Karas v. Strevell

(Nos. 104123, 104133 cons . et KARAS, v. JOSEPH STREVELL Appellee,

ROBERT al., Appellants. February

Opinion 2008. filed Jr., Kenneth McLaughlin, Kreuzer, S. of Esp, Cores & LLP, McLaughlin, Wheaton, of appellant for Joseph Strevell. Resis,

Michael Ellen L. Green and Liam Timothy Ep- stein, LLC, of Chicago, SmithAmundsen of for appellant Russell Zimmerman. Miller, Swanson,

Matthew D. Jacobson and Amy R. of Bell, Lisle, Martin & of appellants Naperville for LLR Central Redhawk Association et al.

Patrick Provenzale, PLLC, L. of Ekl Williams of Clar- Hills, endon for appellee.

Karen L. Elward, Kendall and Brad Heyl, A. of Royster, Allen, Voelker Peoria, & of Il- amicus curiae linois Association of Defense Counsel. Boehm, Jr., J. L. of Loughname

David Garrett (John Bell, Ltd., Chicago Borger Johnson & E and Leita Min- Walker, of & Benson Faegre Minneapolis, LLR for amicus curiae USA nesota, counsel), Inc. Hockey, Peoria, Steagall, Richard L. of Nicoara & Steagall, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Association. Lawyer’s judgment

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the court, opinion. with Freeman, Fitzger-

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Carman, judgment in the ald, and Karmeier concurred and opinion. concurred, opinion. Kilbride specially

Justice OPINION Plaintiff, Karas, on behalf of complaint Robert filed son, Karas, alleging Benjamin minor Benjamin his hockey in an ice injured playing organized was while bodychecked op- he was from behind two game when complaint alleged opposing posing players. wanton, further al- willful and players’ conduct was team, governing the as- opposing players’ leged and the game, refereed the sociation of the officials who teams opposing hockey league amateur to which willfully and and wan- belonged, negligently, had both al- addition, In injury. complaint caused the tonly, and hockey league conspiracy a civil between leged against a rule forgo enforcing officials’ associations from behind. bodychecking players filed and defendants player organizational Both the 2— 615 of the dismiss to section pursuant motions (West 2004)). (735 ILCS Code of Civil Procedure 5/2 —615 Page County, relying primarily Du The circuit court of by this court adopted sports exception the contact Shusta, 167 Ill. 2d 417 (1995), dismissed v. Pfister entirety. in its complaint plaintiff’s and appeal, appellate part On court reversed Ill. The court part. affirmed 884. concluded successfully pled had willful and wanton defendants, conduct on of the had part player suc cessfully on the of the pled negligence part organizational defendants, had successfully pled conspiracy. civil However, the court affirmed the circuit court’s appellate dismissal of plaintiffs allegations willful wanton conduct against organizational defendants. follow,

For the reasons that we reverse that portion judgment of the court which allowed the claims of willful and the part player wanton conduct on of the defendants, negligence conspiracy and civil on the organizational defendants, go forward. We portion affirm that of the appellate judgment which allegations dismissed the of willful and wanton conduct against the organizational defendants. We also remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions.

BACKGROUND following The facts are plaintiffs taken from second complaint. amended In January Benjamin Karas was a member of the Barrington High Hockey School junior varsity hockey Club’s team. Russell Zimmerman Strevell, and Joseph defendants, the were mem- junior varsity bers of a hockey by team run defendant (Red- Naperville Hockey Central Redhawk Association Hockey). hawk Both hockey teams were members of a Illinois, defendant league, Hockey Amateur Association (the Hockey Association), Inc. governed by were hockey Hockey rules which the promulgated. Association One of these rules a prohibition against bodycheck- was ing players from behind. 25, 2004,

On January Barrington team played the Naperville organized hockey game. team in an ice game was refereed officials with defendant Il- (the linois Hockey Officials Association Officials Associa- tion). player’s jersey On the back of each the word player’s “STOP” had been sewn above between the against bodychecking number to reinforce the rule play- According plaintiff’s complaint, ers from behind. dur- defendants struck ing game, player Benjamin “from behind on his back area his head to strike causing resulting personal injury, including the boards serious neck and head injuries.” 14, 2004, eight-count,

On filed an September Du complaint Page second amended the circuit court of County. alleged Benjamin’s I of the that complaint Count injuries were caused defendants’ willful states: complaint wanton conduct. Defendants, 25, 2004, January

“10. the Unknown On ZIMMERMAN, and RUSSELL JOSEPH STREVELL disregard safety willful and wanton for the showed KARAS, Plaintiff, Minor BENJAMIN S. in one or more of following ways: a. Minor Plaintiff from behind when he was Struck the they position in such a knew or should have known him; injury possibility inflicting serious on he was b. Struck the Minor Plaintiff from behind when they proximity [such] in close to the boards knew inflicting possibility have known of the serious should him; injury on Plaintiff from behind when he was

c. Struck the Minor proximity position and close to the boards such possibility known of of inflict- they knew or should have him; injury ing serious checked’[1] when

d. ‘Back the Minor Plaintiff at a time complaint check” in his when 1Plaintiff uses the term “back evidently “bodycheckfrom behind.” To “back-check”is he means goal op covering the rushes of “to skate back towards one’s own hockey game.” Third New Interna posing players in a Webster’s (1993). check,” hand, “body Dictionary A on the other tional body hockey blocking opponent with the in ice is “a of an Dictionary Third New International lacrosse.” Webster’s head looking with his and down partially bent over he was boards; pointing towards Minor checking’ the from ‘back

e. Failed to refrain rules; in violation of contest Plaintiff reckless.” f. Were otherwise complaint amended II, and VI of the second Counts IV Hockey, negligence alleged of Redhawk Hockey Count Association. Association, and the Officials Hockey alleged its “failed to instruct II that Redhawk players bodychecking opposing players” refrain from to discipline, or otherwise behind; “failed to sanction from bodycheck players” to from known control its who were encouraged “promoted, condoned or otherwise behind; bodycheck players” behind; “failed to from its to players.” supervise the activities of its alleged complaint the second amended Count IV of Hockey “failed to instruct its Association players” from teams to refrain their authorized member bodychecking [the Of- behind; “failed to instruct from against strictly Association] the rule enforce” ficials discipline, bodychecking behind; sanction from “failed to Hockey and the Of- or otherwise control” both Redhawk encouraged “promoted, Association; ficials otherwise bodychecking behind; from and “failed to condoned” supervise” Hockey As- and the Officials

both Redhawk sociation. alleged “failed that the OfficialsAssociation

Count VI bodychecking strictly against from enforce” the rule discipline, or otherwise behind; “failed to sanction regarding their known its member officials control against bodycheck- strictly the rule failures to enforce” encouraged ing “promoted behind; otherwise from strictly fail to enforce” condoned its member officials to against bodychecking behind; “failed from the rule supervise of its member officials.” the activities y plaintiffs amended III, second Counts VII iy allegations complaint repeated II, in counts found and VI However, verbatim. instead of alleging negligence, III, counts alleged, VII respectively, that Redhawk V Hockey, Association, Hockey and the Officials As- sociation “showed willful and disregard wanton for the safety of’ Benjamin Karas.

