Karpien v. KarpienKarpien v. Karpien
OPINION
{1} Husbаnd and Wife were in the process of divorce when Wife died. The district court continued with proceedings related to the division of the marital property and entered a final decree. Husband’s appeal presents us with a question of first impression: What is the effect of the death of one spouse on a pending divorce proceeding? We conclude that
I. BACKGROUND
{2} Husband filed a petition for divorce in March 2005. Before the divorce was finalized, Wife, who was suffering from cancer, died overseas while on a trip with her mother. Wife’s parents (Parents) paid medical expenses related to her last illness as well as funeral and repatriation expenses. As personal representatives of Wife’s estate, Parents were substituted for Wife as the “Respondent,” and the district court continued with proceedings to divide the marital property. A final decree was entered on June 13, 2007. The court allocated the community property of the couple, determined and divided the community debt, and ordered that the marital residence be sold in order to satisfy the debt of the community. That community debt included the balance owed on two mortgages on the home, credit card debt, certain medical bills, and repatriation and funeral expenses that were incurred after Wife’s death and paid by Parents. Husband appeals the order of the district court.
II. DISCUSSION
{3} Husband makes two general arguments on appeal. First, Husband contends that the district court erred in its division of the couple’s community property beсause the statutes regarding intestate succession require that Husband, as Wife’s surviving spouse, receive all of Wife’s community property. Second, Husband argues that the district court improperly ordered the sale of the family home without permitting Husband to take a homestead exemption. Both issues require statutory construction; our standard of review is de novo. See Bell v. Estate of Bell,
A. Division of Community Property
1. Basis for Distribution of Wife’s Community Property
{4} The starting point for Husband’s argument is in the Uniform Probate Code (Probate Code), specifically
{5} Before we address Husband’s first argument, we believe it is helpful to review the history and the language of
Upon the filing and service of a petition for dissolution of marriage, separation, annulment, division of property or debts, spousal support, child support or determination of paternity pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 40, Article 4 or 11 NMSA 1978, if a party to the action dies during the pendency of the action, but prior to the entry of a decree granting dissolution of marriage, separation, annulment or determination of paternity, the proceedings for the determinatiоn, division and distribution of marital property rights and debts, distribution of spousal or child support or determination of paternity shall not abate. The court shall conclude the proceedings as if both parties had survived. The court may allow the spouse or any children of the marriage support as if the decedent had survived, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 40, Article 4 or 11 NMSA 1978. In determining the support, the court shall, in addition to the factors listed in Chapter 40, Article 4 NMSA 1978, consider the amount and nature of the property passing from the decendent [decedent] to the person for whom the support would be paid, whether by will or otherwise.
(Emphasis added.) In essence, the statute permits a district court, upon the death of one of the divorcing parties and prior to entry of a final decree, to continue the division of marital property as if both parties had survived — a statutory change to the common law.
{6} The majority of jurisdictions do not take such an approach and continue to adhere to the common law rule of abatement: “When a party to a dissolution action dies before the entry of a decreе, the marriage terminates as a matter of law. The court divests of jurisdiction over the matter, including any property rights, as they are incidental to a final decree of dissolution.” Anthony Bologna, Comment, The Impact of the Death of a Party to a Dissolution Proceeding on a Court’s Jurisdiction Over Property Rights, 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 507, 507 (2000) (footnotes omitted); see also Rhodes v. Pedersоn,
{7} As best we can determine, only two other state legislatures have provisions in their domestic relations codes that allow distribution of marital property after the death of a divorcing spouse. See
{8} With this as background, we now consider Husband’s interpretation of
{9} “Legislative intent is evidenced primarily through the language of the statutes.” Souter v. Ancae Heating & Air Conditioning,
{10} In addition, an integral part of Husband’s argument is that he should be treated as a “surviving spouse” for purposes of the distribution of Wife’s estate.
{11} If we were to adopt Husband’s reasoning and conclude that
2. Personal Representative of Wife’s Estate
{12} Husband also argues that the division of marital property was improper because due to Wife’s death, there was no appropriate “Respondent” to receive her share of the community property. The district court awarded Wife’s share of the community property to the personal representatives of Wife’s estate, Parents. The Probate Code explains that “[ejxcept as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent, a personal representative of a decedent ... has thе same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of New Mexico ... as his decedent had immediately prior to death.”
3. Sale of Family Residence
{13} Next, Husband contends that the district court improperly awarded community property to creditors. Husband’s basis for this argument is not entirely clear: it could be either Parents’ status both as personal representatives of the estate and creditоrs of the community debt or the district court’s order to sell the marital residence in order to satisfy community creditors. The first basis fails because the district court awarded Wife’s share of the community property not to Parents, but to the personal representatives of Wife’s estate. As personal representatives, Parents are “under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of а decedent in accordance with the terms of ... the [Uniform] Probate Code.”
{14} The alternative basis for Husband’s challenge to the sale of the marital residence is that the property should not be sold to satisfy community creditors and that Parents are community creditors. Parents, citing
{15}
{16} Parents appear to want it both ways. They argue that Wife’s share of the community property should be distributed to her estate under domestic relations law, yet they simultaneously contend that Husband’s share of his community property should also be liable for all debt. This would have the effect of treating Husband as a surviving spouse for the purpose of payment of debt but not for the purposes of inheritance or allowances. Such an approаch leads to denying Husband the benefits of the status of surviving spouse, while at the same time assigning to him all of the liabilities of a surviving spouse. In addition, Parents’ argument ignores existing statutes, which provide for the division of community debt under the current circumstances.
{17} As we have stated before,
{18} Although Section 40-3-ll(D) could be read to nullify the court’s power under
{19} It appears from the record that the district court’s allocation of community debt and property — without reference to
{20} Accordingly, we remand the matter to the district court to recalculate the community debt absent the repatriation and funeral expenses that were incurred after Wife’s death and to further assess the need to sell the marital residence in order to satisfy the remaining community debt. The district court may also reallocate the community property, if necessary.
D. Homestead Exemption
{21} In addition, Husband argues that the district court was required to apply the homestead exemption before the house was sold. See
III. CONCLUSION
{22} We reverse and remand for entry of a final decree in conformity with this opinion.
{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.