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Kathleen Cope and Teresa D. Davis v. Devra S. Heltsley, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Hopkins County Court Clerk
128 F.3d 452
6th Cir.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 adversary proceedings given that propriate Davis, final D. lawsuits” and Teresa viewed as “stand-alone Kathleen COPE

can be appealed Plaintiffs-Appellees, if the could disposition which bankruptcy. 16 outside of dispute had arisen Wright Miller, Arthur R. Alan & Charles Individually HELTSLEY, Devra S. 3926.2, § supra, at 283. Capacity Hopkins as her Official 54(b) for Rule certi requirement Clerk, Defendant-Appellant. Court finality purposes determining fication for No. 95-6696. 158(d) § under 28 U.S.C. “establishes much-needed, for bright-line test determin Appeals, States Court of United finality certainty for liti ing providing [and] Circuit. Sixth court orders as to whether district gants” Argued Nov. 1996. ap bankruptcy court are remanding to the Petroleum, Decided Oct. In pealable. re Frederick of certifica F.2d at 853-54. In absence Rehearing Rehearing Suggestion 54(b) finality to the of a tion under Rule En Denied Dec. 1997.* Banc in a disposition by the district court partial any partial disposi bankruptcy proceeding, purposes ap is deemed non-final for

tion

peal. Id. 853-54. 54(b) was request Rule certification

No and no certi

made to the District Court such

fication issued. In absence such certifica

tion, remanding order the District Court final. Bankruptcy

case subject lack matter

Id. at 854. We therefore 158(d)2

jurisdiction must under section appeal this at this time.

dismiss

III. Conclusion above, forth DIS-

For the reasons set we appeal subject this for lack of matter

MISS

jurisdiction. 1292(b), appellate interlocutory jurisdiction § orders in bank

2. which confers review of U.S.C. appellate interlocutory ruptcy long to review deci proceedings. party on courts So as a bankruptcy proceed sions of district courts proceeding bankruptcy meets the con or case jurisdiction ings, provide as no does not us with appeals § imposed a court ditions may 1292(b) section made. Con certification jurisdic rely that statute a basis for Germain, necticut National Bank v. tion.”). 1146, 1149-50, 117 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d * ("There Judge grant rehearing rea- Cohn to infer either no reason 158(d) Congress § sons his dissent. § to limit stated in meant *2 appropriate qualification

patibility as jobs. reappointment On proposition this the defendant strength summary judgment on a claim of moved immunity. qualified Her motion was denied. review, Upon de novo we conclude as mat- *3 was entitled to ter of law that defendant n immunity. of such im- qualified The denial munity will be reversed.

