*1 Before B AUER R OVNER , and S YKES , Circuit Judges . B AUER Circuit Judge. Kathy and Lia Holt filed this putative class action alleging Franchis ‐ ing, LLC (“Massage Envy”), committed unfair and deceptive business practices by advertising selling one hour mas ‐ *2 17 ‐ sages but providing massages that lasted only 50 minutes. They now appeal from the district court’s order granting Massage Envy’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Massage Envy is franchisor based Scottsdale, Arizona, grants licenses independently owned and operated entities for use of its name, trademark, and standardized business operations. Haywood is an Illinois resident and Holt is Missouri resident. Massage Envy has multiple franchise locations both states offer massages and other related services.

On November 2016, and Holt filed their first amended complaint which is subject Massage Envy’s motion dismiss and this appeal. It alleges Massage Envy violated numerous provisions Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), ILCS 505/1 et seq. and Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq. when it offered and sold “what it stated were one hour massages or ‘massage sessions’ provided no more than minutes massage time.”

Before detailing Haywood’s and Holt’s specific experiences, complaint explains how Massage advertised massage services on its website between May September 2016. It focuses primarily on advertisement on website’s homepage “Introductory hour Session*” at price $50. Clicking asterisk after word “Session” led user separate web page did contain *3 ‐ information about the length a massage. However, at the bottom the homepage there was a link that stated “*View pricing and promotional details.” That link led a separate page with a number disclaimers. One disclaimer titled “Session”explained that a “[s]ession includes massage or facial and time for consultation and dressing.” The complaint alleges that the multiple asterisks confused the average consumer and that Massage Envy deceptively hid disclosures where they were “nearly impossible” find.

Haywood’s first encounter with Massage Envy came after receiving an electronic gift card for $75 from her daughter via email. The email provided instructions for downloading the *4 ‐ 2402 hour. She received another massage that lasted no more than minutes.

Holt’s allegations regarding her experience are less detailed than Haywood’s. The complaint alleges that April 2012, Holt “accessed Massage Envy’s website to research the prices for a one hour massage” and learned that the nearest franchise location was Oakville, Missouri. She telephoned that location and made appointment for a one hour massage. Sometime during that same month, she went to the Oakville location and received a massage that lasted no more than minutes.

On behalf of Haywood and all other similarly situated Illinois residents, the complaint alleges counts of Affirmative Deception, Material Omissions of Fact, and Unfair Practices in violation the IFCA. It alleges the same three counts in violation the MMPA on behalf Holt and all other similarly situated Missouri residents. Massage moved to dismiss complaint arguing both lack subject matter jurisdiction and failure state claim on which relief may be granted.

On June 2017, district court granted Massage Envy’s motion and dismissed complaint with prejudice. The court first held and Holt had standing, rejecting Massage Envy’s argument they had not pleaded cogniza ‐ ble injury fairly traceable Envy. However, when analyzing requirements pleading damages under IFCA and MMPA, court held both Haywood and Holt’s allegations failed meet standards set forth by those statutes corresponding case law. The court also found Holt’s claims did meet heightened pleading *5 17 5 standard required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as she did allege a time or a place fraudulent conduct, nor did she state particularly how she deceived. Haywood and Holt timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s ruling a complaint fails to state claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. , 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). We “may affirm district court’s dis ‐ missal on any ground supported by record, even if differ ‐ ent from grounds relied upon by district court.” Slaney v. The Intern. Amateur Athletic Fed’n F.3d (7th Cir. 2001). “To survive motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide enough factual information state a claim relief is plausible on its face and raise right to relief above speculative level.” Camasta F.3d at (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Haywood Holt bring their claims under different statutes, we will analyze sufficiency their allegations separately.

