclined to follow it.
It will thus be seen that we are of the opinion that neither plaintiff nor interpleader is entitled to the money, and this brings us to the question of what shall be done with it. We have not arrived at a conclusion without considerable difficulty.
As we have seen, the law authorizing the association governs as to the persons or classes to whom the fund may be paid. The member has no property interest in it; he has the naming of the beneficiary, the mere power of appointment. If he fails to make such appointment or designation, and the law, or the by-law of the association within the limits of the law, does not make it in case he fails, the fund will lapse to the .association. Bacon on Benefit Societies, sec. 237, 243; Hellenburg v. Dist. No. 1 of I. O. of B. B., 94 N. Y. 580. The difficulty- in finding authority, applicable to this branch of the case, lies in the fact that the by-law of this association differs from that of any other which we have met with in our examination of this case. It is as follows :
“ Beneficiary fund. Bee. 1. Who entitled to the $8,000. Upon the death of a workman degree member, in good standing, of a subordinate lodge of the order under the jurisdiction of this Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen, such person or persons as said members may have directed, while living, shall be entitled to receive from the beneficiary fund of the order the sum of two thousand dollars; provided, said member shall have complied, in all particulars, with*553 all the laws, regulations and requirements of the order, and with the following conditions:
“ ‘ Sec. 16. * * * If one or more of the beneficiaries shall die during the lifetime of the member, and he shall have made no other direction, the surviving beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be entitled to the benefit equally, unless otherwise provided in the certificate, and if all the beneficiaries shall die during the lifetime of the member, and he shall have made no other directions, the benefit shall be paid to his heirs at law, and if there be none such, then the benefit shall revert to the beneficiary fund of the grand lodge. ’ ’ ’
It will be noticed from these sections of the by-laws that the fund does not become payable except there be a beneficiary certificate; and, in all but one case, the beneficiary must have been designated by the member. That case is where the beneficiary dies in the lifetime of the member, and no other is designated, the fund “ shall be paid to his heirs at law.” Now we feel legally bound to make every endeavor consistent with the statute and the by-laws of the association, to prevent a forfeiture. As was said by Taylor, J., in Ballou v. Giles, supra: “ In determining who is entitled to receive the benefits of the provisions made by a society of this kind, it is the duty of the court to construe its rules and regulations liberally to effect the benevolent purposes of the order, and in no case to construe them as to defeat such purposes, unless the meaning' of such rules and regulations is so clear and certain as to admit of no other reasonable construction.” Bacon, in his work on Benefit Societies and Life Insurance, section 247, states the same rule. See also Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Schmidt, 98 Ind. 374, 381.
In this case a certificate was issued, and the deceased has complied with all his duties in relation thereto, but such certificate lacks a beneficiary, in which case, when it happens by the death of the beneficiary, the by-law declares the fund shall go to the heirs. Is it not in
We will, therefore, reverse the judgment, and remand the cause, that the heirs of deceased, in addition to the widow, the present plaintiff, may be brought into court; whereupon the court will order distribution of the fund to them as their interests may be by law declared.