*1 SMITH Barry KARK-TV v. Andre SIMON and 83-47 Court of Arkansas
Supreme delivered September Opinion *2 Owens, Calhoun, McHaney if M. by: McHaney, James Hostetler, Jr.; Sr. and M. by: and Baker if McHaney, James Levine, Bruce and Lee W. appellant. Sanford P.A., Brewer, A.
Kaplan, by: if Peter Hollingsworth Miller, for appellees. was case This defamation Hays, Steele Justice. Smith, appellees, and Barry Andre Simon
brought by Rock, the evening On appellant. KARK-TV of Little against 11, 1982, Simon were shopping while Smith of August Center, the police Shopping store at Galleria men. At robbed two being was call that the store received on the scene. converged 8:30 p.m., eight policemen about placed handcuffed and searched They for KARK- Long, a Carolyn reporter them in a car. squad TV, establishment two business another happened her from someone relayed down. Information doors scanner police that there was a listening who *3 the camera crew met robbery Long situation. potential filmed. She had the incident been sent the station and by had comment from them. She no police got but questioned whom she only in the store from got then interviewed a clerk then left scene. At The newsteam vague responses. some after, released when the were shortly appellees or p.m., 9:00 was mistaken and no crime decided that the caller officers broadcast on was making. following report was in the The the ten o’clock news: a Police by tonight stopped action Little Rock
Quick the Galleria Design at Custom at robbery attempt it Details are however sketchy, Center. Shopping their to the store suspects up two backed car appears time, men held a allegedly order rob it. For a the two shaken, The clerk was and wasn’t hostage. store clerk exactly sure what had happened. about named, but the newscast included were not appellees car. It squad police placing appellees scenes 82,0001 house by viewed was the newscast was stipulated on a jury After trial the court entered judgment holds. $12,500 each KARK against awarding appellees verdict we reverse appeal, as On compensatory damages. remand. judgment were entitled
Appellants argue they substantially news was report matter law because the 160,000 people. estimated 1 An
accurate and was While we have privileged. recognized these concepts we cannot that under the generally,2 say facts this case the news as a matter of law was report substantially or accurate that the was In privileged. matter Pritchard v. Times Southwest Broadcasting, 277 642 S.W.2d Prosser,3 (1982), we stated that literal truth was quoting not necessary, that substantial truth will In suffice. Pritch ard, we found that or of the gist “sting” defendant’s true, remarks was in essence there were although some contrast, minor conflicts alleged. what substance of this news contained no truth story at all. There no simply and the robbery attempt were in appellants no way involved in crime. any
Appellants contend that
they
given
common-law
Torts,
under
privilege
(h)
Restatement of
§
report
the fact of an arrest.
we
question
case,
of that
applicability
section. There was no arrest in this
were
only detained
brief
during a
investigation.
And
this
whether
action
police would be considered
“official action” within
611 (h)
to be a new and
appears
§
unsettled question. See
Time,
Medico v.
F. Supp.
(E.D. Pa. 1980). But
privilege granted
611 is
§
qualified and will be lost if abused by failure to
an
give
accurate and fair report under
(f).
need not
report
§
*4
correct,
be precisely
as
long
it
substantially correct.
Appellant
WCAU-TV,
cites Williams v.
facts in the broadcast were accurately reported. Here there
was no robbery
attempt,
had not
appellees
backed up
Broadcasting,
2Pritchard v. Times Southwest
Ark.
Co.,
Publishing
truth;
Brandon v. Gazette
(1982),
S.W.2d 877
substantial
(1961),
Ark.
privilege.
Appellants
urge
case, the
were not
any
appellants
were
and that in
improper
negli
on
jury
ordinary
The court instructed
negligent.
instructions
that the proper
contend
gence
appellants
careful
reasonably
have been the standard
should
Dodrill broadcaster indicated
community.
