Kathy L. Kaul v. Robert T. Stephan, Attorney GeneralKathy L. Kaul v. Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General
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Appellant Kathy L. Kaul, a Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian, operates a general store on the Prairie Band Potawatomi Indian Reservation (the “Reservation”) in Kansas. After learning that the Kansas Department of Revenue believed Kaul was violating state taxation laws, Appellee Robert Stephan, the then-Kansas Attorney General, assigned a member of his staff to investigate Kaul’s business. When the investigation revealed that Kaul did not have a valid sales tax identification number, Stephan participated in a search of Kaul’s store pursuant to two search warrants, which resulted in the seizure of 5,300 cartons of cigarettes. The state prosecuted Kaul for possessing cigarettes without the required tax indicia, but a jury acquitted her of the charges. Kaul then brought this action pursuant to
Background
Kaul, a Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian, owns the Indian Country Lumber and Gener
In late May or early June of 1991, officials of the Kansas Department of Revenue, including the general counsel for the Department of Revenue, Mark Burghart, and the Secretary of Revenue, Mark Beshears, met with Stephan to request his assistance in prosecuting Kaul for failing to collect and remit Kansas retailers’ sales taxes. The revenue department officials told Stephan that they believed Kaul was in violation of Kansas tax statutes and subject to prosecution under Kansas’ criminal tax statutes. Neither Besh-ears nor Burghart disclosed to Stephan the department’s policy of not taxing sales made on Indian reservations, nor did they tell Stephan that Kaul had applied for a tax identification number and that no number was issued because the department considered her exempt.
Stephan assigned the matter to Deputy Attorney General Edward Van Petten. On June 18, 1991, Van Petten applied for a search warrant to search and seize from Kaul’s store records kept in the normal course of retail business. The application alleged a violation of
Law enforcement officers, including Stephan, then proceeded to Kaul’s store to execute the warrant. While executing the warrant at Kaul’s store, a revenue department agent observed cigarettes for sale without the required tax stamp attached. Van Pet-ten then applied for a second search warrant, this time alleging a violation of K.S.A § 79-3321(a), which makes it “unlawful for any person ... [t]o possess, except as otherwise specifically provided by this act, more than 200 cigarettes without the required tax indi-cia being affixed as herein provided.” 2 The warrant was issued and executed that afternoon, resulting in the seizure of approximately 5,300 cartons of untaxed cigarettes from Kaul’s store. Stephan assisted the law enforcement officers by carrying several boxes of cigarettes out of Kaul’s store.
Kaul alleges that during the search, she showed Stephan two letters written by the Department of Revenue which she claims exempt her from state taxation, although Stephan denies seeing these letters until he was deposed in connection with this case. The first letter, dated June 23, 1989, is a letter from Burghart to attorney Lance Burr. It states that the Department of Revenue’s policy at that time was that it could not require certain “Indian Nations” to collect and remit excise taxes to Kansas. The second letter, dated November 7, 1990, is from Burghart to an employee of the Georgia-Pacific Corporation. The letter states that the revenue department was reviewing whether it had advised taxpayers that the
The state brought criminal misdemeanor proceedings against Kaul in Kansas district court, charging her with failure to make a retail sales tax return in violation of
Kaul then brought this
Standard of Review
In Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir.1995), we expressed the standard of review applicable to a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment as follows:
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.CivJ?. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then we next determine if the substantive law was correctly applied by the district court.
While the movant bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the movant need not negate the non-movant’s claim, but need only point to an absence of evidence to support the non-movant’s claim. If the movant carries this initial burden, the non-movant may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof. An issue of material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant.
50 F.3d at 796 (citations omitted).
Discussion
Kaul argues that Stephan is subject to
[ejvery person who, under color of [any law of] any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Here, Kaul alleges that Stephan deprived her of her Fourth Amendment rights because: (1) when he and his staff applied for and executed the search warrants, they lacked probable cause to believe that Kansas law prohibited Kaul’s possession on an Indian reservation of cigarettes without tax indicia or that she had committed a crime; and (2) Stephan was without jurisdiction to execute the warrants within the boundaries of the
A. Probable cause supporting the warrants
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
For a valid warrant to issue, it must appear from the affidavits supporting the application for the warrant that “there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it_”
Well-established Supreme Court precedent prohibits states from taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation absent congressional consent.
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax. Comm’n,
411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973);
Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463, 475-81, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1642-45, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). However, similarly well established Supreme Court precedent permits states to require that Indian retailers on reservations collect and remit sales tax earned on sales made to non-Indians or to Indians who are not members of the tribe governing the reservation.
