Kaplan v. HezbollahKaplan v. Hezbollah
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiffs attempted to serve defendant Hezbollah by sending a summons and the complaint by DHL to Mohammed Fneish, a ministеr in the Lebanese government and an alleged leader within Hezbollah. Fneish received the package on March 18, 2010. On April 12, 2010, plaintiffs filed an affidavit of default as to Hezbollah, but the Clerk’s Office refused to enter default on the grounds that under
Plaintiffs instead moved for leave nunc pro tunc to serve Hezbollah by serving Fneish by DHL under
Plaintiffs argue that serving Fneish by DHL is “infinitely more certain to ensure that the defendant actually receives notice of the action” than service by publication would be. (PL’s Mot. for an Order Pursuant to
Courts are divided as to whether serviсe may be authorized retroactively under
Here, even though DHL’s tracking service confirmed that Fneish received the shipment
(see
Pl.’s Aff. in Supp. of Default), the plaintiffs have not filed оn the docket any proof that Fneish is authorized to accept service on behalf of Hezbollаh, or any receipt reflecting that Hezbollah as an organization received the summons and complaint and has actual notice of the suit. Nor has an attorney representing Hezbollah filed a notice of appearance on the docket. Just as in
Brockmeyer,
where there was no evidence that the defendants had received actual notice of the suit, the plaintiffs here will not be authorized nunc pro tunc tо serve Hezbollah by only serving Fneish by DHL. Instead, plaintiffs will be authorized to serve Hezbollah by including service by publicаtion. Since Lebanon is not a party to the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Dоcuments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 339 (reprintеd following
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ ex parte motion [14] to direct the Clerk to enter the default of defendant Hezbollah be, and hеreby is, DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion [16] for an Order pursuant to