148 Ga. App. 204 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1978
Plaintiff, a partnership, doing business in New York State, brought this suit on open account to recover for unpaid accounting services. Defendant answered alleging that the debt was not his but the obligation of a third party corporation. Later defendant gave notice of the taking of the oral depositions of two employees of plaintiff at the office of defendant’s counsel on January 12,1978, and that these individuals were to bring certain records of plaintiff with them. Both employees resided in New York. Plaintiff then moved for a protective order under CPA § 26 (c) (Code Ann. § 81A-126 (c)). In its motion it was alleged that the personnel who were to be deposed were two key employees of plaintiff; that plaintiff
1. A trial court has been granted a broad discretion under the discovery provision of the Civil Practice Act and the appellate courts will not interfere with that discretion in the absence of abuse. Williamson v. Lunsford, 119 Ga. App. 240 (166 SE2d 622). On the motion of a party from whom discovery is sought and for good cause shown, a trial court may grant a protective order that discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than selected by the party seeking discovery. CPA § 26 (c) (2) (3) (Code Ann. § 81A-126 (c) (2) (3)). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to ordering the taking of the depositions of the employees of defendant under the terms and conditions as outlined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the first protective order as this action appears to be reasonable. See Reams v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 233 Ga. 742 (213 SE2d 640). The critical question is then whether the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the defendant’s right of discovery to only those methods expressly allowed in the protective order and further restricting all discovery (not just that discovery complained of in the protective order) to a time limitation period of 30 days from the protective order.
It must be kept in mind that a litigant is entitled to pursue on a reasonable basis many types of discovery procedures including methods which were not available under the terms of the order. While we have held that restrictions as to the manner of taking depositions and seeking documents were reasonable, we find other restrictions in the protective order here unreasonable. The protective order for reasons unstated limited the defendant’s discovery options, other than the depositions mentioned above, to written interrogatories and thereby excluded requests for admissions directed to the plaintiff partnership, depositions on written questions and other possible discovery methods. Also under the facts of this case the imposition of a thirty day time period during which all discovery must be initiated is unreasonable as no need was shown in the motion for the limitation nor
Judgment reversed.