A. Haywood’s ICFA Claims

We analyze ICFA claims deception under heightened pleading standard Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b). Id. Although brings one ICFA claim alleging unfair practices, claim still sounds fraud because it relies upon same baseline allegation intentionally misled consumers by hiding information on length of massage time. Therefore, it too is subject Rule 9(b)’s require ‐ ments. See id. at (holding unfairness claim that “sounds fraud” can implicate Rule 9(b)). Rule 9(b) requires *6 17 ‐ 2402 the complaint “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). That means that it must specifically allege the “who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud.” Camasta , 761 F.3d at 737 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To state a claim under the ICFA as a private party, Haywood must plausibly allege: (1) a deceptive act or promise by Massage Envy; (2) Massage Envy’s intent that she rely on the deceptive act; (3) the deceptive act occurred during a course conduct involving trade or commerce; (4) actual damage as result the deceptive act. Camasta , 761 F.3d at 739; see also 815 ILCS 505/10a (providing individual cause of action violation resulting in “actual damages”). “Actual damage” this context means Haywood must have suffered actual pecuniary loss. Camasta , 716 F.3d at 739. Additionally, deceptive act must have been “but for” cause damage. Mulligan v. QVC, Inc. N.E.2d 1190, (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).

As initial matter, cannot obtain relief based on her second visit Envy because after her first visit, she cannot plausibly allege she deceived regarding length massage. In fact, she states complaint she booked second massage “to verify Massage provided only minutes’ massage time.” Because she knew how long massage would last, she cannot maintain claim based on second visit. Oliviera v. Amoco Oil Co. N.E.2d (Ill. 2002) (holding those who “know the truth” do have valid ICFA claim). Therefore, we need only focus on allegations regarding Haywood’s first visit. *7 ‐

Much of the district court’s decision, as well as the briefing before this court, was dedicated to a discussion of the require ‐ ments for pleading damages under the ICFA. The district court held that Haywood could not establish that she suffered an actual pecuniary loss because she did not spend any money on the massage, but instead used the gift card her daughter gave her. Additionally, the court found that Haywood’s allegations failed to establish that the value of the massage she received “worth less than what [she] actually paid,” citing Kim v. Carter’s Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 2010). Haywood argues that the court erred by failing to evaluate her alleged injury under the benefit ‐ of ‐ the ‐ bargain rule, which only requires an allegation that she received something less than what she was promised. However, we need not settle debate here because Haywood’s claims fail for a different reason alto ‐ gether.

Even had Haywood adequately pleaded actual damages, her allegations fail establish the requisite causation. Al ‐ though proximate cause IFCA claim is typically an issue fact, a court may determine it as a matter of law where “only one conclusion is clearly evident.” Mulligan N.E.2d at 1199. Here, only reasonable conclusion is Massage Envy’s representations regarding one hour massage session were but cause any alleged injury. See id. There is no allegation complaint her belief about the length massage caused make appoint ‐ ment. To contrary, only reasonable plausible inference is only receipt gift card caused her to book massage; alleged deceptive representations did not influence decision. Her failure cite specific deceptive *8 No. 17 ‐ 2402 representation that caused her pay for something she did not receive is particularly problematic in light of Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard. See Camasta , 761 F.3d at 737 (plaintiff must plead “how of the fraud”). She cannot, based on these allegations, establish Massage Envy’s alleged deception was but ‐ for cause her injury, and her claims fail as a result. See Mulligan , 888 N.E.2d at 1199; see also Oshana v. Coca ‐ Cola Co. , 472 F.3d 506, 513–14 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] damages claim under ICFA requires plaintiff was deceived some manner and damaged by deception.”).

B. Holt’s MMPA Claims Just as with Haywood’s claims, Holt’s are based on the allegation Massage intentionally misrepresented the length their massages. Holt concedes, and we agree, that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards apply her MMPA claims. Though parties do cite, and we have not found, direct authority on this point from our cases or those of our sister circuits, we note district courts Missouri routinely apply Rule 9(b) MMPA claims. See, e.g. , Pfitzer v. Smith & Wesson Corp. , No. 4:13 ‐ CV ‐ 676 ‐ JAR, 2014 WL at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2014); Khaliki v. Helzberg Diamond Shops, Inc. No. 4:11 ‐ CV ‐ ‐ NKL, 2011 WL 1326660 at *2 (W.D. Mo. April 6, 2011); Blake v. Career Educ. Corp. 4:08 CV ‐ ERW, WL at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 2009).

