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Kay v. Kay
513 P.2d 1372
Utah
1973
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*1 probabilities against things all of these any given sprinkler system occurring in KAY, Respondent, Plaintiff and necessary sequence causal cause one; run thousands into Myrtle L. KAY and Farm it is obviously any much more so Defendants Appellant. any harmful person one or house- beyond question any- hold. It seems that No. 13103. likely by one is far more to be harmed oth- Supreme Court of Utah. er ordinary living hazards of than Sept. 6, 1973. danger the is designed rule concern here to eliminate. foregoing impresses us as

demonstrating persua soundness

siveness argument expense

extraordinary imposed trouble and beyond regulation is entirely reason extremely it is to the rare

possibility of harm intended to

guard against; so because

it would seem whatever minimal dan

ger may could greatly exist minimized

by simpler precautions less expensive

in the construction and operation of such

systems.

On the basis what been said here-

in, it is our conclusion validity rule in is vulnerable to the at-

tack upon made it: arbitrary that it is

unreasonable, and that it therefore should

not be enforced. No costs awarded.

CALLISTER, J.,C. and ELLETT and JJ., concur. J., does not participate

herein. the insurance

apply bodily injury any member of residing in the same household Upon appeal, as the insured. *2 held that under the facts of the case Kay exclusionary Richard within the was clause, policy.1 which did violate Thereupon, plaintiff his amended com plaint joined as an addi defendant, tional claiming that he enti was tled to recover under the uninsured motor L. L. Summerhays, of Strong Hanni, of his mother’s State Salt Lake City, for State Farm Mutual. summary Farm moved for judgment, L. Black Gary Atkin, E. John Salt was denied. The was tried before a action City, Lake for Kay. merits; a verdict was rendered Heber Ivins, Grant Fork, American W. in plaintiff; and judgment was Wilcox, Brent Salt City, Lake plaintiff against entered both jointly defendants and respondent. severally. Farm, alone, appeals. CALLISTER, Chief Justice: prevailed Plaintiff before the trial court Plaintiff initiated this his action theory that as to his mother injuries damages mother to for the recover motorist an operating uninsured riding sustained while her in a vehicle, uninsured since the liability in one-car accident. mother’s household exclusion absolved the clause surer, Mutual, a filed declara in par- insurer from tory judgment action both mother ticular successfully accident. Plaintiff and son to under the determine provision claimed that in policy a un- liability policy by Myrtle Kay, carried as der uninsured motorist owner and de the vehicle stated term “uninsured automo- schedule, policy scribed in the which was bile” shall not an automobile de- include Kay in involved was accident. fined in the as an “insured automo- household, resident mother’s in exclusion bile” was void and violation of the man- section of Peterson, 1. State Farm (1971), 26 Utah P.2d held that wherein join improper in- 2. State Farm elected to remain in the action party surer as a defendant with tort-feasor. ruling did invoke the. of Christensen 41-12-21.1, accident; U.C.A.19S3, date of Section such . . This . .” section amended 1967. further such a be effective under this section it must be provides:

Section 41-12-21.1 issued an insurance authorized Commencing 1, 1967, July no auto- to do state and business mobile . certain minimum limits monetary of cover- . . . delivered unless cov- age. erage or a such operator, owner had it, supplement bodily in limits for in- liability policy effect jury or death set forth in 41-12- section respect to the motor filed with and accident in which sustained his in- proved by the state insurance commis- juries. Plaintiff has not claimed that such persons protection sion for the comply statutory with the legally are thereunder who entitled requirements of Section 41-12-5. Since damages to recover from owners or defendant exempt from the sanc- erators of uninsured motor vehicles tions of by having in ef- bodily . because liability policy her on her motor vehi- *3 resulting therefrom . . . cle, her may vehicle not be deemed an “un- insured vehicle” Safety Respon- the The foregoing section does not define an sibility Act. The uninsured motor vehicle vehicle;” however, “uninsured motor is, coverage effect, liability a substitute part section is Safety of the Motor Vehicle policy by which the insurer becomes liable Responsibility Act and coverage is cor- negligence the or fault of the unin- related with Section 41-12-5 of the act.3 motorist; guaranty it contract post- (c) the promise ais to answer for the ing security of suspension or the debt, default, or miscarriage of another erator’s license reg- and the motor vehicle person. operator istration upon report of such of a