Finally, count plaintiff’s VIII of second amended complaint alleged that there was a civil conspiracy between Hockey Association and the Officials As- sociation “not against enforce” the rule bodychecking behind, and that this conspiracy caused Benjamin’s injury.

The player and organizational defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs second amended complaint pursuant (735 to section 2—615 of the Code Civil Procedure (West 2004)). ILCS 14, 2005, On March 5/2 —615 circuit granted court by the motions filed the player defendants and dismissed I count of the second amended complaint.

On July the circuit court dismissed the remaining counts of the complaint. order, In a written the circuit court explained the dismissals, reasons for the including the previous dismissal of count I. With respect I, to mle, count the court noted the this adopted by Shusta, v. (1995), 167 Ill. a plaintiff that Pfister injured by who is a coparticipant engaged while in a sport may only if the injury recover was the result of intentional or willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court concluded hockey game that the ice at issue sport, was a contact plaintiff that had failed to plead willful and wanton conduct on the part player defendants. II, respect VI,

With to counts negligence IV counts directed against Hockey, Redhawk As- Hockey Association, sociation and the Officials the court con- cluded that “no duty of care exists in Illinois for claims arising negligence out of in high sports.” school contact Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed these counts. fail- III, and VI for counts dismissed

The court also V conduct on the and wanton allege to willful ing however, noted, The court defendants. the organizational Redhawk alleged that plaintiff III and V that in counts “promoted, had Association Hockey and the Hockey bodycheck players” otherwise condoned encouraged or actively circuit court observed from behind. beyond the rules went to violate encouraging s that, plaintiff pled, as but also found negligence, mere conclusory and encouragement were of active allegations granted then The court a cause of action. did not state facts, allege III and V to to amend counts leave plaintiff Court Supreme under inquiry reasonable if supported Hockey Associa- Hockey and 137, that Redhawk Rule rule to violate the actively encouraged players tion had Thereafter, plaintiff from behind. against bodychecking plaintiff and counsel for amend counts III and V did not court, no have “[W]e stated to the circuit subsequently now, pursu- plead right that would—that we could facts 137, that would establish [Supreme Rule] ant to Court actively organizations encouraged these any —in words, they players instructed the violate other bodychecking behind].” [against this rule court also the circuit July In its order VIII, alleging conspiracy, the count civil dismissed count replead the count with granted but leave filed a third subsequently Plaintiff specificity. more count VIII and listed that amended complaint amended count repled, counts. As previously each of the dismissed Association and the Hockey again alleged VIII *** enforce the “agreed not Officials Association games that occurred during from behind rule checking [Hockey Associa- authority of the rule of under the tion].” 7, 2005, granted circuit court

On November section Officials Association’s Hockey Association and 2—615 motion to dismiss count VIII. Regarding this count, the court noted that the principal issue was whether the failure to strictly call the penalty of check- ing from behind was a concerted action for an unlawful purpose. The circuit court stated that it “couldn’t find any authority” which held that the failure to strictly call a penalty amounted to an unlawful purpose in a con- spiracy claim. Accordingly, the court dismissed count VIII and entered judgment a final as to all counts.

On appeal, reversed the trial court’s I, II, dismissal of counts VI, and VIII and af IV firmed the trial court’s III, dismissal of counts andV VII. 369 Ill. App. 884. With respect to the player defendants, the appellate court held that plaintiff had adequately pled willful and and, wanton conduct particular, a disregard “conscious for [plaintiffs] safety”: alleged

“Plaintiff only that Strevell and Zimmerman broke the hockey, rules of they but that broke a rule of special emphasis such players’ jerseys were altered to reinforce it. alleged Plaintiff also circumstances surround ing Strevell’s and they Zimmerman’s allegedly actions — Benjamin checked when he was posi defenseless and in a tion of vulnerability acute evince a conscious —that disregard safety. for his allegations These taken as true create an inference that Strevell’s and Zimmerman’s ac tions acceptable exceeded those during the excitement of play and they cause, were so likely reckless that were cause, and indeed did injury Therefore, to another. we conclude plaintiffs that the first count of complaint should be reinstated so opportunity that he has an to prove the allegations.” truth of the 369 Ill. 3d at 891-92. respect With organizational defendants, appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of V III, VII, counts the counts alleging willful and conduct, wanton but II, reversed the dismissal of counts VI, the counts alleging negligence, and reversed IV VIII, dismissal count the count alleging civil conspiracy. counts, appellate the the

Regarding negligence may as apply, sports exception that the contact concluded defendants, that but matter, to general nonparticipant The court stated: in this case. did not exception apply the may the exception insulate sports the contact “While negli organizational liability from based defendants injuries rough play, as a result gently caused sustained above, alleged to been here, as have injury the discussed such, As falls conduct. it the result willful and wanton beyond sports exception the scope protection the successfully plaintiff Because we hold above that affords. and wanton pled and Zimmerman’s willful Strevell’s conduct, exception not we hold the contact does that protect organizational negligence for their the defendants allegedly and conduct.” 369 leading to the willful wanton Ill. at 916. App. 3d the the trial court’s

Accordingly, appellate court reversed against organiza dismissal the counts the negligence tional defendants. 369 Ill. 3d at 915-16.