See Moe,
425 U.S. at 481-83, 96 S.Ct. at 1645-46 (holding that Montana could require Indians
We therefore now turn to the issue of whether Kansas state law exempts Kaul from following the Kansas tax statute when sales are made to nonmember purchasers. We first note that neither
Indian retailers operating on federally recognized reservations selling products which have been imported for sale are subject to the collect and remit requirements of the State’s retailers’ sales tax and cigarette tax acts when the legal incidence of the tax falls on non-Indian purchasers.
(Aple. Supp.App. at 278.) Kaul refers to no statutory exemption under these provisions
Kaul next argues that the state policy at the time Stephan sought these warrants provided that these provisions should not be enforced against Indian retailers operating on Indian reservations. First, Kaul states that at the time she applied for a license to sell cigarettes, the state Department of Revenue had a policy of not collecting sales taxes from products sold on Indian reservations. However, an agency rule or regulation has “no force or effect” under Kansas law unless it is filed and published-as required by state statute. K.SA. § 77-425;
Bruns v. Kansas State Bd. of Technical Professions,
255 Kan. 728, 877 P.2d 391, 395-96 (1994). In
Bruns,
an engineer sought a license from the state’s Board of Technical Professions based on reciprocity and waiver of the Kansas examination. 877 P.2d at 392. A state statute granted state licenses based on reciprocity, although an internal board policy provided that such requests would be refused when the applicant’s license in the state of original examination no longer was valid.
Id.
877 P.2d at 392-93. The court noted that
Second, Kaul introduced two letters which she believes prove that the state law at the time the warrants were applied for prohibited the state from requiring that Indian retailers collect and remit sales tax. Because she alleges that she presented these letters to Stephan while he was executing the search of her store, she argues that he should have realized that he lacked probable cause to proceed with the search. However, these letters fall far short of suggesting that Kaul was exempt from complying with K.S.A
Third, Kaul argues that Stephan could not enforce
Because Kaul has failed to prove that
B. Stephan’s jurisdiction to execute the warrants
Kaul also argues that Stephan was without jurisdiction to enter the Reservation to execute the search warrants and carry out the seizures. Specifically, Kaul argues that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty bars state officials from entering Indian reservations. We recognize that in general, “[f]ederal protection of tribal self-government precludes either criminal or civil jurisdiction of state courts over Indians or their property absent the consent of Congress.” Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 349 (1982 ed.). However, “at times Congress has retained Indian country status but has delegated partial jurisdiction to states over areas of Indian country or over specific legal subjects.” Id. at 361.
Such a Congressional delegation of jurisdiction has occurred in Kansas.
Kaul argues that despite the Kansas Act’s general grant of criminal jurisdiction to Kansas, federal caselaw prohibits state officials from searching and seizing the operations of on-reservation Indian retailers. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980), the Court held that the state has the power to seize unstamped cigarettes as contraband when a tribe does not cooperate in collecting the state’s taxes on sales made to non-Indians. Id. at 161-62, 100 S.Ct. at 2085-86. However, in Colville the state seized the cigarettes outside the reservation’s borders as they were being transported to the reservation. Id. at 162, 100 S.Ct. at 2085-86. The Court found it “significant” that the seizures in Colville took place outside the reservation, “in locations where state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.” Id. The Court deferred consideration of the question of whether a state may enter onto reservations, seize stocks of cigarettes intended for sale to non-members, and then sell the stocks in order to obtain payment for taxes due. Id.
We have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable for damages in actions brought by the State. And under today’s decision, States may of course collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, or by assessing wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores. States may also enter into agreements with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactory regime for the collection of this sort of tax. And if Oklahoma and other States similarly situated find that none of these alternatives produce the revenues to which they are entitled, they may of course seek appropriate legislation from Congress.
Id. at 514, 111 S.Ct. at 912 (citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store.
However, we do not read
Oklahoma Tax Commission
and
Colville
as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce
regulatory
cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we accept the designation of
A further distinction with
Oklahoma Tax Commission
and
Colville
is that those cases involved a state’s attempt to tax an Indian tribe, while in the present case the state asserted authority to tax an individual who is not a member of the tribe where her store is located. The Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between Indians and nonmember Indians in several contexts, and has for most practical purposes treated nonmember Indians in the same manner as non-Indians.
See, for example, Colville,
447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. at 2085 (holding that state’s taxing jurisdiction over non-member Indians is equivalent to state’s taxing jurisdiction over non-Indians);
Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 688, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (holding that Indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-member Indians within the tribe’s reservation). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held that states possess criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations by non-Indians against non-Indians.
