57 So. 794 | La. | 1912
This is a suit to annul a conveyance of minor’s property as having been made without observance of the formalties prescribed by law.
No evidence was taken, the parties having entered into a written agreement that the case should be decided on the pleadings. Whether this meant that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered, or also those in the answer, is now matter of dispute; but it is immaterial, since the defendants lose in either event.
The facts taken from the answer are as follows: In 1901 the mother of the plaintiffs sold the property in question, which was her homestead, to Spell, and delivered possession. She reserved- the right to redeem, on reimbursing Spell the purchase price of $350, with 8 per cent, per annum interest. This reservation was made in the act of sale itself, and without limit as to time, áhe died in 1904. The two plaintiff's, whose father had died previously, were left penniless, save for the said right of redemption, considered of little or no value, and were taken charge of by relatives. In the latter part of 1904, the said land began to show signs of greater value, as an effect of the tendency of the Caddo oil field to extend in its direction, and the grandfather of plaintiffs bethought him of the advisability of redeeming; and as-Spell was claiming that the right of redemption had been lost, Decause of not having been exercised in time, and that his title was absolute, the grandfather consulted the defendants, who are lawyers, and offered to give them one-third of the property as their compensation if they should recover it for the minors by either suit or redemption, they to furnish all moneys necessary for that purpose, and be reimbursed out of the share of the minors. The grandfather was as destitute as the minors were of the means wherewith to redeem the property. Defendants would not then undertake to furnish the money, as they thought that for making the redemption the taxes paid by Spell and interest thereon would have to be added to the purchase price and interest, and that the property was not worth that much. But they deemed it advisable that the grandfather should qualify as tutor, and that the land should be inventoried as belonging to the minors; and this was done, they acting as attorneys in the matter. Things remained in that condition for some four years, until April, 1908, when a written contract was entered into between the grandfather as tutor and the defendants, whereby the defendants were to have one-third of said property for the recovery of same by suit or redemption, they to furnish all -moneys nee
Defendants contend that the property did not belong to the minors, since their mother had sold it; that all they had was the right to redeem; and that a contract for enabling them to exercise this right was not an alienation of the property, but was, on the contrary, in fact and in law, a contract for the acquisition of the property, or of whatever portion of it would inure to them under the contract.
This court did on one occasion approve of a retrocession made in payment of the purchase price of the property where the minors were unable to pay in any other manner and were being pressed for payment. Mahle v. Elder, 26 La. Ann. 681. But two of the five judges dissented, and on the plain ground that the said article 341, C. C., requires the property of minors to be sold at public auction in all cases without exception. The majority of the court in that case rested their opinion on the fact that'the retro-cession had been for the best interest of the minors, as if the said article 341, C. C., al
The defendants cite the case of Holliday v. Bank, 118 La. 1000, 43 South. 656, where the present bench approved a compromise whereby a certain sum was accepted in settlement of a claim of minors to certain property. The distinction between a sale, or alienation, and a compromise, is that in the compromise there is not, and in the nature of things can never be, any certainty of anything having been alienated. It is simply the settlement of a lawsuit.
This act does not purport by its title to do more than amend and re-enact section 2897, R. S., creating a special privilege in favor of lawyers for their fees upon the judgments obtained by them. If, therefore,-it contained a provision amending the said article 341, C. C., such provision would be unconstitutional, null, and void as not having been expressed in the title of the act. The announcement of an intention in the title of an act to legislate upon the special privilege accorded to lawyers for their fees upon the judgments obtained by them would certainly not advise any one that the time-honored rule of article 341, C. C., by which the property of minors can be sold only at public auction was proposed to be modified. <
■The said act does not purport to do anything of the kind. It simply purports to remove the disability, real or supposed, of an attorney to contract with his client for ,an interest in the property to be recovered, in compensation for his services. The clause of said act relied upon as authorizing the alienation of minors’ property- by"private sale reads as follows:
“By written contract signed by the client;, attorneys-at-law may acquire as their fee an: interest in the subject matter of the suit,” etc..
The argument is that, inasmuch as the-attorney is here authorized to acquire by private contract, the tutor is authorized to> make the contract.
By the same token, the curator of an interdict or of an absentee, the administrator,, executor, or other legal representative of a succession, or of an estate in course of' judicial administration, could make a like-contract. In fact, all agents could, though, not authorized by their principals. Manifestly, said act has no such scope as this, and' means no more than that the attorney may make such a contract with those clients-who have the legal capacity to make the contract.
Said act is a general law, and, as such,, does not repeal, amend, or affect all those-special laws governing and regulating the capacity of persons to contract, or the manner of disposing of property in particular cases.. The rule is that a special law is not repealed’ or amended by a general law, unless the two> cannot possibly stand together, or unless the intention to repeal or amend is otherwise-manifest. 36 Cyc. 1057; 26 A. & E. E. 739. As illustrations of this rule, we will cite the-following: In the case of Hayes v. Morgan’s R. R. & S. S. Co., 117 La. 593, 42: South. 150, it was held that a statute providing that all public carriers may be sued’ at the point of delivery did not have the-effect of repealing a special act requiring-the defendant in that case to be sued at its domicile. In Welch v. Gossens, 51 La. Ann. 852, 25 South. 472, the court held that a provision of the charter of a city requiring for the election of the mayor a majority of all the votes cast was not repealed by the provision of the general election law to the effect
The case was tried twice in the lower court, each time by a different judge, and was decided both times for the plaintiffs.
Judgment affirmed.