Keeley Tatsuyo HUNTER, a minor, by Gina F. BRANDT, her mother and next friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, and Theodore R. Mitchell, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-55920
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted Feb. 1, 1999. Decided Sept. 9, 1999.
190 F.3d 1061
B. Request for Reassignment
[REDACTED] Based on the fact that the district court has granted summary judgment to GTE three times, American asserts that “it is asking a lot of American to go back to the district court and expect to receive anything but another two year delay as the district court searches for one more basis to throw American out of court.” It therefore requests that this case be remanded to a different district judge. In the absence of a showing of personal bias, however, which American does not claim, reassignment is appropriate only in “unusual circumstances.” See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977))) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the circumstances relied on by American for its request to reassign this case to another district judge are not such “unusual circumstances” as would warrant reassignment. We are confident that the district court will expeditiously set this case for trial.
IV.
The district court‘s grant of summary judgment to GTE on American‘s claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act and dismissal of American‘s state law claims are reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Dennis M. Perluss, Los Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Before: PREGERSON, BEEZER, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge BEEZER.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
I.
This case is about an elementary school operated as a research laboratory by UCLA‘s Graduate School of Education and Information Studies. The Corinne A. Seeds University Elementary School (“UES“), and its research and training mission is to help the State of California meet the needs of a dramatically changing public school population. To this end, UES identifies issues relevant to the education and social development of children in multicultural, urban communities, conducts research on these issues, and develops innovations in teaching based on this research. UES shares its research results with public school teachers throughout the State of California through seminars, workshops, teacher training programs, and published articles.
Each year, UES‘s Admissions Committee, under the direction of the Dean of the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies and the Director of UES, determines what characteristics are needed in UES‘s 460-student population to fulfill its research and training mission. UES considers gender, race/ethnicity, and family income in its admissions process to obtain the desired student population. In selecting students, UES also considers other factors that might affect a child‘s suitability as a research subject, e.g., dominant language, permanence of residence, and parents’ willingness to comply with UES‘s mandatory involvement requirement. Parents of students applying to UES are informed of UES‘s consideration of race/ethnicity, gender, and family income in admissions.
The district court conducted extensive hearings on the school‘s purpose, its research, and its admission process, and ultimately ruled in its favor. The district court found that (1) California had a compelling state interest in operating a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the quality of education in urban public schools, and (2) UES‘s consideration of race/ethnicity in its admissions process was narrowly tailored to further that interest. We affirm.
II.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
[REDACTED] The district court‘s conclusion that UES‘s admissions procedures meet the strict scrutiny test is based on extensive findings of fact which we review for clear error. See National Ass‘n of Radiation Survivors v. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1992). After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that Judge Kenyon‘s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.
[REDACTED] The district court‘s conclusions regarding the sufficiency of those facts in meeting strict scrutiny is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. See id. We conclude, as did the district court, that the facts demonstrate that the defendants have met the strict scrutiny test.
III.
[REDACTED] In applying the strict scrutiny test to UES‘s use of race/ethnicity as a factor in its admissions process, we first consider whether California‘s interest in the operation of a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the quality of education in urban public schools is a compelling state interest.3
“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Supreme Court has recognized “the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting
The district court heard extensive expert testimony on current problems in public urban education. The challenges posed by California‘s increasingly diverse population intensify the state‘s interest in improving urban public schools. Cultural and economic differences in the classroom pose special problems for public school teachers. In his decision, Judge Kenyon noted that defendants presented “an unexhaustive list of such issues and challenges [that] includes limited language proficiency, different learning styles, involvement of parents from diverse cultures with different expectations and values, and racial and ethnic conflict among families and children.” Dr. Mitchell,4 who testified as an expert witness, stated that “[t]here is no more pressing problem facing California, or indeed the nation, than urban education; for it is in the urban school system that the majority of California‘s future citizens will be educated (either well or poorly), creating the basic fabric for the society of the future.”