We
Co.,
628, 590
Arkansas Democrat
(1979)
Welch,
in Gertz v. Robert
that within
latitude accorded
individual,
(1974)
the case of a private
Nor can we as a matter of law that say appellant satisfied there was a sufficient We negligent. thoroughly basis to submit that issue to the The initial information jury. hostage about a situation robbery progress possible station heard relayed by way reports television with on a scanner. information was police put together That reporter’s eyewitness police taking account into could no informa- custody. reporter get tion from the officers at the scene nor could the producer the news information verified head- get any by police was written shown a little over an quarters. story hour later. say We cannot that a news with its sources report *5 apparent majority jurisdictions note that an also have 4We negligence “private Miami adopted the standard individual” suits. See: Ane, 376, Publishing (Fla. App. n. Co. v. 385 3 Dist. Ct. Herald 423 So.2d 1983); Living A Practical Look at Constitutional Libel with Gertz: Standards, (1981); Virginia Review n. Mathis v. Law 13 Inc., (E.D. 1978). Philadelphia Newspapers, Supp. F. n. Pa. scanner, of information consisting from a uncor- police scene, roborated on the by police conjunction with an account eyewitness by a news who did not know the reporter observed, circumstances of what she will be surrounding found to be due care as a matter of law. We think the issue of submitted to the negligence properly jury. further it is entitled
Appellant argues that to reversal as a matter of law because the failed to demonstrate appellees sustained a they legally as a compensable injury result of the proximate news makes report. appellant first, Gertz, two that under points: the court erred not instructing jury that the awarded be for damages must actual incurred. injury Gertz does not require such an instruction. The Court out it Supreme pointed would not define “actual but said it was not limited injury,” to out-of-pocket expenses and could include personal humiliation and mental Gertz does eliminate anguish. presumed damages holds that must be damages proved by competent evidence. In the this instructions was told jury did have the burden proving they sustained Such instructions damages. clearly indicate that could not damages second presumed. Appellant’s point, sustained, that no legally compensable we cannot injury uphold. Addressing question of constitutional limita- tions on the recovery general damages, posed by the Gertz decision, Rest. of Torts (b), 2d states: §
The court has not defined actual specifically injury, but it has explained that the term is not confined to out-of-pocket loss. It includes “impairment reputa- tion and standing but this must be community,” supported by competent evidence and cannot be pre- sumed in the absence of the harm is proof. Unless nature, pecuniary the evidence need not “assign an actual dollar value” to it. “Actual is also held to injury” humiliation, include “personal anguish mental and suffering,” provided to have been they proved sustained. The Constitution does not require proof impairment reputation damages before for emo- tional distress can be recovered.
234 witnesses,
Here, of testimony giving presented the appellees broadcast, own well as the appellees’ to the response their competent think there was the broadcast. We to reactions question. on this jury evidence presented that award last point, appellants argue As their a new trial must be vacated and damages compensatory award of punitive it was held that an ordered. Gertz with proven be made where it was only could damages story broadcast that the defendant clarity convincing Dodrill, holding malice”. We reiterated that with “actual showing for the are damages precluded except that punitive the truth. for disregard or a reckless knowledge falsity of a clear find the record devoid of evidence Because we with “actual nature that the defendant acted convincing recklessness, malice,” therefore error or with sufficient it was The the jury. the issue of punitive damages to submit ordinarily refusal to award would punitive damages jury’s harmless, but were permitted the error render held worth. We have net appellant’s evidence of present the issue of punitive number of that where on a occasions with the jury, together submitted to erroneously damages condition, an award of compen- defendant’s financial v. Dalrymple stand. is tainted and cannot satory damages Fields, (1982); Ark. Life Padgett, Insurance Co. 407 S.W.2d Casualty further The is reversed and remanded for case consistent with this opinion. proceedings Dudley, J., concurs.
Purtle, J., dissents. plaintiffs, Dudley, concurring. Justice, H.
Robert individuals, the defendant proved two private who in the redaction care ordinary did not exercise and, as a videofilm editing statement broadcast. result, the false by were defamed they actual with acted not that the defendant did prove plaintiffs liable the defendant them. Consequently, toward malice actual, the plain- suffered damages or compensatory, for punishment, or liable punitive, was not tiffs but so, ground proof punitive Even on the damages. prove defamed allowed were damages, plaintiffs million had a net worth of five and one-half broadcaster *7 a net worth under such journalist’s Proof of a dollars. for the to punish journalist rationale invites jury to compen- rather than unpopular opinion of publication the by for sustained injury sate the defamed the person of the falsehood. publishing in issue case is the antithesis meaningful this of speech the law of defamation the freedoms
between and After self-governing society. analyzing and in a press concerns, sub- it is that our my conclusion competing Within stantive law is established. constitutionally may result. It law there can be an undesirable substantive of of occur when the at the time publisher, publication statement, or not no what was knowledge had of event of to himself from liability sufficient care protect then, is trial, falsity and at of statement error the ultimate in the time self-censorship at that and proven. Liability self- are the result. Unwanted by future of threat of censorship expression unpopular constitutes a that, I upon being write opinion. separately suggest case, rule of exclusionary we an presented proper adopt evidence law safeguard which will provide procedural against threat. foregoing subject
In our dual of we are system government two for the law of Both governmental regimes. provide for injury by freedoms and redress speech press. has no federal defamation is law. It provided only state by counterpart.