I Constitution, Kentucky § Under Fulmer, (argued and II William K. county is to each in Commonwealth KY, briefed), Plaintiff-Appel- Covington, for in county clerk —referred elect a lee. County a Clerk1— as Constitution briefed), Choy R. Allen (argued Sun S. and every function as years. These officials four Louisville, KY, Button, Wagoner, Williams & recorders, signifi they and county also Defendant-Appellant. for respect responsibilities cant with voter elections, registration of and conduct DAUGHTREY, NELSON Before: licensing, of registration motor mar vehicle COHN, Judges; Judge.** District Circuit li riages, hunting fishing of issuance taxes, censes, of fees and collection certain NELSON, J., opinion of delivered matters, including increasing and other J., DAUGHTREY, court, joined. in which imposed unfunded of mandates number COHN, (461-462), a separate D.J. delivered capitol in Frankfort. from the state dissenting opinion. Kentucky’s Hopkins Western —de- testimony a deposition “small scribed in OPINION county” population type with a of Southern NELSON, Judge. A. DAVID Circuit 45,000 county a long-time clerk around —had Mr. Brooks first William Brooks. named brought against rights This is a civil action county clerk’s in won election to Kentucky clerk newly-elected a retired for reasons of health at and he passed deputy clerks who were over two fifth term in 1993. the end of his took of- when the defendant reappointment dispute There is a as whether fice. At time of his retirement there were plain- to retain the decision not defendant's staff, clerks Brooks’ full-time on Mr. job perfor- on the latters’ tiffs was based All plus part-time two clerks. were mance, they opposed to the fact that had Democrats, registered except Repub- for one primary gen- in other candidates backed at the appointed request lican defen- won by eral elections the defendant. dant, Heltsley, after the November Devra - (Mr. policy ap- Brooks a dispute factual election. had Regardless how this resolved, only political pointing members of his own might be the defendant took successor, Heltsley, party; Mrs. did not position before court that no his the district automatically Republicans exclude con- legal rule would have established sideration, too manifestly notwithstanding that she person unreasonable for a made it Democrat.) in her to treat com- standing shoes ** law, Cohn, example, provided United Dis- all cor- The Honorable Avern States otherwise porate powers Kentucky are of a exer- Judge Michigan, trict Eastern District 67.080(e). by a court." cised county "fiscal K.R.S. The designation. sitting by may county may given clerk in a nomenclature, court, 1. Under which see K.R.S. serve as clerk fiscal 67.120(1), Regis, justice indirectly courts have their hark back to the medieval Curia but own regardless. necessarily judicial body. is not Unless clerks a court appointed Heltsley, asked -had clerks were Mrs. who been her class- They school, pleasure. high served at his had about getting job clerk and mate statutory protection. civil service no the clerk’s Mrs. office. said she Cf. Robertson, (Ky. thought Moss 712 S.W.2d going there was be an so opening, (deputy “political ap are App.1986) clerks spoke Mrs. Mr. Davis it. Brooks about lacking civil service sta pointees,” “merit or He .a,part-time deputy, hired her as tus,” jobs “obtain and their at the who hold licensing department. vehicle motor pleasure will and of’ the working Davis full started time several clerk). months before the 1993 election. during Mr. Brooks testified that his tenure point thereabouts, At some in 1991 or after employees he told his that he office would Mr. hospital Brooks had been and at expect, them to vote for at election time. him circulating time when rumors were that he According deposition to the defendant’s testi- might reelection, not run for a magistrate *4 mony, the given were understand Wayne Browning named if asked he could be if Mr. Brooks not reelected ... “that was first the to be told should Brooks decide and successor] could come in clean house [his responded run. Mr. in Brooks the affir- day....” Another witness the next testified mative. deputy clerks asked to cam- that all were Early in January of 1993 Mr. Brooks made paign They for Mr. Brooks at time. election up his' mind not to stand for reeleetion. He so, apparently. all did Browning, so advised Mr. and he asked Heltsley Mr. Mrs. was hired Brooks as Browning for a commitment not to discharge deputy clerk in 1983 or She testified anyone in Browning the clerk’s office if place polling that she had been a worker for Browning should be elected clerk. agreed. during prior Mr. Brooks to her two elections Mr. employees Brooks his called into his appointment, and she had been recom- day, office the next them of told his decision position by for mended the the run, suggested they not to support and judge-executive. county Browning. Heltsley Mr. replied Mrs. Cope, a Plaintiff Kathleen friend of Mr. running she was in interested for election .