UES is dedicated to providing more useful and more accurate information to educators facing these challenges. Dr. Deborah Stipek,5 director of UES, testified, “[t]he current mission of UES is to do research relevant to ... urban education and to disseminate that research to promote more effective education for children in urban schools.” As part of its research mission, UES exchanges information with the State Department of Education as well as other California educational policy groups; trains teachers; develops and tests innovative teaching strategies; and disseminates study results nationwide.
Dr. Mitchell also testified that “[t]he dynamic interplay of ... research, dissemination, professional development, and the training of an ever-expanding cadre of researchers dedicated to find[ing] the answers to the perplexing problems facing urban schools ... makes UES a unique and powerful instrument in meeting the State‘s fundamental obligations to the children of its cities.”
[REDACTED] Given this record, the district court concluded, and we agree, that “the defendants’ interest in operating a research-oriented elementary school is compelling.”6
It is not UES‘s designation as a laboratory school that justifies its admission process. UES‘s status as a laboratory school with a research mission is not a designation without substance. UES‘s research is funded in part through federal and private grants and its students are protected by all federal, state, and university guidelines, rules, and policies pertaining to research involving human subjects. Research results are shared through “a variety of publications, the television and film industries, computer technologies, and other media,” as well as through “seminars, workshops, observation opportunities, and conferences” offered to teachers, administrators, researchers, and educational policy makers. Its research mission and its dissemination of information makes UES “a center for the education and training of teachers and educational leaders.” Through UES, “nationally recognized scholars work together with educators and administrators to foster a better schooling system for California children.”
Nor does UES‘s stated mission of “educational research” justify its admissions process. A mere statement from a governmental entity that it is committed to research, without more, would not be sufficient to establish a compelling interest. But research is fundamental to the UES‘s charter. The research mission affects the day-to-day experience of its students and requires more resources than those available to most, if not all, other elementary schools. In 1995, UES‘s elementary school, with its population of 460 students, had a faculty of twenty-seven professors with doctorates in fields including psychology, education, and medicine. In addition, twenty-one graduate, doctoral, and postdoctoral students, three medical students, thirty-two nursing students, and seventy-five undergraduate student teachers were involved with the elementary school, observing, working with students, and conducting research.
All of these characteristics make UES an exceptional school and a valuable resource to California‘s public education system. Consequently, we do not share the dissent‘s concerns that this decision will lead to racial classification in “every stratum of a state‘s public education system.” Infra at 1075.
IV.
[REDACTED] To complete our strict scrutiny analysis, we next address the question whether the district court correctly concluded that “[t]he defendants have successfully proven that the use of racial and ethnic identity criteria in UES‘s admission policy is narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of a compelling state interest.” (Emphasis added.) In support of this conclusion, the district court pointed to “a parade of experts [who testified] about the necessity of a race-conscious admission policy at UES. Each expert‘s testimony was underscored by the belief that the State must ‘continue to conduct research on issues involving how children learn and how we can do a better job of teaching
Dr. Carollee Howes8 testified that “[t]here is a simple rule about being a researcher.... If you‘re trying to find a sample that has some [particular] distribution of race, you use race as the variable to make that. You don‘t use an approximation or some variable of it.” Dr. Stipek further testified that “even if the applicant pool in the aggregate [was] sufficiently diverse, an entirely random selection would not yield a population that balances ethnicity with other factors, such as age, gender and family income.” Dr. Handler also testified that “[b]ecause of the small sample size, it is highly unlikely that such a small group, if selected without some explicit consideration of race/ethnicity, would be representative of Los Angeles’ or the State‘s urban school population.”9
The district court commented on the testimony presented:
The Court simply cannot hope to recount each of the particular innovative educational techniques developed at UES, or each of the specific studies conducted at UES, which rely on the diversity of the laboratory school‘s student population. Having examined the testimony of the defendants’ witnesses, the Court is convinced that without a racially and ethnically diverse student population, the benefits to be gained by these innovations and studies would be lost.
Accordingly, the district court concluded that “it would not be possible, nor would it be reasonable, to require the defendants to attempt to obtain an ethnically diverse representative sample of students without the use of specific racial targets and classifications.”