The Constitution
for redress
Arkansas provides
and,
to one’s
our law of
injury
reputation
prior
not
defamation was
held to
with the protections
conflict
First Amendment
Certain
federal constitution.
se
were
regarded
defamatory per
classes
falsehoods
act
to the victim was
the mere
presumed from
damage
Dunagan
Upham,
214 S.W.2d
publication.
or
liability,
common law providing
Our
for strict
fault,
by
regard
without
was modified
liability
federal
when the
Court of the United States
regime
Supreme
ruled that the state laws of defamation could be exercised
only
concert with the
freedoms of
federally guaranteed
decision,
In
New York Times Co. v.
speech
press.
Sullivan,
U.S.
addressed
(1964),
Supreme
Court
the need for a
vigorous
uninhibited
balanced
press
by
interest of
legitimate
redressing wrongful
injury
defamation. The conclusion was that a rule of strict liability
inhibited the
unduly
press when
to defamation suits
applied
officials. A
by public
fault standard of actual malice was
required
place
strict
liability.
accordance with that
journalist
decision a
state
any
is now
from
protected
event a false statement is made about a public
official unless the journalist
of actual malice. The
guilty
two
factors
principal
considered in New York Times were
*8
the need to
protect
free
of ideas so that
exchange
political
and social change desired
could
self-governing public
be brought about and the fear that the law of libel as applied
states,
ours,
by many
such as
lead to self-censorship.
would
sense,
“Self-censorship” has two
In its
meanings.
descriptive
occurs
“self-censorship”
whenever a
refrains from
journalist
Anderson,
publishing material for
reasons. See
legal
Libel
422,
and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tex. L. Rev.
430-31
Sometimes
(1975).
it is intended to curtail
injurious
speech
values,
other
to
such as
standards. This
obscenity
type
However,
self-censorship may be
if it refers to a
acceptable.
needless restraint on the
freedom of
name
expression
value,
some
and is more
than is
competing
inhibitory
Roth,
it
necessary,
is unconstitutional.
See
In Defense of
Law,
Fault in
88 Yale Law
(1979).
1735
Defamation
Journal
decision,
In the years
the New York Times
following
the term “public official” was extended to “public figure.”
Butts,
Curtis
Co. v.
Publishing
(1967)
A short-lived deviation in doctrine six years occurred Court, later when a three-member of the plurality Supreme with five opinions eight jurists, among participating
237 of the defamed person from the status away shifted focus had in which the defamation the nature of the event and to Metromedia, (1971). 403 U.S. Rosenbloom v. occurred. should extend held that the press protection The plurality if the private persons defamatory falsehoods relating interest. of general public statements concerned matters months to Rosen prior down three case handed bloom, federal court had extended but a time when a lower at in private to encompass the New York Times doctrine concern, of important public dividuals matters involved philosophy. the Rosenbloom this court refused apply Co., Ark. Printing v. Commercial Jones that we hold we stated “must” After Rosenbloom (1971). were within the press matters of concern public but, independent Amendment the First protection dictates, philo we did not Rosenbloom adopt federal Carnes, Gallman S.W.2d 47 sophy. (1973). Court Rosenbloom Supreme rejected
In 1974
and,
injured
once
again, emphasized
doctrine
Welch, Inc.,
than
event
v. Robert
rather
Gertz
reported.