To state claim for deceptive practice under MMPA, Holt must allege (1) she purchased merchandise from Envy; (2) merchandise was personal, family, or household purposes; (3) she suffered ascertainable loss money; (4) loss result deceptive act, as *9 17 ‐ defined by the statute. Ward v. West Cty. Motor Co. S.W.3d (Mo. 2013) (en banc); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.020, 407.025.

The entirety of the allegations regarding Holt’s experience with Massage Envy are contained six sentences over four paragraphs of the ‐ page complaint. She states that she called Oakville, Missouri, franchise location to make an appoint ‐ ment for a one ‐ hour massage after she “accessed Massage Envy’s website to research prices for one ‐ hour massage.” When she arrived for her appointment, she received massage that lasted no more than minutes. These bare bones allega ‐ tions fall woefully short of satisfying MMPA’s pleading requirements, particularly when they are subjected to the heightened standards of Rule 9(b).

Specifically, Holt completely fails to allege that deceptive representation from Massage Envy caused her to suffer an ascertainable loss money. She does not state what, if anything, she saw or did not see on website that led her to believe she was paying for one hour massage time. In fact, allegation that she “researched” one hour massage sessions might infer that she saw disclaimer regarding massage session time allocation that complaint freely admits was present. Regardless, stating that she visited website is not sufficient claim she saw something deceived her. It does not provide what or how the fraud, as Rule 9(b) requires.

It is also notable she does state how much, if anything, she paid for her massage. For reason, she has failed plead she suffered ascertainable loss money. Moreover, as case Haywood, she fails plead any *10 17 causation. There is no indication that it was Massage Envy’s deceptive advertisement that led her to book a massage at one of its locations. Accordingly, allegations do not support the conclusion that Massage caused her to suffer an ascer ‐ tainable loss of money.

In sum, Holt’s allegations fail to state claim under the MMPA with particularity required under Rule 9(b). For reason, district court did not err in dismissing her claims.

C. Dismissal with Prejudice

As we have explained, district court was correct to grant Envy’s motion to dismiss. Still, we must determine whether it error to dismiss complaint with prejudice. We review decision an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez Koeneke v. West F.3d 801, (7th Cir. 2015). and Holt argue they can cure any infirmities in their complaint by amending and fleshing out details of their claims. Crucially, however, they did not request leave to amend their complaint from district court. They contend their lack explicit request is of no consequence, citing generally liberal approach granting leave to amend under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). See, e.g. , Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts Greater Chi. Nw. Ind. F.3d 510, (7th Cir. 2015).

We disagree. Nothing Rule nor in any our cases, suggests district court must give leave amend a complaint where party does request it or suggest the court ways which it might cure defects. To the *11 17 contrary, we have held courts are within their discretion dismiss with prejudice where party does not make such a request or showing. See Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , F.3d 930, 943 (7th Cir. 2012); see also James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Constr. Co. F.3d 400–01 (7th Cir. 2006).

Here, in light our analysis above, it is reasonable to conclude district court believed Holt would not be able cure problems their complaint. See James Cape & Sons Co. F.3d at (holding dismissal with prejudice not an abuse discretion where district court “could have quite reasonably believed amended complaint would suffer same fatal flaws as one before it”). Without request leave do so, nor any indication to court how they might accomplish goal, district court did abuse its discretion dismissing complaint with prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For foregoing reasons, district court’s order is AFFIRMED.

S YKES Circuit Judge dissenting. The plaintiﬀs in this pro- posed class action are two disappointed Massage Envy customers who booked one-hour massages but received only 50 minutes of actual massage time. Kathy Haywood and Lia Holt visited Massage Envy’s website before making their appointments—Haywood at an Illinois franchise in May 2016 and Holt at a Missouri franchise in April 2012. The website advertised a one-hour massage for $50 but concealed the fact that the customer would receive something less than a full hour of massage time (or so the complaint alleges). By clicking through a complex series of ﬁne -print links, a visitor to the website would discover that a one-hour massage “session” actually included time for consultation, undress- ing, and dressing. The complaint alleges that the disclaimer was obscure, misleading, and diﬃcult to access.