(herself daughter Brooks’ clerk un- herself. sorry Mr. Brooks said .he was he 1993), til was hired as a clerk two or earlier, adding had not known interest of her years Heltsley. It three after Mrs. was Mr. support he that would not be able to her now impression Heltsley Cope, Brooks’ and already pledged he because was together in motor who worked the vehicle Browning. licensing department years, for several had primary was held in of May election problems getting along one another. with Heltsley, with Mr. Browning, Mrs. and however, Cope, Mrs. testified that she liked seeking other three candidates the Demo- Heltsley. Mrs. Cope cratic nomination. Mrs. and Mrs. daughter Plaintiff Teresa Davis was of Davis, actively supported Browning, as did Hopkins magistrate. a former Her in several of their co-workers the clerk’s had fiscal court father served on the supported Heltsley— office. Others Mrs. years, she testified. Davis knew Mr. Mrs. pink clothing signify wearing sometimes father, through her and she Brooks worked n they part Heltsley’s “pink of were in the clerk’s office for short time"in team,” as it to be called—while came the rest the 1970s after her father asked Mr. Brooks people apparently in office re- job. in keep her mind for a Mrs. Davis primary until mained uncommitted was left the clerk’s office to first in the tax work " over. commissioner’s office then in the and sheriff’s department. stay primary, In After won Heltsley 1979 she decided to Mrs. ev- eryone except Cope home to raise her was in children —this about the clerk’s office Mrs. time Mrs. in support the same that her father retired as Davis came out of Helts- ley’s magistrate candidacy shé returned to the work for election November. —but candidate, years Republican few 1990 or hygienist force a later. In 1991 she The dental phone and for Tarter, personal calls by Cope for excessive supported Retha named Cope Mrs. friction within office. causing Davis. called Mrs. —who help in primary to offer Tarter after the December, 1993, Shortly the end of before campaign— yard signs the Tarter placing Mrs. Heltsley Cope and Mrs. notified Mrs. that, Brown- Tarter as a sometime told Mrs. employment would termi Davis that their be- supporter, was concerned about ing she expiration term upon nate of Mr. Brooks’ Heltsley keep job if Mrs. won ing able to her Before they reappointed.. not be general election. testified, Heltsley she taking step, Mrs. this job keeping her Cope’s Mrs. about concern attorney and a only consulted not misplaced, although it is uncertain was not representative Attorney thé General’s of Heltsley Mrs. and to what extent whether fice, Babbage’s man right but Bob harid Cope’s may been Mrs. influenced Secretary of State’s office and support of other candidates. We are clerks at least two other counties. about the knew Court’s decision any of these privy to the substance of Illinois, Party Republican Rutan genuine There is a issue conversations. 62, 110 L.Ed.2d Heltsley’s fact motivation decid as to Mrs. expanding the decision contexts —-a and, plaintiffs,3 given ing not to rehire recognizes the Court constitutional which case, procedural posture of we must to which limitations the extent present purposes that the issue assume for taken into account in considerations if *5 plaintiffs would in favor the be resolved of government personnel actions2 —and state jury. submitted to a Heltsley that her Mrs. has denied decision dispense Cope with of Mrs. and the services II support on their of Mrs. Davis was based “I Browning Mr. or Mrs. Tarter. either The lawsuit plaintiffs commenced their two plaintiffs,” hired these 1994, August filing complaint against of Heltsley deposition, at her “if Mrs. testified Heltsley individually Mrs. and her —both they for me the full-time.” campaigned had Dis- capacity official the States United —in of Ken- trict for the Western District Heltsley’s The stated for Mrs. dis- Court reasons tucky the fol- job performance of Mrs. at Owensboro. As amended satisfaction with the lowing complaint among year, alleged the Cope and Mrs. Davis included an excessive handling the paperwork, things of other case arose under number mistakes that customers, use of office tele- First and Fourteenth Amendments rudeness 42 phones by Cope Mrs. for United Constitution and U.S.C. and fax machines States ventures, 1988; §§ plaintiffs that had high her own. and absen- 1983 and business positions from their as part. employees on Mrs. Both been removed teeism Davis’ publicly expressed clerks of their allegedly provide failed the sort of custom- because Tarter Heltsley Browning wanted for Mr. and Mrs. er service Mrs. to stress— example complaint performance a’written and not because of their she cited one job; Supreme he decision from a customer who claimed had been that under Court’s Rutan, standing actions violated left in line for 30 minutes while defendant’s guaranteed plain- Cope personal rights and free speech Mrs. Mrs. Davis discussed tiffs and Amend- matters. —and two women were faulted the First Fourteenth April date date for a worker's retention or nonre- 2. Under of Secre- as a basis taiy Babbage of Stale Bob sent memorandum it and the cases on which tention. Rutan earlier office, including III, to all local Mrs. candidates for rests in Part are discussed infra. Heltsley, "Essentially,” subject on the of Rutan. wrote, Babbage employ- Court held Mr. “the that testimony We add that there was should —de- political support, in ment or dismissal based on Heltsley indicating that when nied Mrs. — instances, unconstitutional, especially certain Tarter, Heltsley Cope supporting was she heard rights when it Amendment of violates First complained said about it and some- Brooks employee.” Babbage cautioned that "with thing Cope the effect that she did think exceptions,” few elected officials could not use ought to be able to work there. capdi- political activity particular support of a claims, disposition capacity in the their official merits; liberty that interests of and impaired in good panel names had been but a of this court plaintiffs’ declined to allow of of the Due Process plaintiffs’ Clause such cross-appeal violation review. The was plaintiffs Amendment. jurisdiction, only Fourteenth lack of dismissed for damages compensatory punitive sought qualified immunity question is before us attorney fees. award of costs and and an now. discovery, extensive defendant After Ill summary In