The dissent suggests a number of alternatives to UES‘s current admissions process. These alternatives range from locating laboratory schools elsewhere to mandating laboratory conditions in public schools throughout California. See infra at 1077. But both Dr. Stipek and Dr. Handler testified that it was necessary to explicitly consider race/ethnicity in UES‘s admissions process to achieve the precise student population required for UES‘s research.10 Therefore, even if California were to establish one or more other lab schools elsewhere, this would not address UES‘s need to maintain the representative sample of students UES needs to fulfill its research mission.
Finally, in evaluating whether UES‘s use of race/ethnicity in its admissions process is narrowly tailored, we recognize, as did the district court, that courts should defer to researchers’ decisions about what they need for their research.11 The Su-
Based on the evidence in the record, we agree with the district court‘s determination that UES‘s use of race/ethnicity in its admissions process is narrowly tailored to achieve the necessary laboratory environment.
V.
In short, UES is a research-oriented institution dedicated to developing effective techniques for use in urban public schools-a project that benefits public school children throughout the state. California has a compelling interest in providing effective education to its diverse, multi-ethnic, public school population. UES‘s use of race/ethnicity in its admissions process is narrowly tailored to achieve the necessary laboratory environment to produce research results which can be used to improve the education of California‘s ethnically diverse urban public school population.
AFFIRMED.
BEEZER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
Keeley Tatsuyo Hunter appeals the district court‘s determination that the use of a racially classified admissions procedure at the Corrine A. Seeds University Elementary School (“UES“) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I write separately to express my fundamental disagreement with the court‘s opinion. It contravenes the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause: to purge racial classifications from public life. The opinion strays from our precedent and fails to take heed of the Supreme Court‘s repeated warnings against allowing the use of racial classifications in non-remedial contexts. More generally, the opinion reflects a disquieting renewed tolerance for the use of race in governmental decision-making.
I
UES is a laboratory elementary school operated by the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies (“GSE & IS“) at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA“). Students at UES are research subjects.1 UES‘s stated mission is to conduct research relevant to an urban educational experience, to work with teachers, communities and schools to disseminate that research and to foster a more effective education system primarily for urban elementary students. More specifically, as described in appellees’ brief, UES is devoted to “[s]tudying how children learn and how their backgrounds and family experiences-including their racial and ethnic identities-impact on their educational experience.” UES has a student population of approximately 460 children, ages 4 to 12, who attend pre-kindergarten through sixth grade classes.
The UES admissions committee is comprised of three UES teachers and two GSE & IS faculty members. In selecting students for each year‘s incoming class, the UES admissions committee does not use pre-selection interviews, achievement/ability testing or any other type of competitive criteria. However, the UES admissions committee explicitly considers, inter alia, every applicant‘s racial/ethnic identity.2 It does so in an attempt to
In December 1994 Hunter, who is now eight years old, applied for admission into UES‘s 1995-1996 entering class for four-year-olds (the so-called Early Childhood, or “EC-1,” Program). Six racial/ethnic categories were used for the 1995-1996 admissions cycle: African-American, Asian-American, Native American, Latino(a), Caucasian and Multi-Ethnic. In the section of the admissions application entitled “Child‘s Ethnic Identity,” Hunter identified herself as “Asian-American (specify): Japanese” and “Caucasian.”4 Hunter was one of 215 applicants for admission to UES‘s EC-1 program. 46 of whom were admitted. On March 11, 1995, Hunter was notified that she had been denied admission.