As factual support for this claim, the complaint describes Massage Envy’s website and its representations and omis- sions in great detail, and even includes various screenshots to illustrate the narrative account. The plaintiﬀs seek damag- es for deceptive advertising under the consumer-fraud statutes in Illinois and Missouri.

The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under either state’s law. My colleagues aﬃrm th at judgment, holding that neither plaintiﬀ adequately alleged causation and that the allegations speciﬁc to Holt do not satisfy the heightened pleading standard for fraud claims under Rule 9(b). I disa- gree. The majority’s decision misunderstands the causation requirement for a damages claim under the Illinois and Missouri consumer-fraud statutes. And Holt’ s speciﬁc allegations must be read not in isolation but together with *13 the rest of the complaint. So read, her claim easily satisﬁes Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.

* * *

The consumer-fraud statutes in Illinois and Missouri are materially similar. As relevant here, both statutes prohibit false, misleading, and deceptive advertising, including “the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact” in connection with the sale or advertisement of goods or services in trade or commerce. 815 I LL . C OMP . S TAT . 505/2; M O . R EV . S TAT . § 407.020.1. Both statutes provide a private remedy for damages. 815 I LL . C OMP . S TAT . 505/10a(a); M O . R EV . S TAT . § 407.025.

Recovery under the Illinois statute requires proof of the following elements: (1) the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act; (2) in the course of trade or commerce; (3) with intent that others rely on the deception; and (4) the plaintiﬀ suﬀered actual damages as a result of (i.e., proximately caused by) the deception. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co ., 612 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2010); Mulligan v. QVC, Inc. , 888 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). Likewise , a Missouri plaintiﬀ must prove that he (1) purchased a good or service in trade or commerce; “(2) for personal, family or household purposes; and (3) suﬀered an ascertainable loss of money or property; (4) as a result of an act declared unlawful [by the statute].” Hope v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. , 353 S.W.3d 68, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).

The district judge found the complaint deﬁcient on the elements of causation and damages. Taking the damages question ﬁrst, a fraud injury (whether at common law or under a statute) can be measured in two ways: (1) as a loss of *14 14

the beneﬁt of the bargain or (2) as an out-of-pocket loss. Under the beneﬁt -of-the-bargain rule, damages are assessed by asking whether the value of what was promised (here, a 60-minute massage) is greater than the value of what was actually received (a 50-minute massage). Under the out-of- pocket rule, the fact ﬁnder asks whether the price paid (here, $50) is greater than the market value of the good or service received (a 50-minute massage).

This case is a bit unusual because the ﬁrst method shows an injury but the second does not. Haywood and Holt did not receive the beneﬁt of their bargain (the promised one- hour massage), but they do not contend that they overpaid for a 50-minute massage.

The district judge applied an out-of-pocket method and dismissed the complaint for failing to adequately allege actual damages. That was a mistake. Both Illinois and Missouri apply the beneﬁt -of-the-bargain rule to assess damages in statutory consumer-fraud cases. See, e.g. Mulligan , 888 N.E.2d at 1196 (explaining that in statutory consumer-fraud cases, “Illinois courts have adopted the beneﬁt -of-the-bargain rule as applied to common law fraud- ulent misrepresentation”); Giammanco v. Giammanco , 625 N.E.2d 990, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining the bene ﬁt -of-the-bargain rule applicable in common-law fraud cases); Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC , 503 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that “ascertainable loss” under the Missouri consumer-fraud statute is assessed “ under the beneﬁt -of-the-bargain rule, which compares the actual value of the item to the value of the item if it had been as represented at the time of the transaction”).

