OPINION
Plаintiff-Appellant Robert B. Keene appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error with regard tо the trial court's grant of Defendant-Appeliee Marion County Superior Court's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
We affirm.
Appellant presents one issue for our review which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by granting Appellee's motiоn for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the statute of limitation.
Keene was employed by Appellee. On August 25, 1998, Keene rеceived from Ap-pellee a notice that Appellee intended to terminate him one month in the future. On Septеmber 25, 1998, Keene was terminated from his employment with Appellee. Subsequently on September 25, 2000, Keene filed his cause of action against Appellee alleging that he was discharged as a result of age discrimination. Appellee filеd a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court later granted. Keene challenged the trial court's ruling with a motion to correct error, but the court denied the motion. Keene now appeals the trial court's ruling.
At the outset, we note that a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Ind. Trial Rule 12(C) is an attack on the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Fifth Third Bank v. Stаnek,
Keene сontends that the trial court erred in granting the Appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon the statute of limitations. Specifically, Keene urges that he timely filed his complaint for age discrimination.
Ind.Code § 34-11-22 states, in pertinent part: "[aln action against the state of Indiana relating to the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment (including, but not limited to, hiring, suspension, discharge, discipline, promotion, demotion, retirement, wages, or salary) must be brought within two (2) years of the date of the act or omission complained of." Here, Keene filed a complaint alleging that he had been disсharged from his position with Appellee due to his age. Keene filed his complaint on September 25, 2000. Although the partiеs agree that the applicable statute of limitations is two years, they disagree on when that time period commеnced. Keene argues that his complaint was timely filed, pursuant to Ind.Code § 34-11-2-2, because he was terminated from his position on September 25, 1998. However, Appellee claims that Keene's complaint was not timely because the statute began to run on August 25, 1998, when Keene received notice from Appellee that Appellee intended to dischargе him thirty days from that date. Therefore, Appellee asserts, Keene's complaint should have been filed no later thаn August 25, 2000.
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Thus, the issue in this case is when, in a wrongful termination case, does the action acerue for the purposes of triggering the running of the statute of limitations. Indiana has yet to develop specific case law in this area; however, numerous jurisdiсtions have followed the rationale and decision of the United States Supreme Court decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks,
In the present case, Keene argues that he suffered no damages until he was actually disсharged because there was no change in his salary or working conditions. Therefore, he asserts, notice of terminаtion in the future was not enough for the accrual of an action and the commencement of the running of the statute оf limitations. However, the date upon which there is a change in salary or working conditions does not determine when an action accrues. In keeping with the rationale of Ricks, we determine that the alleged discrimination occurred, аnd the corresponding limitation period began to run, at the time the decision to discharge Keene was communicаted to him in the notice of August 25, 1998. This is so even though the actual loss of employment did not occur until thirty days later. The Ricks court instruсts us that the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequencеs of the acts actually become painful. Id. at 504. Thus, we hold that Keene's cause of action for wrongful termination accrued when he received the notice of his termination on August 25, 1998.
Keene's cause of action for wrongful termination accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, when he received the notice of his termination. Thus, the trial court properly granted Appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings and properly denied Keene's subsequent motion to correct error.
Affirmed.