Regarding against the willful and wanton counts defendants, however, three organizational appellate dismissal, stating: court affirmed trial court’s regarding “Plaintiff’s essential contention all three organizational they is that failed to enforce defendants hockey safety sufficiently, to, rules and that this failure led perhaps encouraged, and Zimmerman’s al Strevell’s legedly conduct, Benjamin’s injury. improper which caused dispute plaintiff’s While do not that we assertion omissions or failures to act can constitute willful and wanton conduct [citation], alleged hold we that the omissions and failures here, proven, even if to willful and would amount App. 3d wanton conduct.” 369 Ill. at 918.

Finally, circuit appellate court reversed the court’s VIII, alleging a dismissal of count the count civil Of- conspiracy Hockey between the Association enforcing prohibition ficials forgo Associations against Key holding from to this bodychecking behind. court’s determination that plaintiff was successfully pled Hockey had Association purpose: the Officials had an Association unlawful above, plaintiff “As discussed successfully alleged has [the Officials may Association] liable in for the be tort al legedly injurious willful wanton resulting negligence failing its to enforce the hockey relevant Therefore, safety rules. the extent that is able liability, prove he will able prove that the purpose agreement alleges Hockey [the he between tortious, Association] [the Association] Officials was i.e., App. unlawful.” 369 Ill. 920. 3d at Justice Kapala Although dissented in part. Justice agreed Kapala that the claims against player the defen forward, go dants should he disagreed majority’s with the to decision allow the claims of negligence civil the conspiracy against organizational defendants to 369 proceed. J., Ill. 3d at 921-24 (Kapala, concur ring dissenting in part). granted

We the organizational defendants’ petitions for appeal leave to and consolidated the cases cross-appealed review. Plaintiff has the affirming court’s the judgment dismissal of the counts of willful and against wanton conduct the organizational defendants. granted Inc., Hockey,

We have leave to USA and the to file amicus Illinois Association Defense Counsel curiae briefs. Lawyers Illinois Trial The Association also leave to file an amicus curiae sought brief urges that the alia, inter affirmance of the appellate contends, court and this court should abandon pleading fact favor of notice Defendants filed a pleading. joint have motion to brief, contending strike the the fact-pleading is doctrine not at issue. ami repeatedly by

“This court has rejected attempts cus to raise not raised to the by parties ap issues peal.” Burger v. General Hospital, Luther 21, Ill. 2d 198 v. (2001), citing Frye Corp., Medicare-Glaser 62 153 Ill. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. Indus (1992); 2d 30 “ (1990). Comm’n, trial amicus 2d 117 ‘[A]n Ill. it, framed takes the case as he finds with issues ” v. 62, quoting People 2d at 198 Ill. Burger, parties.’ (1991). to this case has No P.H., party 2d 145 Ill. Accordingly, of fact pleading. for the elimination argued to granted respect to is motion strike defendants’ urges this court the amicus brief which portion al of the brief is The remainder fact pleading. abandon lowed.

ANALYSIS brought under section 2—615 A motion to dismiss sufficiency of legal tests the the Code of Civil Procedure is review, question “whether complaint. On light complaint, when construed allegations of the plaintiff, are sufficient establish most favorable may granted.” relief upon a cause action which (2004); South Mihelcic, 209 Jarvis v. Vitro v. Ill. (2002). 81, 86 Inc., 201 Ill. 2d standard Dodge, Oak Ill. 2d 81. Vitro, novo. of review de Player Defendants every person ordinary In owes a care general, injuries Forsythe to others. v. Clark guard against USA, Inc., 2d 291 A person 224 Ill. who duty is be held negligent may breaches this deemed financially proximately injury if his liable conduct causes Ass’n, League another. Hills v. Little Bridgeview to However, Shusta, in 2d v. Ill. Pfister (1995), adopted exception 2d 417 this Ill. court in ordinary participants engaged care for standard in a exception, Under this a sports. participant contact may negligent not be held liable for conduct sport contact liability injures Instead, a will arise coparticipant. which only intentionally, willfully if a participant otherwise, in a wantonly, coparticipant. a Stated injures by a a fellow sport participant contact owed refrain from willful participant “duty is at 167 Ill. 2d Pfister, wanton intentional misconduct.” 420. explained the rationale for limiting partici-

Pfister pants’ liability in sports: contact

“The sports exception contact the appropriate strikes bal- society’s ance between interest limiting liability in for injuries resulting physical contact inherent in a sport contact and society’s in allowing recovery interest for injuries resulting from willful and wanton or intentional by misconduct participants. Those in participate who soc- cer, football, softball, basketball, spontaneous or even a game kicking, play games physi- can choose to in which among participants cal contact inherent in is the conduct game. Participants in games greater such assume a injury risk of resulting negligent from the co- *** participants. * * * *** The sports exception recovery contact allows for injuries resulting from willful wanton and intentional taking misconduct while into the voluntary account nature participation games in physical where contact is anticipated injury and where the risk of caused this contact Pfister, is inherent.” 167 Ill. 2d at 426-27. See also v. Bishop Azzano Catholic 304 Ill. Chicago, (1999) (“the 3d App. 713, 718 public policy underlying the contact sports exception today is the need to strike balance protecting between in participants sporting voluntary activities and the nature of participation games where contact inherent physical and inevi table”). also noted that a rule limiting liability of

Pfister participants necessary contact was avoid a sports chilling way effect on the these are As sports played. observed, if a negligence standard were imposed participants, fundamentally would be or, perhaps, altogether. Pfister, altered eliminated 167 Ill. 2d quoting Shusta, Ill. v. Pfister (1994) (Green, J., 191-92 other dissenting). Numerous courts have voiced the same concern and have stated primary justification limiting liability fundamentally altering, context is to sports avoid

453 See, e.g., at issue. in, sport discouraging participation 318, 696, 710, 296, 834 P.2d Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th Knight v. (1992) (“vigorous participation Rptr. 2d 11 Cal. li legal chilled if be sporting likely events would such on the participant on a basis ability imposed were to be conduct”); Clouser, v. Ross ordinary or her careless of his (Mo. 1982) (“Fear liability of civil stem 11, 14 637 S.W.2d occurring in an athletic event acts ming negligent game fervor which proper could curtail discourage participa individual be played should (Ind. 984, 992 tion”); v. 853 N.E.2d McNary, Bowman 2006). App. have a need for addition, recognized

