76 P. 834 | Kan. | 1904
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On the 14th day of May, 1897, the Wichita Electric Railway and Light Company, a corporation under the laws of Kansas, with its place of business at the city of Wichita, entered into a contract, or lease, in writing, with the Wichita Gas, Electric Light and Power Company, a corporation under the laws of Kansas, with its place of business at the city of Wichita. By its terms the former leased to the latter, for a period of ten years, at an annual rental of $3000, payable semiannually, certain machinery and appliances in the city of Wichita, adapted to, and used by the lessor for, the purpose of generating electricity for light, heat, and power. On the 20th day of March, 1900, the Keene Syndicate, a corporation, purchased of the lessor, the Wichita Electric Railway and Light Company, the property covered by the lease, and also its interest in the lease, taking a written assignment thereof. The lessee, the Wichita Gas, Electric Light and Power Company, being in default for three years’ rent, in August, 1900, the Keene Syndicate, as assignee of the Wichita Electric
Does the petition on its face disclose a cause of action—a right of plaintiff to recover from defendant?' It is charged by defendant that the petition discloses-the lease sued on to be against public policy and void. The district court found it to be void for that reason. It is the only question before us for determination.
The petition of plaintiff, by its averments, in addition to embodying the facts above stated with reference to-location, corporate existence, the execution of
“The said first party hereby binds and obligates itself not to engage in the business of furnishing electric light and power to private or public consumers within the city of Wichita during the period covered by this agreement, eicept for the purpose of operating the street-railway now owned by the first party, and said first party furthermore agrees not to dispose of any of the apparatus, machinery, appliances, etc., retained by it, for producing or generating electric light and power in said city of Wichita.”
The above language quoted from the lease, applied to, and construed with, the averments of the petition, of which the lease formed a part, fairly discloses that the lessor obligated itself not to engage in the business of furnishing electric light and power to private and public consumers within the city of Wichita during the period of ten years covered thereby; and further agreed that during said period of ten years it would not dispose of any of its machinery or appliances, retained by it, for the purpose of being used to generate electric light and power in the city of Wich
In Western Wooden-ware Ass’n v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 604, 11 L. R. A. 503, 22 Am. St. Rep. 686, an action to enjoin the association from engaging in a certain business and from using certain premises in carrying on said business in violation of a contract ’with plaintiff, which contract provided that the association would not engage in, or carry on, the business in controversy for a period of five years, and would not within said period use the said premises or sell them or permit them to be sold or used without the consent of plaintiff, the court denied the injunction and held the contract void as against public policy. Referring more particularly to that feature of the
“In the present case, the defendants were not only to remain out of such business for the full time specified, but the premises which had been used to carry on the manufacturing by them, though not sold and conveyed under the contract, could not be again used for such time by them or any other party for the same business. I do not think it needs the citation of authorities to show that contracts of this nature have frequently been condemned by the courts, and held void, as unreasonable restraints of trade, and therefore void on the ground of public policy.”
Among the .contracts declared illegal under the •common law because opposed to public policy were contracts in general restraint of trade—contracts between individuals to prevent competition and keep up the prices of articles of utility. It is well settled in the law of contracts that the first purpose of the court is to look to the welfare of the public, and if the enforcement of the agreement would be detrimental to its interests no relief should be granted to the party injured, and that, even though it might result beneficially to one of the parties who made and violated the agreement. In Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, 9 Sup. Ct. 553, 32 L. Ed. 979, the court said: “Courts decline to enforce contracts which impose a restraint, though only partial, upon business of such character that restraint to any extent will be prejudicial to the public interest.” The rule that contracts and agreements, when contrary to public policy, will not be enforced is one of the great pre
Whether plaintiff could maintain an action against defendant on a quantum meruit or otherwise, independently of the contract, need not be here considered. That question, in the view we have taken of the seventh cause of action of the petition, is not in the record before us:
The lease sued upon being in contravention of public policy, no action for a recovery upon it can be maintained. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.