The UES admissions procedure for the 1995-1996 school year operated as follows:
First, the 20 siblings of current UES students who applied for admission were identified and admitted;
Second, the UES admissions committee determined a specific number of each racial/ethnic group to be admitted;
Third, dominant Spanish-speaking applicants were identified and a number of them were admitted;
Fourth, applicants from each self-identified racial/ethnic group were chosen at random to create a shorter list of potential admitees;
Fifth, from the children randomly selected within each racial/ethnic category, further sorting was done to ensure a reasonable gender balance and to distribute the admitted children among income groups;
Finally, a number of children were specially selected by the Dean of the GSE & IS (so-called “Dean‘s Admits“) and substituted for randomly-selected children of the same gender, racial/ethnic identity and income group.5
Hunter brought suit on May 17, 1995 against the Regents of the University of California (“Regents“) under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
II
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
“[R]egardless of [the] purported motivation,” Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997), “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; see Coalition for Economic Equity, 122 F.3d at 702 (“[a]ny governmental action that classifies persons by race is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny“). “[S]uch classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. It is the government‘s burden to satisfy the de- 6 mands of this “extraordinary justification,” Coalition for Economic Equity, 122 F.3d at 702. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny“).
III
It is uncontroverted that the racially classified admissions procedure at UES treats individuals unequally. Cf. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 (9th Cir. 1997). The only issues on appeal are whether appellees have asserted a sufficiently compelling interest to do so, and whether their chosen means are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
A
Appellees assert two separate, but related, compelling governmental interests: (1) California‘s “interest in research on effective urban educational strategies and dissemination of new knowledge about educational practices” and (2) California‘s “interest in promoting freedom of inquiry at the University of California.” Appellees’ Brief at 18, 41. Neither interest, whether considered singly or together, is sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny.
1
As the First Circuit recently noted in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795 (1st Cir. 1998), “[t]he question of precisely what interests government may legitimately invoke to justify race-based classifications is largely unsettled.” A few things, however, are certain. “A State‘s interest 7 in
It is also certain that “a generalized assertion of past discrimination in a particular industry or region is not adequate” to justify a race-conscious remedial scheme. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 909. Such a broadbrush justification “provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For like reasons, the “role model” theory8 is unacceptable as a compelling governmental interest. Not only does such a theory lack any connection to “the kind of prior discrimination that would justify race-based relief,” but also it “could be used to justify race-based decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and duration.” Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike a race-based remedy that is specifically tied to the eradication of identified past discrimination, the role model theory “has no logical stopping point.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (1986) (plurality opinion). It would allow the government “to engage in discriminatory practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose.” Id.
Beyond those few certainties, the case-law is more opaque.9 In Croson, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that racial classifications are justified only when used to remedy the effects of racial discrimination. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O‘Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ.) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.“). One year later, four members of the current Supreme Court reiterated this view: “We subject even racial classifications claimed to be remedial to strict scrutiny ... to ensure that the Government in fact employs any race-conscious measures to further this remedial interest [in redressing the effects of identified race discrimination] and employs them only when, and no more broadly than, the interest demands.” Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 611 (1990) (O‘Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95, 498-502 and Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267 (plurality opinion)).
Six of our sister circuits have adopted this view and have definitively held that racial classifications may only be used for the purpose of remedying racial discrimination. See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Contractors Ass‘n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1996); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1994);
A majority of the Supreme Court has never accepted a non-remedial justification for a racial classification.10 See Metro, 497 U.S. at 612 (O‘Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (“Modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one [compelling governmental] interest [in using racial classifications]: remedying the effects of racial discrimination.“). In fact, four members of the Court, dissenting in Metro, squarely rejected a non-remedial compelling governmental interest in “diversity of broadcast viewpoints.”11 See id. Two circuit courts have also specifically rejected the “diversity” justification.