In several courts in order to liability rule in the context limiting a has stated: litigation. avoid a flood of As one court care, simple negligence adopted “If as the standard of were made, every every punter midfielder with whom contact fouled, sticked, every high every player batter basketball hockey tripped by pitch, every struck a would *** injury if resulted. ingredients have the for a lawsuit potential for a [TJhere exists the surfeit lawsuits when simple negligence, it known based on an becomes rule, a inadvertent violation of a contest will suffice as ground recovery This injury. for an athletic should Kiernan, encouraged.” v. 241 Conn. 409- Jaworski 10, 696 A.2d Robertson, 3d

See also Savino v. Ill. (“the (1995) ordinary an applying effect of practical open legal negligence standard would be Pandora’s in a box, virtually every contact allowing participant practice, injured by during ‘warm-up’ another sport, inherent virtu bring an action based on the risks ally every type This is result sport. exactly avoid”). sought the courts have to the contact Importantly, although referred Pfister assumed terms of the risks sports exception 426), exception is not Ill. plaintiff (Pfister, defense, it the court to require does affirmative nor 454 plaintiff’s subjective

determine the of awareness the risks Rather, associated with the sport. the contact is exception objective doctrine that the scope defines (Third) of the duty. defendant’s See Restatement of Torts: Apportionment j, Liability §2, Comment at 27 (2000) (“What courts ‘primary often call assumption of is risk’ a doctrine actually about the liability defendant’s Fritz, v. (1969) (as Barrett duty”); or 2d 529, 42 Ill. 535 sumption the risk concepts generally duplicative are doctrines, other duty); Davenport v. including scope Hope Cotton Plantation Regime, Horizontal Property 333 71, 80-81, Perez v. 565, (1998); S.C. 508 S.E.2d 570 (Tenn. McConkey, Turcotte v. 897, 872 S.W.2d 1994); 902 Fell, 432, 437-39, 68 964, 967-68, N.Y.2d 502 N.E.2d 510 N.Y.S.2d 52-53 deciding

When whether the contact sports exception the must applies, court consider the nature the sport determine, at issue and risks, based its inherent whether it is a sport. contact the When court concludes “physical contact among participants is inherent” (Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at game 425), in the player a owes no to a duty to coparticipant ordinary negligence. See, avoid Gonzalez, Landrum e.g., v. 257 Ill. App. 3d 947 (1994) (whether a is particular subject case to contact sports exception “is properly by examining resolved objective game itself, factors not on surrounding the subjective expectations generally of the see parties”); Knight, 3 Cal. at P.2d Cal. Rptr. 4th at 11 (a 2d need particular at not ask what risks a encounter, knew of and chose plaintiff subjectively but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the and the or sport relationship defendant’s role in to that sport order to determine whether the defendant owes duty to protect particular from the risk of harm). bar,

In the case at there is no dispute regarding ice agree sport parties at issue. nature bodychecking game in a which hockey, played Thus, Pfister, sport. pursuant is a permitted, was Benjamin defendants owed wanton or inten to refrain from willful and “duty 420. 2d at Pfister, misconduct.” Ill. tional “a conduct as defined willful wanton Pfister or deliberate intent course of action shows actual which which, if action is not inten harm or the course of tional, to or conscious shows an utter indifference safety safety for a own disregard person’s Zi Pfister, 421, citing of others.” Ill. property (1994). Co., 161 arko v. Soo Line R.R. Ill. 273 that had plaintiff The court below appellate concluded on of pled part player conduct the the defendants court, According the met this standard. alleged the defendants plaintiff because against bodychecking violated a rule knowingly behind, they Benjamin and in a because knew that was rink, boards, the he position edge near the of when struck, a sufficiently pled was “conscious safety of the disregard” Benjamin’s player defendants. court, plaintiff repeats Ill. 3d at 892. Before this Une reasoning. this of the note that did not consider application

We Pfister of full- the traditional willful standard to wanton as ice and tackle football sports hockey contact such simply where contact between is physical players vigorous but funda- play, unavoidable of is a by-product of is In these part way game played. mental the the holding for disre- sports, consciously liable participants problematic. the is garding safety coparticipants of standing a who is Striking bodychecking person inherently a ice is an atop thin metal blades sheet of two check, a executed cleanly body action. Even dangerous hockey, the of ice evinces performed according to rules conscious for disregard safety the of the person being Yet, struck. in an ice hockey game where bodychecking is permitted, players throughout are struck game. the This inherent, is an part sport. fundamental the Similarly, football, tackle players must necessarily disregard others, of injury risk simply because of way is game played:

“The playing body-contact sport. football ais game players demands that the come physical into constantly, frequently great with each other force. charge The linemen opposing vigorously, line shoulder leaping to shoulder. The tackier faces the risk at the swiftly legs moving of the latter ball-carrier must prepared Body ground violently. contacts, to strike the bruises, and are game. clashes inherent There is no way play 26C, other it.” v. School Vendrell District No. 1, 15, 233 Or. P.2d football, In full-contact such as tackle sports ice hockey permitted, where bodychecking is conscious disregard safety for the of the is an opposing player inher- Lazaroff, game. ent D. Torts Sports, & 7 U. 1990) Miami Ent. & Sports (Spring L. Rev. (infliction pain knowledge danger with the is inher- hockey). ent in certain such as sports football A standard of care that a player holds liable based on contrary conduct that is inherent in the sport underlying noted, rationale of As rule an Pfister. nounced in is based long-standing principle on the Pfister certain contain inherent risks which a duty Pfister, defendant owes no of care. 167 Ill. 2d at 426-27; Murphy Co., see also v. Amusement Steeplechase (1929) J.). 479, 166 (Cardozo, N.Y. N.E. Although 173 of they disregard safety evince a conscious other players, bodychecking tackling and are an inherent sports hockey of ice and football. Pursuant Pfis ter, no avoid such participant a has conduct.

