Kawasaki v. Hertz Corp.Kawasaki v. Hertz Corp.
Ordеr, Supreme Court, New York County (Beverly Cohen, J.), entered April 28, 1992, which granted plaintiff’s motion to renew, and upon renewal adhered to an earlier determination granting defеndants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, defendants’ mоtion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated, without costs.
On November 23, 1987, plaintiff was struck by аn automobile owned by defendant Hertz and operated by defendant Salant. The quеstion here presented is whether the IAS Court correctly granted defendants’ motion fоr summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that she suffered a "serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), which as here pertinent includes a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impаirment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from perfоrming substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the оccurrence of the injury or impairment.”
Plaintiff claimed in her affidavit in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and in her EBT testimony that she was required to wear a neck brace, belt and corset for at least six months following the accident because of severe pain in her neck, which left her unable to work as a
Dr. Robert F. Coreth, plaintiff’s treating chiropractor, averred in his affidavit "that the herniated disc is causally related to the automobile accident of November 23, 1987 [and that] in addition to the herniаted disc, plaintiff has pain and a significant limitation of motion of the cervical sрine, which is permanent.” Dr. Nathaniel Shafer’s affidavit described his treatments of plaintiff from December 1987 through June 1988, and his finding that plaintiff "had tenderness over the cervical, upрer dorsal and lumbar spine, with pain radiating not only up through her neck to the skull, but also down her left leg. * * * Mrs. Kawasaki also suffered from severe limitation of movement of her head and neck to less than fifteen (15) degrees in all directions. Mrs. Kawasaki had abnormal coordination, with a positive Romberg. In addition, her deep tendon reflexes were generally decreased.” (Compare, Zoldas v Louise Cab Corp.,
Thus, we conclude that there are at bеst factual questions as to whether plaintiff’s injuries prevented her from performing substantiаlly all of the material acts constituting her usual and customary daily activities for not lеss than 90 days during the 180 days after the accident, and whether she suffered "significant limitation of use of a body function or system.” (Insurance Law § 5102 [d].) As to the latter category of "serious injury” the Court of Appeals has stated (Lopez v Senatore,