See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 (“the use of race to achieve a diverse student body ... simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to meet the steep standard of strict scrutiny“); Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting, in the employment context, that “[w]e do not think diversity can be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level, particularly when the Court has given every indication of wanting to cut back Metro Broadcasting“). Based on its review of the relevant Supreme Court caselaw, the Hopwood court even went so far as to state that “non-remedial state interests will never justify racial classifications.” Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
Justice O‘Connor‘s dissenting opinion in Metro represented the view of four Justices. The majority opinion in Metro upheld the federal government‘s non-remedial interest in “diversity of broadcast viewpoints” only by applying intermediate scrutiny (which the Court believed appropriate for federal racial classifications). Metro has since been overruled, see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27, in part because its application of intermediate scrutiny to federal racial classifications was inconsistent with the strict scrutiny applied to state racial classifications. In overruling Metro, Adarand did not specifically address the question whether “diversity of broadcast viewpoints” could count as a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny. See id. at 258-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“the question is not remotely presented in this case“). Thus, the Metro dissent‘s thorough and thoughtful rejection of an asserted non-remedial governmental interest in “diversity” under strict scrutiny provides signif-
The leitmotif of Justice O‘Connor‘s dissent in Metro is best captured by the following: “Social scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think.” Metro, 497 U.S. at 602. Racial classifications, “whether providing benefits to or burdening particular racial or ethnic groups,” are inherently pernicious because “[t]hey endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.” Id. at 603-04. Such policies “may stigmatize those groups singled out for different treatment” and “may embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race....” Id. at 604.
The majority in Metro found solace in their argument that “diversity” would only justify “benign” uses of race-conscious measures. See Metro, 497 U.S. at 563-65 & n. 12. The dissenters found this cold comfort, noting that “[t]he Court‘s emphasis on ‘benign racial classifications’ suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria. History should teach greater humility.” Id. at 609. “Divorced from any remedial purpose and otherwise undefined, ‘benign’ means only what shifting fashions and changing politics deem acceptable.” Id. at 615. Thus, “racial distinctions might be directed expressly or in practice at any racial or ethnic group” depending on “the preference of the moment.” Id. at 610.
It is precisely because racial classifications are “potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,” id. at 604, that the Supreme Court has only tolerated them in carefully defined remedial contexts. See id. at 612; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion) (noting “the Court‘s focus on prior discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a State‘s adoption of race-based remedies“). A non-remedial “interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications.” Metro, 497 U.S. at 612.
Justice O‘Connor‘s dissenting opinion excoriated the majority for “too casually extend[ing] the justifications that might support racial classifications, beyond that of remedying past discrimination.” Id. at 613. Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion characterized “diversity” as “certainly insufficiently weighty to justify tolerance” of government-sponsored racial distinctions; indeed, to accept “diversity” as a justification would be to “trivialize[ ] the constitutional command to guard against such discrimination.” Id. at 614. Of particular concern was the possibility that, “[l]ike the vague assertion of societal discrimination, a claim of insufficiently diverse broadcasting viewpoints might be used to justify ... unconstrained racial preferences ... [and] would support indefinite use of racial classifications.” Id. Justice O‘Connor‘s discussion of “diversity” as a possible com-
We should not accept as adequate for equal protection purposes an interest unrelated to race, yet capable of supporting measures so difficult to distinguish from proscribed discrimination. The remedial interest may support race classifications because that interest is necessarily related to past racial discrimination; yet the interest in diversity of viewpoints provides no legitimate, much less important, reason to employ race classifications apart from generalizations impermissibly equating race with thoughts and behavior.
The same fear expressed in Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion that “diversity” could be used to justify the indefinite use of racial classifications explains the Supreme Court‘s requirement that even remedial race-conscious measures be supported by a “specific and verifiable,” id. at 613, interest in eradicating racial discrimination. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 909. The Court requires such showings to ensure that racial classifications will have “only limited and carefully defined uses.” Metro, 497 U.S. at 613. For example, discussing Justice Powell‘s opinion in Bakke, the Court in Croson highlighted the contrast between the “focused” goal of remedying “specific instances of racial discrimination” and the comparatively “amorphous concept of injury” inherent in “societal discrimination” that “may be ageless in its reach into the past.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-97 (internal quotation marks omitted). The idea of “societal discrimination” “does little to define the scope of any injury ... [and] could justify a preference of any size or duration.” Id. at 505. Likewise in Wygant, the Court rejected the asserted interest in providing minority role models to redress societal discrimination because such a rationale would allow remedies “timeless in their ability to affect the future.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion).