See United States v. McBratney,
104 U.S. 621, 624, 26 L.Ed. 869 (1881) (holding that Colorado by its admission into the United States acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens and other white persons through the whole territory within its limits, including any Indian reservations);
New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,
326 U.S. 496, 499, 66 S.Ct. 307, 308-09, 90 L.Ed. 261 (1946);
United States v. Antelope,
430 U.S. 641, 643 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1397 n. 2, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977);
Duro,
495 U.S. at 680-81 n. 1, 110 S.Ct. at 2057 n. 1.
See also United States v. Baker,
894 F.2d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir.1990) (discussing
McBratney
exception to exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction over Indian reservations);
State v. Snyder,
119 Idaho 376, 807 P.2d 55, 56-58 (1991) (holding that state has jurisdiction to prosecute a non-Indian for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol within the boundary of an Indian reservation);
State v. Jones,
92 Nev. 116, 546 P.2d 235, 235 (1976) (upholding arrest on Indian reservation of non-Indian found to be in possession of marijuana);
State v. Herber,
123 Ariz. 214, 598 P.2d 1033, 1034-35 (Ct.App.1979) (same). Because Stephan would have criminal jurisdiction to execute search warrants against a
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we believe that Stephan had both probable cause and jurisdiction to execute the search warrants at Kaul’s store, and therefore did not intrude on Kaul’s Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
Notes
. The application alleged specifically that Kaul was in violation of
.
.The district court concluded that Stephan‘s personal involvement in the investigation and search of Kaul‘s store was limited to his initiation of the investigation and his assistance in carrying boxes of seized cigarettes from Kaul’s store. However, Kaul argues that Stephan also was responsible for the acts of applying for and searching pursuant to the search warrants because he was the supervisor of the officers who actually performed these acts. ”[T|he proper articulation of the test for supervisory liability under
.A state officer is not automatically shielded from
. Our references to “nonmembers” of a particular tribe refer inclusively to all non-Indians and all Indians who are not members of the particular tribe.
. Federal law also does not prohibit states from requiring that Indian retailers maintain records of their sales to both Indians and non-Indians.
See Colville,
447 U.S. at 159-60, 100 S.Ct. at 2084-85 (upholding a state sales tax scheme that required Indian smokeshop operators to keep detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transactions made to non-Indians as well as Indians);
Dept. of Taxation & Finance
v.
Milhelm Attea & Bros.,
- U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 129 L.Ed.2d 52 (1994) (noting that Supreme Court precedent permits states to impose on reservation retailers “minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians.”). We believe that
. Kaul argues that
It shall be unlawful for any person:....
(h) To wholesale cigarettes to any person, other than a manufacturer’s salesman, retail dealer or wholesaler who is:
(2) exempt from state licensing under applicable state or federal laws or court decisions including any such person operating as a retail dealer upon land allotted to or held in trust for an Indian tribe recognized by the United States bureau of Indian affairs.
We do not, however, read this provision as exempting Indian retailers operating on federally-recognized Indian reservations from state taxation. Instead, the provision on its face addresses only exemptions for wholesalers and provides merely that wholesalers are exempt from submitting state taxes when they sell to Indian retailers who — as determined by state or federal law — are exempt from state licensing. The provision does not exempt Indian retailers themselves from state licensing requirements. In fact, state law, as determined in
Oyler,
803 P.2d at 584, holds directly the contrary:
. We also note that because neither letter was written to Kaul, she could not rely on them under the Kansas “Taxpayer Bill of Rights,”
. Because Kaul presents no evidence that the governor issued any order to Stephan, we do not consider whether Stephan’s role of attorney general would have obligated him to override such an order and enforce the statutes, or whether Stephan would have been required to obey such an order and not enforce the tax statutes against Indian retailers.
. Kaul does not argue that these cigarettes were intended for sale to member Indians or that Stephan lacked evidence that they were intended for nonmembers when he obtained and executed the search warrants. Accordingly, we do not address this issue on appeal.
. The full text of the Kansas Act reads:
Jurisdiction is conferred on the State of Kansas over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, including trust or restricted allotments, within the State of Kansas, to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the State.
This section shall not deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations.
. On appeal, Kaul argues that although
Kaul, however, conceded at oral argument that she did not raise this argument until appeal. Because we generally will not consider an issue on appeal that was not raised below,
see In re Walker,
959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir.1992), we express no opinion whether
. Because we do not consider Kaul’s Fourth Amendment claim actionable under the facts alleged here, we do not decide whether Stephan is shielded by qualified immunity for any constitutional violations. See Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1255.