reasons for the
There were two
principal
The Supreme Gertz held Court First satisfied, Amendment protection was the case of a private individual, so as is not long liability imposed without fault. Thus, must set the standard states of fault for of a with defamation journalist charged private persons. Gertz,
Since majority of states adopting standard of negligence for cases where a private person is defamed have adopted the “ordinary negligence” standard. Collins & Drushal, The Reaction Courts State to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306, 313-314 Case Res. L. Rev. W. rationales standard adopting ordinary fall into four first, common theme, themes. The and most common is that “reputational interests command constitutional protec tion.” The second is the state law nothing requires stricter standard. The third line of is that reasoning private person who had been defamed should be allowed recovery as easily constitutionally permissible. The fourth theme is that can be press demagogic not ought states, five, additional given A power. have minority reached contra holdings. court, us,
This the case now before has no leeway the standard In Dodrill setting of fault for Arkansas. Co., Arkansas Democrat 628, 590 840 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. followed Gertz we (1980), the Rosenbloom content- acknowledged repudiation based doctrine. reversing case we remanding that, retrial, instructed the trial court upon the standard of fault was as follows: a libelous article shall be liable to the
defamed private individual for failure to exercise ordinary care. not
Although expressed, for the reasoning ruling *10 that, states, like the of the majority the Constitution of Arkansas commands protection of the interest. reputational It the “inherent and inalienable of recognizes rights” and and “acquiring, property reputa- possessing protecting Const, II, It tion ...” Ark. art. also mandates that an 2.§ is individual entitled to “for all or remedy injuries wrongs he or may receive in his character.” Ark. person, property Const, II, art. has 13. Each of our constitutions contained a § for freedom and each has provision expression of also of specifically the interest in the recognized of The protection his constitution reputation. present II, provides art. 6:§ of the shall forever remain liberty press inviolate. of communication is one thoughts opinions man;
of the invaluable and all rights persons may write freely their sentiments on publish all sub- the abuse being responsible such right. jects, [Emphasis added.] Our four constitutions also contained prior the phrase Const, for the abuse of “being responsible such Ark. right.” Const, II, 1864, 1861, 1836; I, 2,
art. Ark. art. 1868. § § Thus, state, from the outset of this the constitutionally recognized right individual to his is reputation not to be limited as a means of freedom of the protecting press. constitution,
Unlike our state the First Amendment of Constitution the United no States contains defama- tion clause but the Supreme Court the United States has determined that a standard of less protective than that of actual press malice will not impermissibly the First Amendment abridge freedoms cases involving individuals. The private federal is determinative of ruling the freedom of expression of both provisions constitutions but not the responsibility of our state constitu- provision tion. See Wilson Pine City Bluff, Thus, our state constitution mandates and the federal constitution accommodates standard fault being ordinary negligence event the person defamed a private individual. that,
In the case at bar it is even if the standard is argued “ordinary negligence,” it should be measured what a *11 or would community careful broadcaster
reasonably uncertainty would cause not Such a measure publish. would First, the con- self-censorship. induce more ultimately and broadcaster, of a measure for the legal negligence of one cept and another for an yet another for a newspaperman, of our constitu- is ordinary spirit individual contra distinction can be made be- tional No provision. logical a written statement. Of tween a statement and spoken course, careful reasonably person what determining do, is admissible as to the or would not proof would of professional journalistic standard generally áccepted is not in of a local standard Secondly, concept conduct. the state. one constitution for all of with spirit concept would leave a concepts publisher Most these importantly, freedom from ensuring without definitive means any to meet a his conduct by tailoring particular be the inevit- would self-censoring Unwanted requirement. able result. the stand- determining there is no
Similarly, leeway Rosenbloom, In ard for the degree proof negligence. malice must be made held of actual plurality proof standard more protective “with convincing clarity,” than the usual press “preponderance freedoms of speech Gertz leaves it to the states to set of the evidence.” and, the standard the state constitution mandates again, answer. has a or state summary, publisher privilege print as it is not done
a falsehood about a so public figure, long if with actual malice. That same does not privilege apply There, defamed is a individual. person private liability may standards states so imposed by long set imposed as the standard is not strict The standard liability. in Arkansas is of the evidence of proof by a preponderance tends, Such a standard ordinary negligence. practice, his control hold a liable for factors outside that, he cannot be when an article is whereby certain erroneous, accuracy his efforts to insure ultimately proven will be deemed lack of control is sufficient. publisher’s A due to two factors: standard of due care. (1) nebulous fence, he even speaker stays “steers clear of a barbed wire but if he is not fence is.” farther sure where the away exactly To Defamation, Right Public’s Wright, Privacy, A National Problem Tex. L. Know: and a New Approach, Rev. of ultimate (1968), (2) fact proof which cause an inordinate influence falsity permitted may on the evaluation of whether due care was exercised. As a *12 result, unwarranted will still take self-censorship place that, turn, in is a threat to unpopular expression. Roth, A first mentioned in Fault proposal Defense of Law, in 88 Yale L. (1978) 1747-49 Defamation Jour. the The speech.