To prevent such an unbridled use of racial classifications, the Court has imposed rigorous evidentiary safeguards: any governmental entity endeavoring to classify by race must point to specific, identified instances of past or present discrimination, Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 909, for which that governmental entity has been either actively or passively responsible, Croson, 488 U.S. at 482-84, 490-91; and that governmental entity must come forward with “a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09 (“findings of constitutional or statutory violations” necessary to justify a racial classification). Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects. Such findings also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself. Absent such findings, there is a danger that a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion).
2
I recognize that the great majority of equal protection jurisprudence has been formulated in the context of challenges to affirmative action programs of one stripe or another. The case at bar is not an affirmative action program; indeed, as appellees put it, the admissions procedures at UES “are not remedial in purpose and are not intended either to enhance the educational opportunities of disadvantaged children admitted to UES or to improve the general educational experience at UES
Let us not forget, however, the fundamental purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642. In the face of such a powerful constitutional proscription, UES‘s novel justifications quickly wither. So “noxious,” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring), so “odious,” Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100, are racial classifications in our constitutional democracy, that four members of the current Supreme Court have held that they have absolutely no place except in the most narrowly defined remedial settings. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). Another member of the Court, Justice Thomas, has written that “government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice.”13 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).14 I find these opinions instructive, if not controlling.
Even if UES‘s asserted interests are examined as possible compelling governmental interests, it is evident that they suffer from the same defects that doomed the “role model” theory in Wygant, the “societal discrimination” justification in Croson and the “diversity” rationale in Metro. As a preliminary matter, I would emphasize that academic freedom, standing alone, is clearly too flimsy an interest to justify racial discrimination. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14 (although academic freedom constitutes a “countervailing constitutional interest, ... constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded“). If “academic freedom” could justify a racial classification, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), would still be the law of the land. Thus, “academic freedom” will be considered only as an interest that might buttress UES‘s alternative claimed interest in educational research.
The district court held that “the defendants’ interest in operating a research-oriented elementary school is compelling.” I cannot agree. The “Supreme Court‘s decisions in Croson and Adarand indicate quite plainly that a majority of the Justices are highly skeptical of racial preferences and believe that the Constitution imposes a heavy burden of justification on their use.” Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 808. UES‘s asserted interest in “research on effective urban educational strategies and dissemination of new knowledge about educational practices,” Appellees’ Brief at 18, 41, cannot bear that burden.
Just like the “role model” theory in Wygant, an “educational research” rationale is “amorphous” and admits of “no logical stopping point.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275-76 (plurality opinion). Just like “the vague assertion of societal discrimination [in Croson, or the] claim of insufficiently diverse broadcasting viewpoints [in Metro],” Metro, 497 U.S. at 614, a governmental interest in educational research “might be used to justify ... unconstrained racial preferences,” id., that are “timeless in their ability to affect the future,” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
Because an “educational research” justification contains “no viable limiting principle,” it “may be expanded beyond any reasonable limits.” Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950-51. Although this case arises in the unique setting of California‘s only publicly supported elementary laboratory school, one shudders at the uses to which an “educational research” justification might be put. The holding articulated in the opinion filed today provides no principled basis for limiting the use of racial classifications in the service of “educational research,” nor even for restricting the type of state actors who may conduct such research. Every stratum of a state‘s public education system (whether formally designated a “laboratory school” or not) may now, in the name of “research on effective educational strategies,”15 implement a racially classified admissions system. The sure result would be “a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims.”16 Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
For example, the University of California at Davis Medical School might decide that its school would provide a valuable “research laboratory” site to examine whether a class made up of fixed percentages of members of various races and ethnicities would result in improved educational outcomes for those members. A local school board may determine that all of the elementary and secondary schools within its jurisdiction are now to be educational “laboratories” and that racial quotas in admissions will be utilized in order to guarantee the “research relevance” of its student population. The court‘s opinion betrays a disturbing tolerance for racial classifications, and a historically unjustified confidence in the ability of government to employ them for “benign” purposes. See Plessy, 163 U.S. 537; see generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 486-87 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) (plurality) (“The history of governmental tolerance of practices using racial or ethnic criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing an invidious discrimination must alert us to the deleterious effects of even benign racial or ethnic classifications when they stray from narrow remedial justifications.“).