Morever, liability under conscious imposing disregard safety of standard would have a pronounced hockey as ice such sports on full-contact chilling effect a every time could be established liability If and football. injury resulted or tackle body check —because safety for the disregard conscious a demonstrates conduct and hockey of ice games opposing player of —the Pfister, played. be know them would as we football 3d at Ill. Pfister, quoting 2d at 167 Ill. (Green, J., dissenting). 191-92 is safety standard disregard of conscious

Finally, the ice such as sports in full-contact to defendants unfair noted, hockey, like ice has As commentator hockey. one body check- “in which example sport an of football, is foreseeably frequent result may play ing physical *** predicate participant unjust injuries. It would tough that a knowledge liability upon participant’s This injury. type in an result or collision could check Miami Ent. itself.” 7 U. in the sport is inherent 214. L. Rev. at Sports & hockey body- where such as ice sports,

In full-contact allowed, football, the traditional and tackle checking is is both unworkable standard willful and wanton To remain underlying contrary to the rationale Pfister. a standard of reasoning Pfister, consistent with accurately accounts for that more employed care must be these sports. associated with the inherent risks to be of care standard considering appropriate In concluded majority of courts have followed, note that we anticipated are inherent that “rules violations and, thus, insufficient contests” aspects Davis, Avila v. Citrus T. liability by themselves. establish Im- Contours Shaping District: College Community Risk, Marq. munity Primary Assumption As this court observed L. Rev. Sports sports, in numerous Pfister, “ beyond that which regularly commit contact ‘players basketball, such applied. In by the rules even as permitted for which a sanction as a foul illegal contact is described 458 imposed. is player Sometimes the injured. fouled is This is ” expected.’

to be Pfister, 427, 167 Ill. 2d quoting Pfis ter, App. (Green, 256 Ill. 3d at J., 191-92 dissenting). Silva, v. See also Lang (1999) 306 Ill. App. 3d 968-69 (“even in sports where there are rules governing the permissible degree of physical contact, rule infractions are inevitable and justify a lower standard of care than Jaworski, ordinary negligence”); 407-08, Conn. at (“In 696 A.2d at 337 athletic competitions, the object *** obviously is to win. In games, particularly those involving degree some physical contact, it is reason able to assume that the competitive spirit of the partici pants will result in some rules violations and injuries. That why there penalty boxes, are shots, fouls free kicks, yellow Moser, Mark v. cards”); 746 N.E.2d (Ind. 2001). 410, 419 App.

Policy reasons justify also the holding that rules viola- tions, by themselves, are insufficient impose liability in a contact sport:

“[E]ven participant’s when a conduct violates a rule of the game may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by sport itself, imposition legal liability might such conduct fundamentally well alter the nature sport by deterring participants vigorously engaging activity in to, that falls permis close but on the of, prescribed sible side (Emphasis rule.” original.) Knight, 318-19, 3 Cal. 4th at 834 P.2d at Rptr. Cal. 2d at 16.

At the time, same courts uniformly have recognized that not all misconduct can be considered an inherent aspect of the sport being played. “[S]ome of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to the Nabozny Barnhill, v. playing field.” 31 Ill. (1975).

Courts expressed have a standard of care that bal- and, ances these concerns in particular, acknowledges the risks inherent in certain sports, ways. various Perhaps the most frequently cited standard is that v. Knight Court of California Supreme adopted 2d 2 Rptr. 11 Cal. 296, 834 P.2d Jewett, Cal. 4th participant that a There, stated if the “only to a coparticipant of care breaches another intentionally injures participant totally as to be is so reckless in conduct that engages in the activity involved ordinary the range the outside 711, 11 at Cal. 4th at 834 P.2d 3 Cal. Knight, sport.” similar adopted have Other authorities 2d at 17. Rptr. 441, 502 Turcotte, N.Y.2d at See, e.g., standards. lie (liability will N.Y.S.2d at 55 at N.E.2d method of unrelated to the normal infractions “flagrant any competitive and done without game the playing Mark, (“liability at 422 will 746 N.E.2d purpose”); to a tactical action amounts injury causing lie where part foreseeable reasonably an inherent or move that competitive is undertaken to secure a game of the (liability at 283 will lie Marq. Sports L. Rev. edge”); that falls outside of squarely for “extreme conduct in a ordinary expected conduct that can customs or wording, precise of the particular sport”). Regardless in that way permits all a line a these standards draw during sporting extreme misconduct a event recovery for li foreclosing time injury, that causes while at same which, amount to an although may it ability for conduct rules, an inherent and of the is nevertheless infraction the standards agree of the We sport. inevitable that, authorities, and conclude in a forth in the above set football, a hockey such as ice or tackle sport full contact to a coparticipant breaches a of care participant injures copartici intentionally if the only participant “totally range outside the engages in conduct pant sport.” Knight, in the ordinary activity involved 2d at 17. Rptr. 11 Cal. Cal. 4th at 834 P.2d at issue in play takes the currently nothing As pled, activity as- range ordinary totally this case outside sociated hockey with ice game bodycheck- which ing is allowed. The complaint contains allegation no that Benjamin was deliberately targeted by the player defen- dants, either retaliation for an earlier incident or some other purpose, or that the player defendants had any intent to hurt Although him. the complaint alleges that Benjamin was struck while next to the boards at the edge rink, there is no allegation body checks are prohibited area, in that body check was in way some out of the normal play. area of Nor does the complaint allege was struck after play had been stopped. key allegation in plaintiffs complaint is that

player defendants violated a rule against bodychecking from behind they when Benjamin. struck However, as noted, rules violations are inherent, considered unavoidable risk of playing sport. then, pled As plaintiffs complaint fails allege totally outside the ordinary range of activity associated with ice hockey. The circuit court properly dismissed I count of plaintiffs complaint, judgment appellate court reinstating that count must be reversed. say, however,

This is not that conduct totally ordinary outside the range activity associated with ice hockey did not occur in this example, case. For if Benjamin by was struck player defendants, not in the heat of play while struggling gain possession of the puck, away but from the puck and the action of the game, that might well be a breach of the standard adopted However, here. in his complaint, plaintiff does any include indication of where Benjamin was in relation to the puck, any ongoing play, when the A place. plaintiff took cannot successfully plead cause of action for totally conduct which is outside the range ordinary activity involved in the sport without including facts play that describe the that occurring was at the time of injury. suggested appellate that the defen below

The court puck players as an is dant could raise the location of the rebuttal, inference of willful and sue in to defeat the by plaintiff’s complaint. Ill. conduct raised wanton improperly However, 3d at 892. this would shift the responsibility plaintiffs defendants. It is a burden to (Hills plead that establish a defendant’s v. facts Bridgeview League Ass’n, Little 195 Ill. 2d (2000)), sport, plaintiffs thus, in it is a full-contact totally responsibility plead facts show conduct range ordinary activity in outside the involved sport.

Finally, acknowledge we that the standard of care we adopt today, by underlying necessitated while explicitly Pfister, rationale of was not set forth any circumstances, decision.Under these to avoid unfair- plaintiff, appropriate ness to we deem it to remand this permit cause to the circuit court with instructions to complaint to amend I count of his in conform- opinion, ance with the standard of care set forth this if he is able to do so.