Heltsley judgment. moved accompanying her she ar- the brief motion qualified the doctrine of Under immu (1) plaintiffs pro- due gued that the had no nity, explained (2) claims; liberty the First cess Fitzgerald, 800, 818, Harlow v. claims of Amendment were barred because (1982), S.Ct. gov L.Ed.2d 396 reemploy- apply failure to plaintiffs’ engaged performance ernment officials in the (3) ment; Heltsley that Mrs. not be could discretionary are generally functions capacity in her because held liable official liability [and, indeed, “shielded from no consti- alleged there evidence was damages suit] for civil insofar as their con violations tutional were the result violate duct does not established stat (4) plaintiffs County policy; Hopkins utory rights or constitutional of which a rea no produced evidence that their - had person sonable would have known.” Cf. motivating expression was a substantial or 635, 638-39, Creighton, Anderson v. 483 U.S. (5) them; in the decision not to 3034, 3038,

factor rehire (1987); L.Ed.2d 523 politi- Heltsley to take entitled Pray City Sandusky, 49 F.3d hiring into (6th cal considerations account when Cir.1995); Saylor 1157-58 v. Bd. of clerks, deputies being “alter- Cty. Ky., Educ. Harlan F.3d herself; egos” (6th the clerk that Mrs. Cir.1997). immunity qualified was entitled to statutory rights are no There at issue presented a reasonable with because officer *6 seen, in the bar. As case at we have howev the facts known to her not have be- er, plaintiffs Heltsley assert the Mrs. clearly violating any that she was es- lieved constitutional right violated their of free plaintiffs right constitutional of tablished speech by allegedly retaliatory to her refusal failing to rehire them. of make them members her staff. This consideration of mo- After the defendant’s Hopkins claim—which the citizens of tion, response by plaintiffs, thereto and a would doubtless have considered bizarre had defendant, reply court district it been asserted back when Mr. Brooks was carefully opinion crafted and order issued clerk for the first time (1) granting summary judgment the defen- 1973—rests on decisions rendered as she in her dant insofar had been sued Supreme v. United Court in States Elrod (2) capacity; granting summary judg- official Burns, 347, 2673, 427 U.S. 96 49 S.Ct. individually ment on the defendant (1976), Finkel, Branti v. 445 L.Ed.2d 547 plaintiffs’ pro- Fourteenth Amendment due 1287, 507, 574 100 S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d claims; liberty summary denying cess (1980), Republican Party v. and Rutan individually judgment the defendant on Illinois, 62, 2729, 111 497 U.S. 110 S.Ct. claims; plaintiffs’ First Amendment (1990). The L.Ed.2d 52 Elrod-Branti-Ru (4) denying qualified immunity. that “the trilogy tan teaches First Amend Notwithstanding government a final dis absence of ment forbids officials to timely judgment, charge promote, the defendant notice ... transfer or fail filed [or (It undisputed appeal. public employees solely that the defen recall or hire] interlocutory appeal being supporters party dant was entitled to an of the 511, Forsyth, power, party appro under Mitchell v. 472 U.S. 105 unless is an affiliation (1985).) 2806, priate requirement position 86 411 The in S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Rutan, 64, plaintiffs permission obtained the dis 497 U.S. at 110 volved.” supplied). v. interlocutory (emphasis Faughender trict to seek 2732 court review Cf. Olmsted, Ohio, City discovery phase 94. But the North F.2d 909 this case of. (6th over, over, Cir.1991); Dep’t appears substantially Rice v. Ohio to be of Transp., (6th Cir.), denied, open cert. 512 U.S. we believe it is therefore to us to F.3d as- (1994). 1207, 2678, 114 S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d 812 sume the of a constitutional viola- existence see, deciding As we shall the case at-bar turns on the tion without it. This is the course clarity with which the contours of the itali we elect to follow. exception mapped in