The judge was thrown oﬀ by our decision in Kim v. Carter’s, Inc. , 598 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2010), apparently reading that case as authority to depart from the beneﬁt -of- the-bargain rule. Perhaps Kim could use so me clariﬁcation . The case concerned a “false discount” claim and must be understood in that factual context.

To be more speciﬁc, i n Kim a clothing store advertised steep discounts on its merchandise, but the markdowns were illusory because the higher retail prices were ﬁctitious . The plaintiﬀs sued under the Illinois consumer-fraud statute and proposed to measure their damages by subtracting the advertised sale prices from the advertised (but imaginary) retail prices. The panel rejected that approach, noting that the plaintiﬀs had not alleged that the defendant’s clothing was “defective or worth less than what they actually paid.” Id.

The reference to what the plaintiﬀs actually paid should not be seen as a green light for using an out-of-pocket ap- proach to damages in a statutory consumer-fraud case. Rather, the opinion simply used the price the plaintiﬀs paid as a proxy for promised value. That is, the panel construed the price paid as the objective value of the promised good instead of the fanciful retail price the clothing store invented. The panel ultimately concluded that the plaintiﬀs f ailed to plead actual damages because they “got the beneﬁt of their bargain and suﬀered no actual pecuniary harm. ” Id. at 366. Properly understood, our decision in Kim rests on the bene- ﬁt -of-the-bargain approach and should not be read as au- thority to depart from that rule.

C lariﬁcation aside, Kim has little relevance here . This is not a “false discount” case. No one disputes that a 60-minute *16 16

massage is more valuable than its 50-minute variant. The complaint adequately alleged actual damages under the beneﬁt -of-the-bargain rule.

The judge also accepted Massage Envy’s argument that because Haywood paid for her massage with a gift card from her daughter, she hadn’t actually lost anything. That too was a mistake. G ifts eﬀect a tran sfer in title, see, e.g. Hall v. Country Cas. Ins. Co. , 562 N.E.2d 640, 648–49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), so Haywood spent her own money when she charged her massage to the gift card. The complaint is not deﬁcient on this ground either.

* * *

My colleagues skip the damages question and instead adopt the judge’s second conclusion that the causation allegations do not measure up. That holding misconstrues the causation element in a statutory consumer-fraud claim under Illinois and Missouri law.

The majority begins in the right place: To prevail under either state’s law, a plaintiﬀ must prove but -for causation. But in testing the complaint under that standard, my col- leagues impose a reliance requirement that does not exist under either state’s law.

More speciﬁcally, the majority ﬁnds the complaint fatally deﬁcient beca use it fails to allege that Massage Envy’s promise of a one-hour massage actually induced Haywood and Holt to make their appointments. Majority Op. at 7 (“There is no allegation in the complaint that her belief about the length of the massage caused Haywood to make the appointment.”); see id. at 10 (“There is no indication that it was Massage Envy’s deceptive advertisement that led [Holt] *17 to book a massage at one of its locations.”). But an allegation of that sort is entirely unnecessary: fraudulent inducement is not a required element under either state’s law.

To the contrary, Illinois courts have unequivocally held that “reliance is not an element of statutory consumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co. , 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996). It’s the pl aintiﬀ ’s “damage,” not his purchase, that must occur “‘as a result of’ the deceptive act or practice.” Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co. , 776 N.E.2d 151, 160 (Ill. 2002). Indeed, in Connick it was enough that the plaintiﬀs ’ purchas- es “occurred after the allegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.

Missouri law is the same. The state courts have held that “the consumer’s reliance on an unlawful practice is not required” for a statutory consumer-fraud claim. Plubell v. Merck & Co., Inc. , 289 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). Causation under the Missouri statute requires only that “a plaintiﬀ ’s loss should be a result of the defendant’s unlawful practice,” not his “ purchase .” Id.

