49 Kan. 726 | Kan. | 1892
The motion in this caséis allowed to correct the mandate so as to conform to the opinion handed down in Insurance Co. v. Amick, 45 Kas. 738, to show that the judgment of the district court of Franklin county is affirmed, but that the receiver will not be permitted to take possession, disturb or control any of the property expressly exempted by the statute, if any such property is expressly exempted. Upon the hearing to correct the mandate, an attempt was made by the counsel of defendant in error to reopen the original case and to present additional matters tending to show that Mrs. Amick took a first-class policy, not a second-class one. It is too late now to contest this matter.. (Insurance Co. v. Amick, 45 Kas. 738.) Therefore it is unnecessary to comment upon the dissenting opinion, because all stated therein is sufficiently replied to in Insurance Co. v. Amieh, supra. If the matters concerning the property described in the policy had been fully presented at the original hearing, they would have been considered before the final opinion was handed down. .
This case in different aspects has been before this court on several occasions prior to this time. (Insurance Co. v. Amick, 37 Kas. 73; same case, 14 Pac. Rep. 454; Insurance Co. v. Amick, 45 Kas. 74; same case, 25 Pac. Rep. 211; Insurance Co. v. Amick, and Naill v. Insurance Co., 45 Kas. 738; same case, 26 Pac. Rep. 944; Naill v. Insurance Co., 47 Kas. 223, 230; same case, 27 Pac. Rep. 854, 857.) The original judgment involved in this controversy was rendered by the district court of Franklin county on October 7, 1885, upon a regular full-paid policy issued by the insurance company to Lydia A. Amick. The judgment was a general judgment for money, absolute and unqualified in its terms, and the insurance policy was issued in and belonged to both the first-class and second-class business of the company, as prescribed by the laws of Kansas existing at that time with regard to mutual fire-insurance companies. (Laws of 1875?
“Thirteen hundred dollars — $1,300 — on her merchandise of every description, consisting of dry goods, notions, hats, caps, groceries, and other goods not more hazardous, while contained in the one-story frame building, with shingle roof, located Nos. 33 and 35, in block 9, Ottawa, Kas. $1,300 total insurance permitted. Attached to policy No. 320 of Kansas Farmers’ Insurance Co., at their Ottawa, Kas., agency. — Oria I. Cheyney, Agent.
“Seven hundred dollars — $700 — on household furniture, useful and ornamental, family wearing apparel, printed books and music, silver plate and plated ware, paintings, engravings and their frames, organ, sewing machine, fuel and family stores, while contained in the .one-story frame dwelling and additions, situated at Ottawa, Kas., on lots 33 and 35, in block 9, city of Ottawa, Kas. Total insurance, $700. Attached to policy No. 320 of Kansas Farmers’ Insurance Company. —Oria I. Cheyney, Agt.”
Property which may be insured as belonging to an insurance company’s first-class business is described in the foregoing statutes as follows:
“First, To include all dwelling-houses, barns, sheds, outbuildings and cribs, and their contents, farm implements, hay, grain, wool and other products, live stock, wagons, carriages, harness, household goods, wearing apparel, provisions, musical instruments and libraries, being upon farms as farm property, or in dwellings, or in accompanying outbuildings that constitute detached risks in villages, and belonging to the members.”
And property which may be insured as belonging to an insurance company’s second-class business is described in the foregoing statutes as follows:
“Second, To conclude all risks on buildings used for merchandizing and manufacturing, and the goods, wares, machinery and implements contained therein, and all other property not included in the first class.”
“In case No. 5491, (The Kansas Farmers’ Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Lydia A. Amick,) the judgment of the district court of Franklin county will be affirmed, but the receiver will not be permitted to take possession of, disturb or control any of the property expressly exempted by the statute.” (Insurance Co. v. Amick, 45 Kas. 741.)
The receiver above mentioned was the sheriff of Dickinson county; and I know of no property belonging to an insurance company “expressly exempted by the statutes” from the payment of a general judgment rendered against the insurance company. In every mandate, however, issued to the district court of Franklin county, its judgment and orders have been affirmed, and no order or judgment of that court has ever in fact and by mandate been reversed, vacated, or modified. All its judgments and orders still remain absolute and unqualified. It is now proposed, however, upon a motion, that the last mandate of affirmance issued by this court to the district court of Franklin county shall be so modified as to require a modification of the judgment and orders of such court, so that they can be enforced only against the company’s second-class business and its property belonging to its second-class business,