Organizational Defendants complaint Plaintiffs second amended contains three allege negligence counts, II, VI, counts IV and organizational defendants, the Hockey, Redhawk Hockey Association, and the Officials As- organizational initially sociation. defendants contend negligence that the counts are barred the contact sports exception and, therefore, that the reversing erred the circuit court’s dismissal of these counts. exception may applied

Whether the contact nonparticipant sporting event, to a in a as the such organizational here, defendants is an issue of first impression considering issue, in this court. In this both parties Supreme direct our attention to the Court of Kahn v. East Side Union High

California’s in decision District, School 31 Cal. 4th 75 P.3d Rptr. Cal. In Kahn, a plaintiff was novice member a high school swim team who broke her neck after diving off a starting block into shallow racing pool. The filed against suit the school district coach, and her swimming alleging that she had been inadequately instructed how to dive into a safely rac had ing pool pushed beyond been her capabilities. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The intermediate af firmed, holding diving presents shallow-water dangers competitive that are inherent swimming that “coaches merely challenge who their students beyond move their performance current level of have not Kahn, 997-1002, breached a care.” Cal. 4th at 33-37, 75 P.3d at 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 107-12.

On appeal, Supreme Court of California consid ered the standard care that should be to the applied defendants. The court noted that a number of cases had impose liability declined to on a coach or on instructor ordinary negligence urging the basis of students to go cases, In beyond competence. their current level of these noted, the court had focused on analysis generally risks, sport the circumstances of the and its inherent other, of the each relationship parties sport to the and “whether imposing liability broader coaches sport instructors would harm the or cause it to be Kahn, changed or abandoned.” 31 Cal. 4th at 39, 4 Rptr. Discussing P.3d at Cal. 3d at 115. these same criteria, Supreme Court of California noted that “the learning may risks associated with themselves be sport inherent sport, risks and that instructor coach does not increase the risk of harm inher generally in learning sport simply by urging ent the student competence.” strive to excel or to reach a new level of

463 1006, Kahn, Cal. 4th at 75 original.) 31 (Emphasis noted Rptr. P.3d at 4 Cal. 3d at 115. The court also inherent risks of duty mitigate a to impose “[t]o student, a learning sport by refraining challenging a chilling these cases could have a effect on the explain, as teaching learning skills that are neces enterprise level, At this sary sport. competitive especially, to the a Kahn, chilling effect is undesirable.” 31 Cal. 4th at 40, 4 Rptr. 75 P.3d at Cal. 3d at 115. ordinary an negligence court concluded that inappropriate, stating:

standard was case, present recognize relationship “In the we that the sports a dif instructor or coach to a student or athlete is in a relationship coparticipants ferent from the between significant sport. But because a of an instructor’s or challenge ‘push’ coach’s role is to or a student or athlete to advance in his or her skill level and to undertake more dif tasks, ficult and because the fulfillment of such a role could improperly stringent chilled too a standard of potential legal liability, general we conclude that same apply standard should in cases in which an al instructor’s leged liability primarily on rests a claim that he or she challenged player beyond perform capac his or her ity provide adequate supervision or failed to or instruction directing permitting before perform a student particular injury maneuver that has resulted to the may student. A be found to have instructor breached care only to a student or athlete if the instructor intentionally injures the or engages student in conduct ‘totally that is reckless in the sense that it is outside the {ibid.) range ordinary activity’ teaching involved in coaching Kahn, sport.” Cal. 4th at 75 P.3d at 32-33, Rptr. 4 Cal. 3d at 106-07. it,

Applying that standard of care to the case before Supreme Court of California then concluded that there were material questions of fact as to whether standard had been breached. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower courts’ judgments granting summary Kahn, judgment. 1011-13, 43-44, 4th Cal. at P.3d v. Trustees Kavanagh Rptr. Cal. 3d at 119-21. See also University, Boston 195, 204-06, 440 Mass. 795 N.E.2d (2003) (declining apply ordinary 1178-80 negligence allegedly to a defendant coach who caused his injure an opposing player). Kahn

Although factually distinguishable from the case, present general principles which the decision upon relied to determine the standard of care for a Pfister, are nonparticipant persuasive, consistent with noted, applicable here. As court below plaintiffs allegation against organiza essential all three tional defendants is that failed to enforce they adequately Ill. against bodychecking App. rule from behind. 369 Yet, earlier, 3d at 918. as noted rules violations are and are generally inevitable contact considered game. Pfister, 2d playing an inherent risk of 167 Ill. (Green, 427, quoting Pfister, App. at 256 Ill. 3d at 191-92 J., Further, contact dissenting). organized sport, an here, such as the one at issue the enforcement of the directly way rules affects the in which the is sport played. liability too strict a standard of on the enforce Imposing effect chilling vigor ment of those rules would have a on Finally, organiza in the as the participation sport. ous out, coaching officiating tional defendants point decisionmaking that often subjective decisions involve It difficult moving game. occurs in the middle of a fast ice place during all the contact takes an observe imagine activities more hockey game, and it is difficult to coaching officiating. than prone second-guessing ordinary standard to these deci Applying negligence an litigation the door to a surfeit of open sions would organizational an unfair burden impose would Accordingly, in the case at bar. defendants such as those here, that, alleged under the facts we conclude applies organizational to the sports exception successfully a cause of action plead defendants. To failing adequately enforce the rules in organized sport, plaintiff allege full-contact must that the defendant acted with intent to cause the injury or that the defen dant engaged “totally outside the range of the ordinary activity” (Knight, Cal. 4th at 834 P.2d at 17) 711, 11 Cal. Rptr. involved with coaching or of ficiating the sport.

Because the contact sports exception applies to the organizational defendants, the circuit court properly II, iy dismissed counts of plaintiff’s VI second amended complaint, the counts alleging negligence against organizational defendants. The appellate below, however, concluded that the negligence counts go could According court, forward. plaintiff had successfully pled willful and wanton conduct on the part of the player defendants and “the contact sports exception does protect the organizational defendants for negligence their leading to the allegedly willful and wanton conduct.” 369 Ill. 3d at 916. We disagree. above,

As discussed whether the contact sports excep tion applies to a nonparticipant defendant is a policy determination rests on the circumstances sport and risks, its inherent the relationship of the par ties to the sport other, and to each and whether imposing broader liability on the defendant “would harm the sport or cause it changed to be Kahn, or abandoned.” 31 Cal. 4th at 75 P.3d Cal. Rptr. at 115. Applica based, tion of the exception is not as the appellate court concluded, on whether the defendant’s conduct causes a third party to violate a standard of care. The appellate court erred in allowing the negligence proceed. counts to judgment of the circuit court dismissing II, counts iy and VI is affirmed.