Appellees proffered governmental interest in educational research, even when
IV
“Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State‘s asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 (plurality opinion). This narrow tailoring requirement demands “the most exact connection between justification and classification.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). In part, this serves to ensure “that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
We look to a number of factors to gauge whether a racial classification is narrowly tailored: “whether there was any consideration of the use of race-neutral means,” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38, and the “efficacy of [those] alternative[s],” United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion); whether the racial classification was adopted for the sake of “administrative convenience,” Croson, 488 U.S. at 508; and whether the chosen means are underinclusive or overinclusive, Metro, 497 U.S. at 621 (O‘Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).17 UES‘s racially classified admissions procedure is not narrowly tailored.
A
UES‘s race-based admissions policy lacks the “exact connection between justification and classification,” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted), that narrow tailoring requires. Appellees appear to believe that a child‘s race and ethnicity is somehow linked to a distinct “learning style,”18 and
But strict scrutiny “requires a direct rather than approximate fit of means to ends.” Metro, 497 U.S. at 620 (O‘Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). For example, the four dissenting Justices in Metro heard, and condemned, the argument that an individual‘s “race will likely indicate that [that individual] possesses a distinct perspective.”20 Id. at 619. They warned that “even if the ... equation of race and ... viewpoint has some empirical basis, equal protection principles prohibit the Government from relying upon that basis to employ racial classifications.” Id. at 620 (emphasis supplied); cf. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) (“Practices that classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals.“).
The dissenting opinion in Metro applies with full force in the instant case. Even if “some empirical basis” might support the existence of a causal relationship between race/ethnicity and a distinct “learning style,” the Equal Protection Clause forbids relying on that basis to classify by race. “[E]ssential equal protection principles ... prohibit racial generalizations.” Id. at 619; see Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 (striking down racial gerrymander because “[i]t reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls“).
B
“Among the various narrow tailoring requirements, there is no doubt that consid-
Appellees only response is to cite Coral Construction for the proposition that they are not required to “exhaust every alternative, however irrational, costly, unreasonable, and unlikely to succeed.” Id. at 923 (alteration omitted). However, Coral Construction teaches that a state must “exhaust race-neutral measures that the state is authorized to enact, and that have a reasonable possibility of being effective.” Id. California certainly has the authority to authorize the establishment of new laboratory schools, and appellees have failed to carry their burden of showing that such an alternative would not “have a reasonable possibility of being effective.”
Another reasonable race-neutral option would be for UES to conduct its research on “the ethnically diverse student population now present in the urban school community.” Hunter, 971 F.Supp. at 1328. The district court held that appellees had demonstrated that “the race and ethnicity-oriented research conducted at UES could not otherwise be performed in the actual urban elementary schools” in California.22 Id. at 1332. The district court erred in discounting “the efficacy of [this] alternative,” Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion). This race-neutral alternative clearly has a “reasonable possibility of being effective.” Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 923.
The district court found that existing public elementary schools would not allow teachers and researchers to control such things as class size, age groupings or student-teacher ratios. See Hunter, 971 F.Supp. at 1332. This is hardly an insuperable barrier. Any public school policies or procedures that present a potential impediment to conducting research in the public schools could be modified or eliminated, as appropriate, by the Board of Education and/or the California legislature.23
The district court also found that ensuring necessary levels of parental involvement in, and cooperation with, research carried out in public schools would be difficult. See id. The district court cited Professor Harry Handler‘s testimony that “depending on voluntary participation by parents produces additional bias in the study being undertaken through the self-selection involved in volunteering. At
The district court, referring to Professor Ronald Gallimore‘s testimony, found that “attrition of teachers and school support”25 presented a significant obstacle to educational research in public schools. Hunter, 971 F.Supp. at 1332. At trial, Professor Stipek expressed a similar view, stating that “[a] laboratory school ... needs teachers who are experienced working with researchers and who understand and accept that their job responsibilities require them to collaborate with researchers, to try, experimentally, innovative practices, and to evaluate those new methods and practices.” These practical concerns are not, however, insurmountable.