cized had been B Assuming -Heltsley that Mrs. did violate A. declining the Constitution in to hire the argument presented by The first defen- plaintiffs, clerks, we must address Heltsley appeal dant is that she comes question whether the constitutional “appropriate requirement” excep- within the rights wrongs of the situation were so tion as a matter of law. Political established, 1993, in December of deputies clerk her is necessari- Heltsley’s po- reasonable official in Mrs. ly appropriate requirement necessarily sition would have realized that contends, position, Heltsley Mrs. be- plaintiffs right had a constitutional not to cause the duties of the are inherent- rejected polit- clerks because ly political and because the are “al- incompatibility ical with the clerk herself. egos” ter clerk under analysis begin question We our of this with a follows, submits, law. It Mrs. survey pertinent legal princi- brief of some plaintiffs have to make a failed colorable ples. rights claim that their constitutional were at all. violated logical step deciding The first whether important It understand there is a colorable claim that a defendant Heltsley’s subjective own views on the “clearly has violated established” constitu- legality staffing of her decisions are essen right plaintiff tional is to decide “whether the Anderson, tially irrelevant. 483 U.S. at Cf. has asserted a violation of a constitutional (“Anderson’s 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40 sub right Siegert Gilley, at all.” v. 500 U.S. irrelevant”). jective beliefs ... are Whatev 1789, 1793, 111 S.Ct. 114 L.Ed.2d 277 may actually er she thought about the (1991); Christophel Kukulinsky, v. 61 F.3d propriety constitutional of what she do (6th Cir.1995); Purisch Tenn. ing, pertinent one, objective test is an Univ., (6th Technological 76 F.3d subjective. Court decided Cir.1996); Scott, Turner v. 119 F.3d *7 years ago qualified more than 15 that where (6th Cir.1997). proceeds thus concerned, immunity is game trying the analytically appropriate the manner when in subjective good public determine the faith of she argument proposition starts her with the officials performing discretionary functions is that a failure to plaintiffs rehire the simply not worth the candle. Harlow v. alleged complaint

reasons in the would not at 815-19, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. at violated the Constitution under cir- applicable 2736-39. The standard is now cumstances. recognized “objective legal as one of reason 819, 2739; ableness.” Id. at 102 S.Ct. at legal The proposition, correctness of this Anderson, 639, 107 however, 483 U.S. at S.Ct. at 3038- necessarily is not self-evident. For 39; Pray, 49 at F.3d 1158. panel to come to a consensus on the issue difficult, might prove and it seem sen- requires This standard the courts pretermit sible to question if that right to examine relatively the asserted at a permissible. high specificity. right level of The must have discovery here, completed Had not been “clearly just been in established” an ab probably sense, we should have had no choice but to in “particularized” stract but sense. Anderson, 640,107 decide the threshold issue head-on. See Sie- 483 U.S. at S.Ct. at 3039. gert, 232-233, 500 U.S. at immunity 111 S.Ct. at 1793- analyzed Claims are thus to be

459 case-by-case fact-specific, reversing “on a basis to de in qualified a denial of immunity to newly-elected termine whether a reasonable official domestic relations court who, judge could have believed acting defendant’s] capac- his administrative ” Pray, ity, that his conduct was lawful.... 49 had declined reappoint a referee whom .Jackson, at v F.3d Garvie 845 the successful candidate had observed Cf. (6th 647, Cir.1988); 650 F.2d Guercio v. Bro act of distributing campaign literature for an (6th 1179, Cir.1990), dy, 911 F.2d 1184 cert. opposing candidate. denied, 904, 1681, 114 What these decisions and others like (1991); Abramson, v. L.Ed.2d Cullinan show, sum, them qualified this: “For (6th Cir.1997). F.3d And the immunity surrendered, to be pre-existing law convincing burden of the court that the law (not dictate, is, truly must compel just particular established under this suggest or about), allow or raise'a question ized “could have believed” is a test burden every like-situated, conclusion for reáson squarely plaintiff. that rests on the Hughes government able agent that what defendant Olmsted, City v. North 93 F.3d is doing violates federal law in the circum (6th Cir.1996). Saylor, stances.” 118 F.3d at quoting Univ., Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Bd. importance specific of the fac Trustees, (11th Cir.1994) 28 F.3d qualified immunity

tual context in which a (en banc) (emphasis original). question Cagle arises be seen in v. Gil (6th Cir.1992), ley, 957 F.2d 1347 where we legal There is one other principle we qualified immunity reversed denial of to a explain point, need to at this turning before newly-elected Tennessee sheriff who had re specifics of the ease hand. Re fused to rehire four sheriffs because Testa, to in ferred v. McCloud 97 F.3d opponent during of their of his (6th Cir.1996), canon,” as “the Rice campaign. Pointing election out that “[t]he principle legislature is this: Where the has parties have not directed the court’s atten particular job political, classified a choos single tion to a Sixth ing not to protection, accord it civil service holding ... Circuit decision af “appropriate requirement” exception to proper job filiation not a requirement for a the Elrod-Branti-Rutan rule “is to be con upon application sheriff of Elrod and broadly, presumptively strued so as to en 1349,4 principles,” Branti id. at this court compass positions placed by legislature held Elrod and alone were not Branti outside ‘merit’ civil service.” sufficient to requisite establish with the clari McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1542. If one believes in ty “that a sheriff could not refuse to rehire representative government, logic politically his motivated rea Rice canon is obvious: sons.” Id. at 1348. appropriate “The outer limits of what is Cagle approval was cited with in Mumford subject are now to determination Zieba, (6th Cir.1993), 4 F.3d 434-35 omitted], [footnote courts but within those panel where the noted that circuit “[t]his limits, surely, judgment people’s Cagle determined that reliance on [in ] representatives respect. merits *8 dictates of Branti and Elrod alone [was] ****** prove clearly insufficient to that law established [in sheriff legisla- context].” “Even after Elrod and Branti panel heavily Cagle relied particular ture’s decision as to whether a Mumford "Ordinarily, clearly clearly 4. by applicable find established consti be so foreshadowed direct right, a tutional district court within the Sixth authority as to leave doubt in the no mind of binding precedent Circuit must find Supreme from the reasonable officer that his conduct was unconsti Court, Circuit, the Sixth or from itself. only tutional." Id. at “[I]t 1348. is in extraordi Seiter, Employees Ohio Civil Serv. v. 858 Ass'n nary beyond Supreme cases we can look that (6th Cir.1988). Although F.2d 1177 deci precedent ‘clearly Circuit Sixth .to find sions of other courts can law, establish " City Southfield, law.’ established Walton v. point such decisions must both unmistaken (6th Cir.1993). 995 F.2d 1336 ly unconstitutionality of the conduct and

460 (The political

job genuine be or non- 416. existence of a issue of should classified entitled, political loyalty ap fact as to whether an political is at least as the First is said, job propriate requirement particular for a Circuit has ‘some deference.’” Rice, 1142-43, obviously preclude 14 at Jime- does not a belief on the quoting F.3d Gaztambide, part appointing of a official that v. Torres 807 reasonable nez-Fuentes req (1st Cir.1985). political loyalty appropriate F.2d is fact an uirement.) place, Kentucky In the second Revised possible, it have been at the provisions Would Statutes contain which a reason- person, newly- county easily interpret end reasonable able clerk could clerk, Kentucky county to believe meaning deputy county that a clerk is the elected^ political that the law entitled her to take ego county alter of the clerk herself. See (“[t]he compatibility deciding into account in whom county K.R.S. 62.210 office of the answer, to retain as her clerks? The ... clerk shall be liable for the acts or omis- think, “yes.” clerks”) 382.990(5) we is sions of and K.R.S. who, (“[a]ny county depu- clerk himself or place, published In the first there was no ty, perform duty enjoined any upon fails to Ap- decision the United States Court of ”). him ... shall be fined ... See also K.R.S. certainly peals for Circuit —and no the Sixth applicable county 61.035—held clerks and decision United States Cranfill, their v. Hallaban holding political compatibility Court — (Ky.1964) provides S.W.2d —which not, Rutan, appropriate in the words of “an any duty “enjoined by law or the Rules of requirement position involved.” 497 officer, upon Civil Procedure a ministerial at at S:Ct. 2732. “[I]n ” him, permitted act to be done case, present pre-ex- circumstances performed by deputy.” his lawful An isting “truly compel” law not did the conclu- county engaged clerk in the selection selecting public sion that her staff —the egos reasonably of his or her own alter could face of the clerk’s office—the clerk political compatibility appro- to be an believe political compatibility could take into ac- priate test. Saylor, count. at 515. F.3d (6th Belcher, place, Christian 888 F.2d 410 In the “[t]o third determine Cir.1989), interpreted by political a case appropri the district whether considerations are holding County] making personnel court as that “a ate in [Harlan decisions for a cer judge constitutionally prohibit- position, executive was tain [one] must examine the inher dismissing County from' position ed Flood ent [Harlan duties of and the duties that Building Inspector] Plain Administrator position perform.” the new holder of that will solely political Faughender, because of association (analyzing 927 F.2d at 913 and/or expression,” was a case that did not involve a position duties of a secretarial to which an clerk, deputy county appointee mayor did not involve a claim aof former not been had successor). qualified immunity, appointed by mayor’s and does not seem to “If gone any to have holding us further than this examination reveals that the genuine nature, “there is a inherently political issue of material fact as then to whether the appropriate duties of the Harlan affiliation is an requirement for Meade, political loyalty job.” FPA were such as to make Blair v. 76 F.3d (6th Cir.1996). ‘appropriate’ job requirement.” A Id reasonable clerk (6th Cir.1987), Lovely, loyalty appropriate requirement Conklin v. 834 F.2d 543 is either an relied, appointment Michigan deputy county on which the district court also did in- to a clerk, deputy county Michigan, job requirement volve a but in aor which a reasonable Kentucky. thought legally appropri- Under law it is at least clerk could have to be *9 arguable deputy county by panel that a clerk is the alter ate. The central issue addressed in clerk; ego county argu- presented whether the same was Conklin whether the evidence at Michigan ment support could be made was under law not trial was sufficient to a verdict for the Moreover, bar, plaintiff addressed in Conklin. Conklin con- on causation. In the case at course, analysis question political currently tains no whether causation is not an issue. COHN, examining placed Judge, .on District dissenting. the duties by clerk’s office statute —duties which by I As dissent. stated the district court: might upon per deputy clerk be called believe, honestly rightly form —could or choosing sup Plaintiffs[’] conduct in wrongly, position that the clerk is port political candidates other than Defen inherently political in nature.6 dant constitutionally protected constitutes above, conduct. As Finally, acquain- a reasonable clerk decided Defendant has we called “the Rice can- party ted with what have that demonstrated affiliation is legislature’s that on” would know deci- “appropriate” requirement an for all six position sion to treat clerk’s positions. Furthermore, teen political, by controlling, while no means law,1 upon based the above case other Rice, 14 entitled to some deference. F.3d at County Clerks Defendant’s know, 1133. Such a clerk would in other they understood that words, “appropriate requirement” were duty under affirmative to refrain exception general rule laid down taking employment such adverse ac Court in Elrod and Branti is an against public employees tion because of exception broadly that must be construed political expression. association or There McCloud, a case such as this one. 97 F.3d at fore, “assuming arguendo, political af filiation was a or ‘motivating’ ‘substantial’ justices Three of the United States Su- Heltsley’s factor Defendant decision not preme Court have subscribed to the view Plaintiffs,” to rehire the she is not entitled (or say precisely is hard to even “[i]t qualified immunity for that conduct. generally) ‘appropriate require- what [the ” Kentucky memorandum from the Sec Rutan, exception means.... ment’] retary of State defendant of the deci (Scalia, J., notified U.S. 110 S.Ct. at 2746 Republican sion Rutan v. Party Illi dissenting). If it is hard for even one Su- nois, U.S. S.Ct. preme say excep- Court Justice to what the (1990), means, stating tion it L.Ed.2d 52 ruling could be no less hard for a “[t]he means; Kentucky county say officials, clerk to what it issued means that elected with few For suggest, the reasons we have tried to we exceptions, political cannot activity use think reasonably the clerk could believe that support particular of a candidate as a basis to exception applies depu- to the selection of retain or not retain a worker or as the basis so, ty being clerks. That we conclude that hiring new workers.” The memorandum prevail Clerk entitled possible also warned: “It is that candidates qualified immunity on her claim of against who seek' office with extensive slate of .an capacity. suit in her individual being could run the risk of sued for else, improper hiring nothing If Insofar decisions.” quali- as Mrs. claim of Heltsle/s immunity put fied memorandum defendant on denied the order en- clear no court, reorganize tered the district the order is RE- tice that if she wanted to her staff, political VERSED. play consideration should not a public 6. The index to Baldwin’s Revised Stat- ed defender who was Democrat from utes Annotated contains five columns of small discharging public assistant defenders because print heading "County under the Clerks.” The they support did not have the of the Democratic reader who is interested consult this index Burns, 347, 351, Party); Elrod v. 427 U.S. 372- complete listing imposed for the of the duties 2673, 2689-90, 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 547 clerk's statute. office (1976) (declaring newly it unconstitutional for replace elected Democratic sheriff to certain 1. The district court’s references are to Rutan v. employees they non-civil service "because did Illinois, 62, 79, Party Republican 497 U.S. and were not members of the Demo 2729, 2739, (1990) (extend 111 L.Ed.2d 52 Party sponsor cratic and had failed to obtain the transfer, ing Elrod and Branti to decisions to leaders”); ship Lovely, of one of its recall, Conklin promote, employees solely or hire because (6th Cir.1987) (upholding association); Finkel, 834 F.2d 543 a verdict Branti v. clerk, 507, 519-20, 1287, 1295-96, deputy county in favor of a who was dis 100 S.Ct. charged (preventing newly appoint political activity). L.Ed.2d 574 *10 part. The fact defendant poli caution because

ignored the traditionally supported

tics a “to the victor

belong spoils”2 of conduct for standard

newly give officials is no reason to immunity a claim of First

defendant in the circumstances of

Amendment violation

this case. ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Ella M.

TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE

COMPANY, Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 96-1865. Appeals,

United States Court

Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. *

Decided June 1997. * opinion republished 2. Such is how New York Governor William Editor’s Note: This with Marcy Learned described President Andrew the correct attachment. patronage. use of Jackson's See Martin Tolchin Tolchin, (1971). & Susan To the Victor ... 323

Case Details

Case Name: Kathleen Cope and Teresa D. Davis v. Devra S. Heltsley, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Hopkins County Court Clerk
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Dec 16, 1997
Citation: 128 F.3d 452
Docket Number: 95-6696
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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