As currently pled, nothing III, y in counts or VII of plaintiffs second amended complaint, the counts alleging organiza- conduct on the

willful and wanton defendants, totally outside the alleges tional coaching or of- range ordinary activity involved with allege hockey. ice Plaintiff does not ficiating sport to completely failed organizational defendants and, behind against bodychecking the rule from enforce alleges that all indeed, complaint amended the second “stop” wearing in the at issue were players game effort to jerseys back of their an warning on the Moreover, although previously, as noted enforce the rule. alleged, counts complaint second amended plaintiffs Associa- Hockey Hockey and the III and that Redhawk V against of the rule actively encouraged violation tion behind, conceded bodychecking facts, any under plead that he could not circuit court conclusory al- support Rule to Supreme Court conclude, therefore, legation. We of counts circuit court’s dismissal affirmed the properly III, and VII. Y care for

However, the standard of again we note that defendants, with the while consistent organizational As in that decision. Pfister, explicit was not rationale I, any count and to avoid respect to we concluded this cause to the we remand plaintiff, unfairness permit plaintiff instructions circuit court with in conform- III, complaint of his amend counts VII Y opinion, forth in this the standard of care set ance with if do so. he is able to Conspiracy

Civil allegation length plaintiffs not address at needWe Hockey Association between the conspiracy a civil enforcing the rule forgo Officials Association conspiracy from behind. “Civil against bodychecking more persons of two or a combination consists of either action by some concerted accomplishing purpose by unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose unlawful Ltd., Ill. 2d Brakegate, Adcock v. means.” case, In this the appellate court held that plaintiff successfully pled purpose unlawful based on the court’s previous conclusion that plaintiff successfully had alleged negligence on the the Officials Associa- tion. As the court stated: above,

“As discussed plaintiff successfully has alleged that [the Officials may injurious Association] liable tort for the al legedly willful and wanton resulting negligence failing its hockey to enforce the relevant safety Therefore, rules. to the extent plaintiff is able prove to purpose liability, he will be able to prove that the agreement alleges he Hockey [the between Association] [the tortious, Association] Officials was i.e., unlawful.” 369 Ill. 3d at 920. We have reversed portion of the appellate court’s judgment which allowed claims of negligence against the organizational defendants to go forward. follows, It therefore, that the judgment of the appellate court allow- ing the civil conspiracy count go forward must be reversed as well. However, as we instructed the have circuit court permit to replead, if possible, wrongful I, III, conduct in V, counts and VII, we deem it appropriate to instruct the circuit to permit plaintiff to replead VIII, count if he is able to do so.

CONCLUSION The judgment of the circuit court dismissing plain- tiff s complaint in its entirety is affirmed. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. II, Counts plaintiffs VI of second amended I\£ complaint are dismissed with prejudice. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to permit plaintiff to I, III, amend counts VII, and VIII of his V complaint in conformance with the standards of care set forth in this opinion, if he is able to do so.

Appellate court judgment in part affirmed

and reversed in part; circuit court judgment affirmed; cause remanded with instructions. KILBRIDE, concurring: specially JUSTICE I majority, result reached agree I with the majority’s adoption quarrel generally do Kahn. Nonethe- Knight the standards announced it holds goes too far when less, majority I believe the Knight, participants in sports full-contact that, under safety copartici- the of their may consciously disregard that a participant I the notion cannot countenance pants. the may consciously disregard activity in any civilized Furthermore, I consequence. of another without safety the sufficiently explained has not majority believe the and youth sport coaches liability by incurred scope of Kahn. Therefore, I specially under organizations sporting in majority but not result reached the concur the reasoning. its sports full-contact “[i]n that majority

The contends bodycheck football, hockey and ice where tackle such as safety for the of disregard is a conscious ing permitted, the game.” inherent is an opposing player the Therefore, the contact keeping 227 Ill. 2d at 456. Pfister effect, “the chilling exception produce would sports would as know them hockey and football we games of ice suggest They further 227 Ill. 2d at 457. played.” not be full-contact playing unfair to defendants that it would be inherent their for conduct hold them liable sports Hence, majority the claims 457. 227 Ill. at sport. different standard a new and require full-contact aggressiveness the adequately address of care to involved, namely, Knight’s duty to avoid physicality activity range normal totally outside the however, disagree. 459. I, 2d at 227 Ill. sport. that a the conclusion I begin, disagree To is players safety opposing for the disregard conscious supports majority sports. in full-contact inherent injury risk of some by noting this conclusion another, even within strikes one involved when sport. of a 227 Ill. 2d 455. While this is rules undoubtedly bodychecking tackling proper true, does necessarily disregard opponent’s “safety.” In organized hockey, example, football, lacrosse, variety protective equipment, rules mandate a wide including injury. pads, helmets and to reduce the risk of Similarly, addressing players’ physical the rules designed unprotected are to shield sensitive and areas of body.Notably, prohibited in all blows to the head are sports. through disapproval, Moreover, three social participants sports discourage play likely in full-contact significant injury. Indeed, cause to be as a known “cheap significant shot artist” is a source shame for participants. participants Therefore, most when collide play, reasonably they expect in the normal course of both get up game. say will It is continue fair to boxing, sports example, even in extreme most both expect boxers to shake hands after bout with no greater injuries despite having than cuts and bruises forcefully struck each in other the face and midsection. any injury by presented

Further, risk of kind of physical majority by contact the describes is means no unique sports. play to full-contact Defensive basketball regularly charges driving ers take from others running players may a basket with start. Basketball also pursuing rebounds, collide while sometimes known as “banging players under the boards.” Soccer sometimes attempting miss while to hit the ball with their heads opponent and, instead, slam into the head of an also competing sport, devastating for the In ball. that same injuries sliding ill-timed, knee occur based tackles Kahn, See behind. also 31 4th at Cal. 75 P.3d (“In Rptr. game at Cal. 3d at a of touch football *** players is an there inherent risk that will collide” added)). (emphasis why sports require