Appellees fail to demonstrate why public school teachers could not be provided with any requisite training and then induced, or even required through contract, to collaborate with UES researchers. Even if public school teachers could not be utilized, appellees offered no evidence showing that UES teachers and research teams, given appropriate support and authorization from the California legislature and/or the Board of Education, could not simply be placed at certain public schools as their research requires. Furthermore, the lack of public school “support” for educational research could easily be addressed through appropriate state legislation and/or changes in public school policy and operating procedure.
Finally, even if appellees’ theory of racial reductionism were valid, there is no reason for UES not to eschew the use of race in its admissions procedure and instead to choose students based on their particular “learning style.” A properly constructed test, or series of tests, could allow UES to identify children who display whatever “learning style” it wished to study “without resorting to stigmatizing and fractionalizing racial classifications,” Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 923. Given this possibility of an individualized admissions method, the only plausible explanation for appellees’ use of a race-based system “would seem to be simple administrative convenience,” Croson, 488 U.S. at 508. That defense is unacceptable. Appellees’ interest in avoiding the bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor UES‘s admissions procedure to race-neutral factors “cannot justify a rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect classification.” Id.
C
Appellees’ offer essentially six rationales to justify their reliance on race in the UES admissions process, namely: to ensure funding;26 to study the race-specific “learning styles” of children; to publish the results of research; to disseminate the results of research; to train future researchers and teachers; and to meet the requirements of specific studies. These rationales cannot justify the racial quotas that UES employed.27
The rationale premised on the need for racial/ethnic diversity in specific studies conducted at UES also lacks any kind of connection to the racial/ethnic quotas used. The only studies mentioned by appellees’ expert witnesses were a bilingual research project involving native Spanish and English speaking students, and an instructional program being developed on the Harlem Renaissance. The bilingual study only requires the selection of children based on their native language, and is therefore irrelevant to any purported need for racial/ethnic diversity or racial quotas. The Harlem Renaissance project is geared solely toward African-American students and it does not, even by its own terms, require any specific number of those students. Thus, it, too, lacks any connection to UES‘s asserted need for a set number of students from different racial/ethnic groups.
D
Finally, UES‘s utilization of a mixed-race category is a “red flag[ ]” signaling that its admissions procedure “is not, as the Equal Protection Clause requires, narrowly tailored.” Monterey Mech., 125 F.3d at 714. Indeed, UES‘s racially classified admissions system is overinclusive. The theory underlying UES‘s research mission is, in important part, that a child‘s race/ethnicity is specifically tied to a distinct “learning style.” But if this is true, the targeted selection of mixed-race children is incomprehensible-how could such a theory possibly require the selection of mixed-race students? Use of this puzzling category is compelling evidence that UES‘s admissions method is not narrowly tailored. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (“random inclusion of racial groups that ... may never have suffered from discrimination ... strongly impugns the city‘s claim of remedial motivation“); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 n. 13 (plurality opinion) (“The Board‘s defi-
Appellees only attempted justification for the anomalous presence of a mixed-race category in UES‘s admission procedures came from Professor Stipek. She claimed that “many children identified in California statistics in a single ethnic category are in fact of mixed ethnicities,” and noted that “researchers ... as well as government organizations ... are working on alternative strategies to collect ethnicity data that do not force individuals into single categories.” Accordingly, Professor Stipek explained that it was “inappropriate” to require multi-ethnic applicants to choose just one racial/ethnic category. This explanation manifestly fails to explain how the theory of race-specific “learning styles” justifies the selection of mixed-race students. The use of a mixed-race category in UES‘s admissions procedure is simply irreconcilable with the “onerous ‘narrowly tailored’ requirement,” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 294 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
V
I would reverse the judgment of the district court. UES‘s racially classified admissions procedure does not comport with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In my judgment, Hunter is “entitled to reapply under an admissions system that invokes none of the [ ] serious constitutional infirmities,” Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962, discussed in this opinion.
I respectfully dissent.