KATHERINE ROBERTSON v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CA-01404-SCT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
01/22/2015
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/15/2013; TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER; COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT;
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Kаtherine Robertson pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in 2006. In 2012, Governor Haley Barbour pardoned Robertson, and she filed а motion to have her record expunged. The circuit judge denied the motion, and Robertson appealed. The issue presented was a novel one when Robertson filed her appeal, but it has since been decided. The Court recently held that statutory authority does not provide for expungement of a pardoned conviction. Polk v. State, 150 So. 3d 967 (Miss. 2014). Therefore, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Robertson‘s motion to expunge.
Facts and Procedural History
¶2. Katherine Robertson was indicted for aggravated assault in 2006 after she shot and injured a man. She entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years suspended. In January 2012, formеr Governor Haley Barbour issued an executive order granting “a full, complete, and unconditional pardon” to Robertsоn. Based on the governor‘s pardon, Robertson filed a motion to expunge her record in the Madison County Circuit Court. The circuit court denied the motion, holding that it did not have authority to expunge a record. Robertson filed a motion to reconsidеr, a short hearing was held, and the judge denied the motion to reconsider. Robertson appealed.
Discussion
¶3. Expungement is statutory in nature. “This Court applies a de novo standard of review to questions of statutory interpretation.” Finn v. State, 978 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2008) (citing Capital One Servs. v. Page, 942 So. 2d 760, 762 (Miss. 2006)). The Court has held that circuit courts do not have the inherent power to expunge criminal records, but they can do so if statutorily authorized. Caldwell v. State, 564 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Miss. 1990). The Legislature has authorized expungement of criminal records in certain instances, including: youth court cases; first offense misdemeanor convictions before age twenty-three; convictions for drug possession before age twenty-six; convictions for purсhasing alcohol as a minor; and municipal court convictions. See Caldwell, 564 So. 2d at 1373 (code sections omitted). However, the Court rеcently held that there is no statutory authority for expungement of a pardoned conviction. Polk v. State, 150 So. 3d 967 (Miss. 2014).
¶4. Robertson argues that
¶5. The same argument that Robertson makes was made in Polk v. State. In that case, Zachary Polk was indicted on three counts of possession of controlled substances. Polk, 150 So. 3d at 967-68 (¶ 1). He entered a guilty plea for Count I, and Counts II and III were retired to the files. Id. Polk was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he received a gubernatorial pardon in January 2012. Id. Polk filed a petition for expungement of his arrest and indictment. Id. at 968 (¶ 2). The cirсuit court held that it did not have authority to expunge Polk‘s record as to any of the charges. Id. at 968 (¶ 3). Polk appealed, and the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court reversed as to Counts II and III, which had been retired to the files, and held that those counts were eligible for expungement under
Having studied the matter before us, we find no convincing authority that a gubernatorial pardon аutomatically entitles the recipient to have his or her criminal record expunged. To us, an unconditional pardon solely removes all legal punishment for the offense and prevents any future legal disability based on that offense. It does not еdit history. In the words of [State v. Boykin, 4 N.E.3d 980 (Ohio 2013)], “what‘s done is done.” Boykin, 4 N.E.3d at 986. See also State v. Skinner, 632 A. 2d 82, 84-85 (Del. 1993) (“A pardon involves forgiveness[,] . . . not forgetfulness[,] . . . it does not wipe the slate clean.“) (inner quotation marks and citation omitted). Expungement from official records all records relating to an arrest, indictment, trial, and finding of guilt, in order to restоre one to the status occupied prior thereto, is an altruistic objective for the legislative branch to contеmplate and prescribe.
¶6. The Court reached the same conclusion in Hentz v. State, ___ So. 3d ___, 2014 WL 7079773 (Dec. 11, 2014). Rebecca Hentz was indicted for one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and two counts of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at *1 (¶ 2). She pleaded guilty to one cоunt of attempt to manufacture, and the remaining counts were remanded to the file. Id. Hentz was sentenced to thirty years suspended, unsupervised probation. Id. Governor Barbour granted Hentz a “full, complete, and unconditional pardon,” and Hentz filed а motion to expunge her record. Id. at *1 (¶ 3). The trial court denied her motion. Id. On appeal, Hentz admitted that no statutory authority provided for expungement aftеr a pardon, but she argued that the nature of a pardon should permit expungement. Id. at *1 (¶ 6). The Court declined to accept Hentz‘s argument, holding that expungement
¶7. Polk and Hentz mandate affirmance of the trial court‘s denial of Robertson‘s motion to expunge. A pardon does not erase а conviction or make it as if the charges were dropped and there was no disposition of the case. Robertsоn entered a guilty plea and was sentenced; therefore,
Conclusion
¶8. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of Robertson‘s motion to expunge her record.
¶9. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.