12 Mo. 499 | Mo. | 1849
delivered the opinion óf the court.
The appellee, Richard F. Sags, brought his action against the appellants, Keemle & Field, in the St. Louis court of common pleas, for a lib.el published by them against the plaintiff. The plaintiff below had a verdict and judgment for one hundred dollars,,and the defendants below bring the case here by appeal.
There being n,o statement by the counsel of the facts and points, relied upon, either for reversal or affirmance of this judgment, I must state the facts from the record, and give my opinion of them as they appear therefrom, and of the law arising thereon, The. plaintiff^ declaration at first contained but two counts. The defendants demurred to the declaration, and, the court sustained the demurrer to the first count and overruled it to the second count.
The defendants then obtained leave to plead, and filed their plea to the second count of this declaration. This suit was brought to.the February term of-the court in the year 1848, and at that term the defendants demurred, and afterwards plead as above stated. At the-same term the plaintiff obtained leave and filed his amended declaration containing two additional counts. And at the September term of the court the trial was had in the same year, and the verdict and the judgmentfor the plaintiff. The bill of exceptions in this case shows the following motion: “And now the defendants, by Leslie & Lord, come and move the court for a new trial for the following reasons :
1st. Because the verdict of the jury is against the evidence, and against the weight of evidence.
2nd. Because the verdict of the jury is against the law and evidence.
3rd. Because the court refused to give instructions asked by, defendant.
4th. Because the damages in the verdict are excessive, not warranted by the proof.
This motion was overruled, and the opinion of the court was excepted to, and is assigned as one of the errors relied on for the reversal of the judgment. This I consider the principal error assigned, and upon its disposition depends the judgment of this court.
The libelous words charged in the declaration as published by the defendants in their newspaper, {i The Daily Reveille,” against the plaintiff are the following, stript of all inuendoes :
“R. E. Sass, steam boat agent, this impertinent person withheld from us on Saturday, New Orleans papers of a late date, entrusted to him for this office by the clerk of the Lucy Bertram. We desire our steam boat friends hereafter to retain favors intended for the Reveille in their own hands until called for, as we put no trust in Mr. Sass whatever, as far as we are concerned. Officers of steam boats will confer a favor by sending to us direct for exchanges, as we are under the impression that those to them through this small individual have frequently missed their direction.”
Are these words when falsely and maliciously printed and published of a person, actionable as a libel ? And has the plaintiff declared upon them in such a manner as to justify the courts in sanctioning his action?
In the case of Nelson vs. Musgrave, decided by this court and reported in vol. 10, page 648, the court adopts the language of Judge Parsons in the case of the Commonwealth vs. Clapp, 4 Mass. Rep. 168. That distinguished jurist defined a libel to be “a malicious publication expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures tending to blacken the memory of the dead or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.”
In McCorkle vs. Binns, (5 Benning's Rep. 349) chief justice Tilghman says, “The distinction between slander by words and by printing or writing, is so well known that it is unnecessary to dwell on it. Suffice it to say, that any malicious printed slander which tends to expose a man to ridicule, contempt, hatred or degradation of character, is a libel.” Justice Yeates in the same case observes, that “any printed publication that tends to bring a man into disrepute, ridicule or contempt, is a libel in a legal sense.” This definition is not less applicable, when the suit is brought by a party injured than when a public prosecution is instituted. Stow vs. Converse, 3 Con. Rep. 341; Clark vs. Binney, 2 Pick. Rep. 115; Southwick vs. Stevens, 10 Johnson Rep. 443; Steele vs. Southwick, 9 Johnson Rep. 214; Thomas vs. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264; Walker vs. Winn, 8 Mass. Rep. 248; Cooper vs. Greely, 1st Denio’s Rep. 347; the People vs. Croswell, 3 Johns. cases, 354. Any written slander, though merely tending to render the party subject to disgrace, ridicule or contempt, is actionable, though it do not impute any definite crime. The publication made in this case by the appellants against the appellee, is fully within the principle contained and supported by the above authorities, and without any authority, were it a new case, I am prepared to say, in my opinion, that such a publication is actionable, and that when falsely and wickedly, and maliciously made, inflicts an injury which the courts and juries of the country should redress by ample pecuniary remuneration. The good of society, the public peace, good morals, the usefulness and liberty of the press itself, require this course to be taken by the courts and juries. The freedom and liberty of the public press will be always promoted and maintained by restraining its licentiousness ■—“ut vivas, igitur, vigila.”
It remains now tobe seen whether the appellee has so declared upon this publication as to sustain the action. For this purpose it is only necessary to insert herein the amended declaration, which is as follows : “And the said plaintiff, leave of the court being first obtained, comes
The declaration I consider sufficient to support the judgment. I, therefore, find no error in the court below in overruling the defendants motion in arrest of judgment. From all that appears to this court then;from the record and proceedings below, I can find no good and sufficient cause why the judgment should be reversed. And my brother judges agreeing with me in the opinion, the judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed.