Plaintiff Kathleen A. Murphy appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Alan H. Nevas, Judge, dismissing her complaint against defendant International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) for denial of benefits under an employee-departure-incentive plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1988). The district court, adopting the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Thomas P. Smith, granted IBM’s motion fоr summary judgment on the ground that the denial of Murphy’s application for benefits was not arbitrary or capricious. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Smith’s Opinion dated August 30, 1993, adopted by District Judge Nevas’s endorsed order dated September 20, 1993.
In May 1991, IBM announced its offer of an ERISA-covered voluntary exit-incentive program called the Individual Transition Option (“ITO”) program. The ITO Program Employee Information Package (“Employee Information Package”) given to employees included a Summary Plan Description (“Plan Summary”), which stated that the purpose of the ITO plan was tо reduce IBM’s workforce while retaining those employees IBM deemed to have skills essential to the continued efficient functioning of its business. The Plаn Summary stated that “[ajlthough an employee is eligible to be considered for the program, he or she is not automatically entitled to recеive program benefits. Based on business needs, requests will be approved for this program.” The Employee Information Package reiterated that “[ejmployees who request to participate in the program are not automatically approved.” {Id. at 10.) It stated that
IBM, in its discretion, will be the solе determiner of when an employee’s departure is acceptable to the business and reserves the right to not approve an employee’s request if management determines that the employee is necessary to the efficient operation of the business.
(Id. at 5; see also id. at 13 (“ITO is a voluntary option for employees who are approved by management. Approvals will be made in a variety of situations when an employеe’s departure will not significantly impact IBM’s business objectives_”).)
Murphy was employed by IBM as an associate programmer from November 1987 until Septеmber 1991. In August 1991, she submitted her application'for a resignation payment under the ITO plan. In the following week, while on vacation, Murphy telephoned her manager, who told her that her ITO application had been denied by the plan administrator earlier that week. After resigning from IBM in September 1991, Murphy rеnewed her request for an ITO payment. In July 1992, she received a letter from the plan administrator, again denying her request, stating that “[t]he ITO Program Project Offiсe in Kingston, New York, determined that you were necessary to the efficient operation of the IBM business. Therefore, under the provisions of the Summary Plan Description, you are not eligible for the ITO program.”
Murphy commenced the present action in January 1993, contending that she was entitled tо ITO benefits. In support of its motion for summary judgment, IBM’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts submitted pursuant to Local Rule 9(c) (“Rule 9(c) Statement”) stated that during her tenure with IBM Murphy had been considered to be “an excellent performer,” “an outstanding employee,” and “a critical resource within IBM.” Murphy did not submit an opposing statement pursuant to that Rule, and these evaluations were therefore admitted. See District of Connecticut Local Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c)l. Murphy nonetheless contends that summary judgment dismissing her claim of entitlement to ITO benefits was inappropriate because there were questions of fact as to the scope of the decisionmaker’s discretion, the identity of the person who denied her applicatiоn, and the reasons for the denial. She also contends that she did not have adequate opportunity for discovery prior to consideration of IBM’s motion for summary judgment and that the district court did not properly review the report of the magistrate judge who recommended the granting of the motion. All of her contentions lack merit.
Where an ERISA-covered benefit plan gives the plan administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility fоr benefits, the administrator’s decision will not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary and capricious.
See Reichelt v. Emhart Corp.,
We see no merit in Murphy’s cоntention that there was a material question to be tried with respect to the identity of the person who denied her application. Arguing that the sрace on her application form where a decision would normally have been indicated remained blank, Murphy speculates that her manager, rather than the ITO administrator, denied her application. She does not deny, however, that she received the July 1992 letter from the ITO administrator confirming that he denied her application for benefits and stating that the determination
We also reject Murphy’s procedural challenges to the granting of summary judgment. Though she contends that she needed more discovery, she did not submit in the district сourt any affidavit specifying why that was so, and the denial of additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Burlington Coat Factory Wаrehouse v. Esprit de Corp.,
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of Murphy’s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Normal costs to IBM; IBM’s request for sanctions is denied.