motor vehicle accident which had resulted State Farm was contractually bound to in bodily injury. provisions These are not however, coverage; there applicable to such “(1) or owner was an exclusion. The household or fami- if such owner had in ly effect at the time of exclusion is for protect- the of such accident an ing insurers from collusion which might respect to the motor disputes arise in intrafamily and from the Lyon Indemnity v. Hartford Accident and 25 Utah 2d tendency CROCKETT, spe- natural of insured to (concurring the one Justice strengthen enlarge him the case : cially) involves members of his household decision, I concur in the but desire family. practical The impossibility plain add these comments: seems facing an action of defending insurer accepted enough can a fact type explains includ- necessity of the main of tak- ing an exclusion in Since ing premiums paying out this insur- public policy support there is a valid ance policy was that she would thus be- exclusion from come an of an “insured motorist” instead would be nonsense for this exclusion difficulty “uninsured motorist.” The here ground constitute a substi- to activate the ap- arisen confronted has because of tuted coverage under parent between two conflict provisions. motor- The uninsured hand, on the one the extension to nul- become a device occupants of coverage to of the automobile lify household There is exclusion clauses. injured by “uninsured nothing in Safety Responsibility Act other, exclusion members that mandates such a result.5 plain- Farm is obliged Since State It has determined that the

tiff under the uninsured motorist family.1 was a Therefore member policy, points the other raised exception clearly would seem to peal by State Farm discussed. need not be from exclude him judgment against is re- argues, plausibili- without considerable versed, with an and this case is remanded ty, so that because he was excluded the ef- order to enter a mother “uninsured motorist.” State Farm. Farm is awarded costs. problem to be confronted re provi

solved which of here is: the two given priority. sions stated above should be ELLETT *4 In order is determine that JJ., concur. to Kay, Co., v. Mutual Insur. 4. Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 36, ; supra. (1972) 1, Ala.App. Holt 48 261 So.2d 757 footnote Co., Tenn., v. Insur. 486 Craig v. 5. Automobile Club Insurance Co. S.W.2d 734 (D.C.E.D. Ky. F.Supp. 1971), 988 328 Co., 1, opinion. (1971) ; main Allen v. Insur. 1. Footnote West American Ky., (1971) ; Lammers v. 467 S.W.2d 123 98 motorist,” would render mean- contract;2 and

proper the entire to look at excep- justified ingless overlapping the reasonable provisions appear be where to family.” as to “members of the conflict, weight pri tion give or in to them thrust ority in accordance with the main said, just Consistent with what contract; and this conclusion, persuasive our and further sometimes involves consideration also is the fact that policy. that: assumption, proceed upon the should We The term “uninsured automobile” above, noted that the main include: the taking out and issuance of the Myrtle Kay was that would be an “insured “in- An defined herein automobile she in fact had sured automobile.” conformity force a law.3 regard In this it is noted automo- of members exclusion as insured, Myrtle bile driven justi- of the an essential and well is was the described as the exclusion, in the fied reasons stated policy. sured automobile in the opinion. main to this: As my an “unin- is that when the entire caused picture comparatively analyzed light recent is sured motorist” of what has law, opinion, innovation in and in and its been said in the main and in this insurance general purpose supplement thereto, reasonably to extend cannot insurance injuries resulting from acci- take care of concluded from the insurance contract no dents other cars/’where there was the “uninsured extended cover- motorist” age pur- main If the con- was intended defeat the accepted, pose pri- making tention were of the that of insured, coverage defeating mary extension of an “insured mo- torist,” primary purpose express nor of obviating exclu- “in- as members to make his mother sion subject Tayco, 323, exceptions, 2. v. 400 P.2d this is Seal 16 306, Davenport Dickenson, regard 503; I be- Kan. the fact situation this case as 301; Enterprises, ing one, so because there was Kasten v. Rod See Aetna A.2d 12. force a conformable to law. Md. Casualty Surety Kellam, & Va. generality stated that if is sometimes McCarthy 287; v. Motor 152 S.E.2d denies App.Div.2d 35, Corp., 16 Vehicle Acc. Indem. g., Fire “uninsured.” e. General Accident See 909; on Insurance N.Y.S.2d Couch Casualty Corp. Life Assurance v. Aetna & Sec. 45:634. Surety Co., 208 Va. 158 S.E.2d 750.

Case Details

Case Name: Kay v. Kay
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 6, 1973
Citation: 513 P.2d 1372
Docket Number: 13103
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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