156 Wis. 181 | Wis. | 1914
The demurrer must he taken to admit the good character, chastity, and good reputation of the plaintiff and the falseness of the accusations against her contained in the affidavit of Sandager, also the agency of the defendant’s attorneys for defendant in procuring and filing this affidavit and the ratification by defendant of their acts in so doing by neglect, after notice, to take any action to withdraw or repudiate said affidavit or the libelous statements therein contained. On the other hand, it cannot he taken to admit the pleader’s conclusions that the affidavit and its contents were irrelevant, because the facts upon which such conclusions are based are set forth in the complaint. The case is, from one viewpoint, well calculated to arouse sympathy for the plaintiff and indignation against the defendant. The latter, upon motion for a new trial in the personal injury action [Keeley v. G. N. R. Co.] reported in 139 Wis. 448, 121 N. W. 167, presented the affidavits of Zearfoss and Barr and that of its
“An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion upon which it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action of slander or libel.” “A conditionally privileged publication is a publication made on an occasion which furnishes a prima facie legal excuse for the making of it; and which js privileged unless some additional fact is shown, which so alters the occasion as to prevent its furnishing a legal excuse. The additional fact which in the majority of cases is required to destroy this conditional privilege, is malice, meaning bad intent.” Noonan v. Orton, 32 Wis. 106.
In Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N. W. 1066, the statements of a witness before a grand jury were held to be absolutely privileged; and in Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358, a relevant statement by an attorney in argument was held to be entitled to the same privilege. In Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82, charges otherwise libelous and maliciously made, embraced in a petition to the governor for the removal of a sheriff from office, but relevant to the removal, were held not
It is contended here that the demurrer admits these aver-ments of the complaint which charged lack of good faith, want of reasonable belief in the truth of the affidavit made against the plaintiff, and knowledge on the part of the'-defendant that the affidavit in question was false and malicious, hence that the defendant cannot shelter itself behind a plea of privilege. This would be true as to conditional privilege. But this complaint shows on its face that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the motion and that the matter complained of was relevant to the inquiry upon this motion, and in this respect shows a ease of absolute privilege within the rule of Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358; Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193; Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82; Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N. W. 1066. The cases of Cottrill v. Cramer, 43 Wis. 242; Eviston v. Cramer, 47 Wis. 659, 3 N. W. 392; and Cochran v. Melendy, 59 Wis. 207, 18 N. W. 24, were cases of communications conditionally privileged and are not in point here.
In order to bring a witness, counsel, or party in a litigation within the rule of absolute privilege, it is only necessary to show that the alleged slanderous or libelous words, at the time wffien made or published, were clearly relevant to the pending legal inquiry in which they were uttered or used. Nothing less than this would be an adequate protection. Odgers, Libel & S. 191; Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met 193; Laing v. Mitten, 185 Mass. 233, 70 N. E. 128. Where slanderous or libelous words employed in such a proceeding are irrelevant they fall within the rule-'of conditional privilege, and if they are shown to be false and not put forward with any bona fide
By the Court. — Order affirmed.