19 Kan. 441 | Kan. | 1877
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action to recover rent. The plaintiff’s assignor testified to a full, unconditional contract of lease, delivery of possession to, and occupation by, the tenant. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff! Upon this therefore the judgment would have to be sustained.
The other matters upon which the defendant, plaintiff in error, claims that the judgment was wrong are these: The house, the subject of the contract, was upon the military reservation of Fort Leavenworth. It was built in 1863 by the assignor of the plaintiff, Henry Kuhn, and occupied by him continuously until turned over to the defendant in October 1873. It was built under a permit from the military authorities. And the defendant claims that the license granted by the authorities had been revoked, Kuhn notified to remove the building, and that failing so to do, the building had become the property of the United States. Upon the question of this license, the court left it to the jury to say whether the license was to continue as long as Kuhn was in the employ of the government, during the mere pleasure of the authorities, or as long as the building should last. Counsel claims that the court should have construed the license itself, as a question of law, and that its failure so to do was error compelling a reversal. As the record now stands it seems to us the action of the court in this respect is not so preserved that we can declare there was error. At the close of the charge the record shows that the court asked the plaintiff if he had any exceptions to it, and was answered in the negative. A like query was put to the defendant, and was
Outside of this question of practice, we concur in the main with the views expressed by the counsel for plaintiff in error in their brief. Mr. Kuhn by his permit obtained no interest in the soil. The building was personal property belonging to him. All his rights arose by virtue of the license; and he who claims rights through a license must show the terms and extent of that license, or it will be held to be merely one revocable at pleasure. The original permit was not in evidence; but in lieu thereof was a letter from Gen. Easton, the chief quartermaster, written sometime two years thereafter, stating that he had at the time given Mr. Kuhn a permit to build the house. There is nothing in that, or in any of the testimony, from which it could be inferred that the license was other than one revocable at pleasure, certainly at least after the termination of Kuhn’s employment in the government service. Upon the revocation of a license, the building does not become forfeited to the land-owner, but the licensee has a reasonable time in which to remove it from the prem
The judgment will be affirmed.