Therefore, I fail to see full-contact fact, In any special legal treatment. to the contrary conclusion, majority’s previously suggested we in sports exception adequately contact would ad- Pfister dress The even sports. majority quotes full-contact in analysis: pertinent portion its own “ soccer, softball, football, in participate ‘Those who basketball, spontaneous game kicking, or even of can play games physical among in which choose to contact participants game. is in inherent the conduct Participants games greater injury in such risk of assume *** resulting negligent coparticipants. from the conduct

*** ^[*] exception * * allows recovery injuries resulting and intentional from willful and wanton taking voluntary nature while into account the misconduct games physical in where contact is antici participation pated injury and where the risk caused this contact is ” added.) (Emphases quoting Ill. 2d at inherent.’ Pfister, Ill. 2d 426-27. at replacing Instead of the willful and wanton standard merely I standard sports, Knight full-contact believe and the further willful and wanton behavior explains disregard coparticipant’s safety. conscious of a Pfister also this conclusion. supports side-by-side, language Knight compared

When substantively indistinguishable. As Pfister out, willful and wanton majority points defined Pfister shows actual or “as ‘a course of action which which, if the of ac intent harm or course deliberate intentional, to or tion is shows utter indifference or the disregard person’s safety for a own conscious ” 2d at quoting 227 Ill. safety property others.’ li Similarly, Knight imposes Ill. 2d 421. Pfister, 167 partici where “the ability sport participant on a contact intentionally injures engages another pant the totally as to outside is so reckless conduct activity sport.” the range ordinary involved added.) at Cal. at 834 P.2d 3 4th (Emphasis Knight, Kahn, Cal. 4th 11 Cal. 2d at 17. also at Rptr. See (“A 32-33, 3d at sports 75 P.3d at Cal. 106-07 Rptr. duty instructor be found have breached a of care may only intentionally a student or athlete if the instructor injures the or conduct that is reckless engages student range in the it outside of ‘totally sense is the *** activity’ ordinary coaching teaching involved added)). sport” (emphasis Recklessness, actually in Knight, standard used synonymous is wanton encompasses willful and disregard safety conscious for of As Profes- another. explains: sor Dobbs *** category recognize “Courts often a kind of of fault distinguishable from negli- both intent and gence. category This is called recklessness willful or *** wanton misconduct. *** reckless, find [C]ourts to be willful or First, wanton when two elements concur. the conduct must only others, create an of unreasonable risk harm to it high degree must very create of risk or a risk of serious Second, harm. must be defendant conscious the risk proceed safety without concern others.” added.) (Emphasis Dobbs, §27, D. Torts essence, In Knight does not create a different standard than Pfister.

I disagree with the majority’s that adopt- conclusion ing the standard Knight heralds a new standard care permitting participants in full-contact disregard consciously safety Rather, participants. other this court should affirm the vitality of in all contact Pfister sports and merely explain application its in full-contact Therefore, sports. I in the respectfully majority concur opinion because, while I agree reached, with the I result cannot agree with its rationale.

I also respectfully clarify seek to the majority’s analysis attributed properly youth sports coaches and sporting organizations. The age experi- of the participants play ence must a role in considering adult-organized by the owed adult coaches and Kahn, organizations. Relying the sporting majority applied a standard of care to be to coaches and adopts organizations specifically addressing without sporting these critical factors.

Although sport a novice young, Kahn involved due to participant allegedly inadequate hurt instruction adult, coach, majority did high from her school the Kahn experi a participant’s age consider how expressly fact, In the duty. ence would affect the coach’s two justices Supreme of the Court who wrote California the inflexibility in Kahn criticized the rule separately the failing age the as to account for by majority created In and skill level of the and coaches. his participants concurrence, stated his belief special Werdegar Justice minor should that coaches and teachers of students bear Kahn, 1019, 4th at greater duty.” 31 Cal. “a somewhat J., (Werdegar, 3d at 126 Rptr. 75 P.3d at Cal. concurring). He further noted: specially *** a or coach is teacher the “When the instructor school usually primary safety of the minor students will my in Society expects legitimately, view— consideration. — merely they from coaches more instructors and than intentionally or harming refrain will student gross disregard safety. An wanton for instructor’s safety lack of for is not an inherent extreme care student Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th programs.” of school at risk athletics (Werdegar, J., 1019-20, Rptr. 75 P.3d Cal. 3d at 126 specially concurring). observed in his dissent:

Similarly, Justice Kennard profes- majority same for a adopts the standard “[T]he Knight teenage coach of athletes that sional novice in appropriate participants active plurality Ford found majority is account sports. Not taken into *** groups. Because significant difference between two minors, their athletes, often consider particularly student model, they coach not to a mentor or role trust coach injury.” needlessly expose (Empha- them to carelessly and Kahn, original.) ses in 31 Cal. 4th at 75 P.3d at (Kennard, J., concurring Rptr. Cal. 3d at 129-30 and dissenting part).

Perhaps pitfalls, majority these to avoid here cites portions majority noting opinion those of the Kahn relationship sport, parties other, of the to each and to the assessing sporting organization a coach or whether totally range ordinary acted coach has outside Although ing or 227 Ill. 2d at instruction. 461-65. majority significant expressly does not discuss the factors youth acknowledgment inexperience, suggests of and this require higher it intends to standard care for coaches organizations young, inexperienced partici and pants. higher triggered by This standard of care bewill relationships among players nature these organizations. pertinent question coaches and their determining organization whether a coach or acted willfully wantonly will be whether action of the sporting organizations totally coaches was outside range ordinary coaching, instruction, supervision, organization players age of a certain experience particular sport. level With that ad presented by major dition, the Kahn framework as this ity majority’s If this intent, sufficient. is not the legitimately ignore however, it should be. We cannot younger greater physical vulnerability athletes’ or their autonomy sporting limited from their coaches organizations assessing propriety of their conduct young their toward athletes. departs majority

To the extent that the from this interpretation of the full-contact standard in Knight application and the in the Kahn context of youth sports, respectfully majority’sjudg- I concur in reasoning. but ment not in its

Case Details

Case Name: Karas v. Strevell

Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 22, 2008

Citation: 884 N.E.2d 122

Docket Number: 104123, 104133 cons.

Court Abbreviation: Ill.