134 N.Y.S. 675 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1911
Upon the demise of William Brill there was bom • a dispute or controversy between these litigants. As a consequence of his death some one was entitled to receive the sum of $1,000 from the Mount Vernon Lodge No. 11, Independent Order Free Sons of Israel. The plaintiffs and the defendant each claimed to be the proper recipient of said benefit. Each demanded payment. Upon the institution of suit by the plaintiffs, the order, aware of the adverse claim of the defendant and acknowledging its obligation to pay, requested the court to absolve it from the necessity of determining the legitimacy of these antagonistic demands. The application being granted, there was deposited with the city chamberlain, in. accordance with'the direction and order of Special Term, the sum of-$990, to which the parties herein assert contrary rights. The disputants are, therefore, before the court by virtue of said interpleader. At the outset it is advisable to proclaim that the obligation of the order to pay the benefit is beyond dispute. The materiality of
Conceding the court’s lack of general equitable jurisdiction (Mack v. Kitsel, 20 Abb. N. C. 293), there yet remains the undisputable authority given to it by section 820 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All power, whether legal or equitable, necessary to a full exercise of the authority conferred must perforce be vested in the court. As was said in United States Mort. & Trust Co. v. Vermilye & Power, 72 Misc. Rep. 375, it is competent for the Legislature to confer equitable jurisdiction upon the City Court, either expressly or by necessary implication. Again, in the authority last cited, it was determined that every power necessary to enable the court to completely execute the jurisdiction conferred upon it is possessed by it as a necessary implication from the powers expressly granted. It follows, as an undeniable sequitur, that the City Court has authority to entertain this action, having in the beginning thereof jurisdiction over both subject-matter and person. If the interpleader has added a question of an equitable nature, the court is not thereby divested of its prerogative of determination.
The difficulty regarding the jurisdiction of the court having thus been overcome, the next question which presents itself concerns the legal effect of the designation made by the
In the matter awaiting decision, the laws of the order required the member to make a designation upon a form prescribed by the by-laws. In accordance therewith, the decedent, upon such a form which he obtained from his lodge, designated the defendant, Julius Witt, trustee, as the beneficiary. The sufficiency thereof cannot here be questioned, inasmuch as the order has accepted it as sufficient. Its materiality in this issue depends upon its effect as a disposition or exercise of the power of appointment. If the exercise of the power requires a positive and unconditional disposition, then, regardless of the manner of designation, Julius Witt is alone entitled to the money deposited by the order. But, if it is no contravention of the law to make a conditional disposition, then heed must be paid to the language- used in the declaration filed by the member with the lodge in order to learn his intention.
Ho exhaustive search of the authorities will disclose a principle denying the right of conditional disposition. It is unquestionably the law that, as between the order and the
Seemingly this is an endeavor to exercise the power of appointment in a proscribed manner. Yet, upon consideration of the decisions which have determined the law of this State, it is not a violation thereof. Taking the will in connection with the declaration filed with the order, it at once becomes apparent that the power of appointment was made in the lifetime of the member and in accordance with the bylaws of the organization. As has been indicated, the mere fact that the person named was to hold only conditionally is immaterial, inasmuch as he was to take absolutely. Had William Brill, in the declaration filed with the association, named Julius Witt as beneficiary to take as trustee to give the fund upon Brill’s death to the charitable institution named in his will, no doubt of the propriety of the claim of
Saving thus discovered the validity of the member’s acts, we are ready to determine finally the rights of these litigants to demand payment of the fund. Undoubtedly, Julius Witt, since he is named as the beneficiary, would be the proper and, strictly speaking, the only person having the right to demand payment. But the law at all times endeavors to give force and effect to the desires and to effectuate the intention of the party in the simplest and most sensible manner. Ko better proof of that fact can be cited than Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, whereby-the principle of law that a person, even though not a party to the contract, may enforce it, if it was made for his benefit, was established.
Applying the reasoning of this irrefutable authority to the facts of this matter, the rights of the plaintiff to demand the benefits of the contract made between Brill and the lodge must be indisputable. They are the ultimate beneficiaries and, consequently, must have the right to enforce and sue upon the contract. To require payment first to the defendant and then by him to the plaintiffs would be ridiculous, since the result would be the same.
The plaintiffs’ contentions, consequently, are upheld and their right to the fund deposited judicially asserted.
Judgment accordingly.