Keal v. RhydderckKeal v. Rhydderck
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Thompson
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant in error, Thomas John Rhydderck, (now known as Thomas Ervin Keal,) was born October 27, 1909. In February, 1910, his mother was adjudged insane and committed to, the Kankakee State Hospital, and Thomas was placed by his father in the care of the Illinois Children’s Home and Aid Society. In August, 1910, the society delivered Thomas to James W. and Ruth B. Keal, husband and wife, of Tuscola. On March 1, 1916, they filed in the county court of Douglas county a petition to adopt the child. The petition stated the name, age, sex and residence of the child, the name of the mother and that she was insane and confined in the Kankakee State Hospital, the name of the father and that his residence was unknown, and that the child had no legal guardian. The father and mother of the child were made defendants to the petition, and summons was issued commanding them to appear March 27, 1916, and answer the petition. Summons was served upon the mother, Ellen R.‘ Rhydderck, March 4, 1916, by the sheriff of Kankakee county. The sheriff of Douglas county made a return on the summons for the father, David Rhydderck, that he could not be found in his county. Thereupon the county clerk caused to be published in the Tuscola Journal, a weekly newspaper, a notice to David Rhydderck and others stating that the petition to adopt Thomas John Rhydderck was filed, and containing this warning: “Now unless you appear within twenty days after the date of this notice, and show cause against such application, the petition shall be taken as confessed and a decree of adoption entered.” This notice was dated March 1, 1916, and was published on the second, ninth and sixteenth days of the same month. March 27 a guardian ad litem appointed for Ellen R. Rhydderck filed a formal answer to the petition, and the petitioners filed a formal replication thereto. David
Where the parents of a child are living and there has been no proceeding in court depriving them of the custody of their child there can be no valid decree of adoption entered unless a verified petition be filed in the circuit or county court of the county in which the person or persons seeking to adopt the child reside or where the child is found, stating (1) the name, sex, age and residence of the child; (2) the name and residence of the person having the custody of the child; (3) the name and residence of the parents of the
The right to adopt a child and the right of a person to be adopted as the child of another was unknown to the common law. It was taken from the civil law and introduced into this country by statute. The adoption proceeding being statutory, the validity of a decree of adoption depends upon the compliance with every essential requirement of the statute authorizing it. (In re Sharon’s Estate, 179 Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283.) Being in derogation of the common law, the statute conferring the right of adoption must be strictly construed. (Watts v. Dull, 184 Ill. 86;
The attack made on the proceedings to adopt the child being collateral, the only inquiry proper to be made is whether the county court had jurisdiction to enter the decree. Before the decree can have vitality the court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. (Rabbitt v. Weber & Co. 297 Ill. 491.) Where a court is exercising a special statutory jurisdiction the record must show upon its face that the case is one where the court has authority to act. Jurisdiction in such cases. is never presumed, and if it does not appear the judgment will be.void and subject to collateral attack. (Rice v. Travis, 216 Ill. 249; Payson v. People, 175 id. 267; Haywood v. Collins, 60 id. 328.) Whatever the rank of the court exercising
In order to give the court jurisdiction of the subject matter it was necessary that a petition conforming to the requirements of the statute be filed. (Kennedy v. Borah, supra; Watts v. Dull, supra; Taber v. Douglass, 101 Me. 363, 64 Atl. 653.) The petition filed in this case did not state that the parents, or either of them, consented to the adoption of their child by the petitioners, or that the parents, or either of them, was unfit to have the custody of their child for any of the reasons stated in section 3 of the Adoption act. Section 2 of the act specifically requires that the petition shall state one or more of the conditions which section 3 requires shall be found before an adoption can be decreed. The petition not only fails to state the necessary facts to confer jurisdiction upon the court, but it states a fact that shows conclusively that the court could not, under the law as it now exists in this State, acquire jurisdiction of the subject matter. It appears from the petition that the mother of the child is living and is insane. Being non compos mentis she could not consent to the adoption of her child, nor could she be guilty of any of the offenses which would render her unfit to have the custody of her child. Whether the law should permit the child of an insane person to be taken from him and given to another by adoption is a question for the legislature to decide. To date