would alleviate threat to help unpopular would limit the of evidence a proposal admissibility to that of the defamation suit which was within the reach when the journalist defamatory prepared. statement The limitation be exclusionary would an accomplished by rule of evidence. The is proposal as follows:
The rules in a defamation governing admissibility should exclude all evidence that a proceeding plaintiff refused to to disclose the defendant response detailed and that not otherwise defamatory charges reasonably available at the time of Under publication. rule, this a would be for con- journalist responsible all sidering reasonably information obtainable when he the article. But the rule would shield him prepared from for information that the accountability subject an journalist article refused to disclose and that could not have elsewhere. reasonably acquired of this rule should
Application exclusionary First, be on two conditions. it should depend triggered if only has journalist presented subject contents of relevant injurious an charge requested The information within the exclusive control. subject’s that, be if fails to subject put would thus on notice he be cooperate, might his remedies for defamation legal Second, impaired. subject required should with no factual than respond greater specificity with which the charges journalist were presented. would rule to thus be from prevented exploiting conduct a The rule would function fishing expedition. if accusations were only original
meaningfully factual Assuming detail. such made considerable accusations, a neither the journalist’s specificity broad, conclusory comment” nor “no statement introduce right would reserve subject’s denials facts at a defamation underlying proceeding. [Empha- sis added.[ would action rule accommodate proposed It on free with minimum restriction speech.
defamation follow, with choices to would clear provide First, if from liability. each of which would result freedom statement, of the the individual after content seeing there is freedom acknowledges truth statement Second, if do more. from no need to anything comment,” “no the evidence simply gives his which statement within falsity peculiarly trial, would be excluded at a and to avoid knowledge *13 a the be to show that only would liability publisher required careful effort was made to the informa- reasonably acquire Third, if a tion elsewhere. the individual private gave denial, know he must the would meaningful publisher make a meticulous and and thorough investigation falsity certain of the truth of his statement the absolutely im- denial attach. Most of the or else would tailor work the would how to his portantly, know to meet specific requirement. rule that it
Other beneficial aspects proposed would a provide method self-help When many lead to the resolution of statements. defamatory facts, set of I to vote in favor presented proper intend rule. exclusionary the proposed Purtle, to me the I. It seems Justice, dissenting. John that a firm or corporation holds majority opinion person, be held for libel first proved cannot liable unless it is with the specific or broadcast was not done publication intent of victim. I with such injuring agree cannot All of the that when a matter cited have held holding. cases “reckless disregard was with “actual malice” or published truth” allowable. In my for the were punitive damages long majority opinion established has now overruled impossible to recover principle punitive and made it almost of law damages suit. a libel majority opinion, facts, show stated in the as by appellant
conclusively story presented was that the robbery attempt; was no was no there of truth. There devoid prevent police hostage; arrests; did not no and the there were Everything report robbery. and unveri- was untrue by appellant. a reckless If not amount to fied disregard this does imagine a case truth then it is difficult to
for the would exist. where this standard opinion there were were ones where
Cases cited only defendant; one defendant. more than one here there is any prejudice such as other defendants There was no Casualty Padgett, & Ins. Co. v. occurred Life (1966)and Dalrymple v. Fields, Ark. present case, matter In the the entire
633S.W.2d 362 jury. properly presented appellees Had the newscast not shown the might subjects damages existed. not have the telecast clearly would-be identified as two were story completely kidnappers. false. robbers and This any, appellees’ telecast, few, if friends and this Without acquaintances brief deten- would have even heard of their police. tion press right speech free of free
The First Amendment responsibility. is no freedom to with it some There carries falsely *14 U.S., in a crowded theater. Schenck shout “fire” injure Nor is there the freedom U.S. people through faces on a of their innocent the broadcast story widely viewed newscast when the facts disregard unconfirmed, for standards falseand show an utter reporting profession that is extent to an within easily recognizable news properly juryA of twelve
as reckless. subsequently the case awarded that this was found prior abrogate damages appellees. compensatory To subject to all do a disservice on this is to considerable law jurisdiction, is now a of whom each residents of this court’s victim of potential This does an irresponsible journalism. itself, even disservice to the news media greater without the reasonable constraints for under our provided previous law, will be ever temptation present to be less diligent efforts to confirm the truthfulness of a newsmaking story. Freedom be abused and I press may believe it sincerely in this case. At least the issue of whether the story broadcast with “actual malice” or “reckless for the disregard truth” was a matter properly presented the jury. Finding errors, no other I would affirm the trial court.
Cullen Reed & HARRIS Sandra HARRIS Kay
v. STATE of Arkansas S.W.2d 710 Supreme Court of Arkansas Opinion delivered September Davis, L. for appellants. James Clark, Gen., Steve Atty. Holder, by: Theodore Asst. Gen., Atty. for appellee.
Per Curiam. Appellants, Cullen Reed Harris Harris, Kay Davis, Sandra by their E. attorney, have James filed a motion for rule on the clerk. The motion admits that the record was not filed timely and it was no fault of the appellants. Their admits attorney
