Case Information
*1 Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Katrina Smith appeals the dismissal of her complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and the denial of her motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I
We review
de novo
a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez
, 480 F.3d
1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). The complaint is viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts are accepted as true.
Id.
at 1057. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a “pleading that states a claim
for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
*3
pleader is entitled to relief,” and that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). “[T]he statement need only give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the ground upon which it rests.”
Erickson v.
Pardus
,
Courts construe the pleadings of
pro se
litigants liberally. But this “does not
give a court license to serve as
de facto
counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”
GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, Fla.
,
II
Ms. Smith appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration of its order granting Ocwen’s motion to dismiss her amended complaint. In her brief, Ms. Smith broadly asserts that her amended complaint met the requirements of Rule 8. She says that the district court improperly applied a heightened pleading requirement above what is required by Rule 8, and was more lenient with Ocwen’s pleadings than with her pleadings. Ms. Smith also argues that the statutes of limitations relevant to her claims were tolled by the fiduciary relationship between herself and Ocwen and were extended by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.
A
We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.
See
Richardson v. Johnson
,
B
Although the notice of appeal indicates only that Ms. Smith is appealing the
district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration, Ms. Smith in her brief
challenges the district court’s initial dismissal of all of her claims. As a preliminary
matter, we may review the district court’s dismissal of Smith’s complaints based on
her appeal of the denial of her motion for reconsideration.
See Kirkland v. Nat'l
Mortgage Network, Inc.
,
Ms. Smith’s federal claims under TILA, HOEPA, RESPA, and for TILA
recision, and her state claim under GFLA are all barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation. All the alleged acts that form the basis for the claims occurred in 2002,
and Ms. Smith filed her complaint in 2011, well after the statutes of limitation had run
on those claims.
See La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc.
,
Ms. Smith raises for the first time on appeal an argument that the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. 111-21 (2009), extended the statutes of
limitations pertinent to her claims. In civil cases, we generally do not consider
*6
arguments raised for the first time on appeal.
See Ledford v. Peeples
,
For the claims alleging fraudulent conduct–i.e., the claims for fraud, collusion, and negligent misrepresentation–Ms. Smith fails to plead with particularity the actions of Ocwen that form the basis of those claims as required by Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed these claims.
With respect to the remaining claims, as the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation explains in great detail, Ms. Smith fails to meet the pleading standard required by Rule 8. The allegations in her complaint set forth only a “jumble of (often conflicting) factual assertions as well as general legal arguments that do not add up to coherent or plausible claims for relief.” R 1: 22 at 2. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Ms. Smith failed state a claim, even under the liberal rules of construction allowed for pro se litigants.
III
The district court did not err in dismissing Ms. Smith’s complaints in any of the *7 ways that she alleges. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration because Ms. Smith did not raise proper grounds for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.