The decree is also void for the reason that the court did not have jurisdiction of the person of the father or the mother of the child. (People v. Seelye, 146 Ill. 189; Carter v. Botts, 77 Kan. 765, 93 Pac. 584.) The Adoption act requires that the resident defendants shall be notified of the proceedings by summons, which shall be made returnable at any time within twenty days after the date thereof. The summons issued for Ellen R. Rhydderck was dated March 1, 1916, was served three days later, and was made returnable twenty-seven days after its date. As the statute required the summons to be made returnable within twenty days after its date the clerk had no authority to make it returnable twenty-seven days after its date. The writ must therefore be regarded as a nullity, and the service of the writ conferred no authority upon the court to render a decree in the cause which would bind the mother of the child. (Schmitt v. Devine, 164 Ill. 537; Culver v. Phelps, 130 id. 217; Rattan v. Stone, 3 Scam. 540.) Where the record shows that notice was not given as required by law the court does not acquire jurisdiction of the person. (Forrest v. Fey, 218 Ill. 165; Clark v. Thompson, 47 id. 25; Johnson v. Baker, 38 id. 98.) The statute requires that defendants who reside outside the State or whose residence is unknown shall be notified of the proceeding by publication of an adoption notice, which shall be published once and dated the day of publication. The notice in this case was published on three different dates and bore a date different from all these dates of publication. The last date of publication was March 16, 1916. Twenty days after the date of this publication was April 5, and therefore the father,
It is contended by the guardian ad litem appointed by the court to represent the child in this proceeding, that the adoptive mother and the heirs of the adoptive father are estopped from asserting the invalidity of the adoption proceedings. The decree of the county court declaring Thomas John Rhydderck to be the adopted child of James W. and Ruth B. Keal, being entered without jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the persons of the defendants to the petition, is coram non judice and is subject to attack by any person at any time. (Bartholow v. Davies, supra; Rice v. Travis, supra; Haywood v. Collins, supra.) It is clear that there is no estoppel by judgment, and the question remains whether there is an estoppel in pais.
To be binding, estoppels must be mutual. (Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Keegan, 152 Ill. 413; City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 259 U. S. 318, 42 Sup. Ct. 486.) An estoppel must bind both parties, and one who is not bound by it cannot take advantage of it. (First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 152 Ill. 296; Mills v. Graves, 38 id. 455.) This rule has been , applied to an adoption proceeding. (Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Ore. 204, 20 Pac. 842.) In general, the doctrine of estoppel in pais has no application to infants. (Wieland v. Kobick, 110 Ill. 16; Schnell v. City of Chicago, 38 id. 382; Cobbey v. Buchanan, 48 Neb. 391, 67 N. W. 176.) Since an infant is not directly bound by his ordinary contracts unless ratified after he -becomes of age, all obligations in the nature of contract will not be indirectly enforced against him by means of an estoppel created by his conduct while still a minor. (2 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur. — 4th ed.— sec. 815.) There is an exception, however, to the rule that the doctrine of estoppel in pais is inapplicable to infants. (Lewis v. VanCleve, 302 Ill. 413.) An infant is liable, when properly sued, for
The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Douglas county.
Reversed and remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
We do not agree with the opinion of the court. It is in direct conflict with former decisions of this court, and while the opinion does not expressly mention them, it overrules them all upon the question of collateral attack upon a decree of adoption. These are: Barnard v. Barnard, 119 Ill; 92; Kennedy v. Borah, 226 id. 243; Sullivan v. People, 224 id. 468; VanMatre v. Sankey, 148 id. 536; In the Matter of Bohn, 308 id. 214; Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 id. 363.
It seems to us stability in the repeated decisions of this court is of great importance, and only an extreme case, if any, would justify departure from a rule of forty years’ standing. , .