So it’s irrelevant wh ether the plaintiﬀs actually relied on Massage Envy’s deceptive promise when they booked their massages. To p ut the point slightly diﬀerently, i t’s not necessary that the deceptive promise induced them to pur- chase a massage. It’s enough to allege, as the complaint plainly does, that (1) Massage Envy’s website was deceptive (because it advertised a one-hour massage but buried in ﬁne print that a one-hour massage session included less than 60 minutes of massage time); (2) Haywood and Holt viewed the website containing the deceptive one-hour massage advertisement before booking their appointments; and *18 18

(3) Massage Envy gave them something less than what they expected (only 50 minutes of massage time).

These allegations explain the “who,” “what,” and “how” of this fraud claim to the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. , 761 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2014). Indeed, the “how” allegations are abun- dant and quite speciﬁc: T he complaint describes the web- site—its layout, representations, omissions, and navigation system—in great detail, and includes multiple screenshots showing what the site looked like at the relevant time. This description covers 108 numbered paragraphs and fully 45 of the complaint’s 69 pages.

The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of the fraud with particularity: The allegedly deceptive adver- tisements appeared on Massage Envy’s website from April 2007 until at least September 2016 when the lawsuit was ﬁled ; Holt viewed the website in April 2012 before booking her one-hour massage at a Missouri franchise; and Haywood viewed the website in May 2016 before booking her one- hour massage at an Illinois franchise. Nothing more is needed.

My colleagues also conclude that the allegations speciﬁc to Holt fall short under Rule 9(b) for two additional reasons. First, they point out that Holt “does not state what, if any- thing, she saw or did not see on the Massage Envy website that led her to believe she was paying for one hour of mas- sage time.” Majority Op. at 9. Not so. The complaint speciﬁ- cally alleges that Holt visited Massage Envy’s website “to research the prices for a one-hour massage.” The robust allegations earlier in the complaint explain the content of the website in great detail. Reading the Holt- speciﬁc allegations *19 against that backdrop, it’s reasonable to infer that when she visited the site, she saw what is described elsewhere in the complaint, including the allegedly deceptive advertisement. Nothing in Rule 9(b) requires that she repeat the facts recited earlier in the complaint.

Second, the majority ﬁnd s it “notable that [Holt] does not state how much, if anything, she paid for her massage.” Id. That’s an immaterial omission. What she paid would be an important detail under an out-of-pocket measure of damag- es, but it’s irrelevant under the beneﬁt -of-the-bargain rule, which (to repeat) applies in statutory consumer-fraud claims under Missouri law.

And we can be conﬁdent that Holt paid something for her massage. The context makes it wholly unreasonable to infer that she received the service free of charge. Indeed, as I’ve just noted, the complaint alleges that Holt visited Massage Envy’s website “to research the prices for a one-hour mas- sage.” (Emphasis added.) The only reasonable inference here is that she paid the advertised rate for a one-hour massage. And we know from the complaint’s earlier narrative that the website advertised a one-hour massage for $50. Again, Holt was not required to repeat the voluminous allegations appearing elsewhere in the complaint. Read reasonably, and together with the rest of the complaint, the allegations speciﬁc to Holt satisfy Rule 9(b) ’s particularity requirement.

* * *

In short, the complaint survives scrutiny under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), and the case should have been allowed to move forward. The plaintiﬀ ’s claims aren’t worth much, and I’m skeptical that the case is appropriate for class certiﬁcation. *20 20

But the complaint states claims for relief under Illinois and Missouri law and should not have been dismissed. I respect- fully dissent. gift card and scheduling appointment. The complaint notes “[a] line buried fine print at bottom email stated, ‘Session includes massage or facial and time for consultation and dressing.’” Haywood visited Massage website and booked a one ‐ hour massage session at a franchise location O’Fallon, Illinois. She did not see a disclaimer either on website or at O’Fallon location stating massage time would be less than minutes. Haywood went for her massage on May 11, 2016. After speaking briefly with massage therapist, she given time undress then received massage lasted no more than minutes. scheduled another appointment at same location on September 2016, “to verify Envy provided only minutes’ massage time for one hour massage.” She booked one hour massage session, this time via phone, $90. She did see any sign or display at the location noting massage time would be less than one