— This сase was instituted in Municipal Court Number Two for Kansas City, Missouri, upon complaint of the city counselor, charging the defendant with a violation of sections 563 and 626 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of 1909, in that he unlawfully failed and neglected to remove from the sidewalk, in front of property owned by him, ice and snow which obstructed and rendered the sidewalk dangerous, inconvenient and annoying to persons residing in the neighborhood traveling over the sidewalk.
The defendant was found guilty, and a fine of five dollars assessed. An appeal was taken to the criminal court for Jackson County, where upon trial he was again found guilty and the same fine assessed and judgment entered accordingly. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled and in due time this appeal was taken.
The cause was submitted in the criminal court without a jury upon an agreed statement of facts, by which it was stipulated that defendant was the managing officer of the corporation which owned the land abutting upon the sidewalk on whiсh the snow in question had fallen and lay, and that he made no point that he did not occupy the position of owner; that at the time mentioned in the complaint there was a fall of snow upon the sidewalk rendering it dangerous, inconvenient and annoying to persons walking thereon; and that he did not remove the snow, as charged in the complaint; that the sidewalk, street and abutting property were within the limits of the city; that the sole question involved in the case was and is the validity of the city ordinances on which the complaint was founded. The validity of the ordinances was challenged in the trial court and upon this appeal on the ground that they are in conflict with the provision of Section 4 of Article 2 of the Constitution of the State which declares that all
Sections 563 ánd 626 of the City Ordinances are as follows: ,
“Ice, Snow, Etc — Repairs—It shall be the duty of all persons, owning or occupying any real proрerty, fronting upon any street, to keep the sidewalk, curbing and guttering in front and alongside of such property and on the same side of the street in good repair and order, and to clean the same, and remove from any such sidewalk, curbing and guttering all ice, snow, earth or other substance that in- anyways obstructs or renders the same dangerous, inconvenient or annoying to any person.
“Penalty. Any person, firm or corporation failing, neglecting or refusing to comply with any provision of this chapter shall, on сonviction, where no other penalty is provided, be fined in any sum not less than one nor more than five hundred dollars.”
Appellant does not question that these ordinances are expressly authorized by Section 16 of Article 3 of the Kansas City charter.
Wе do not think that any of the constitutional provisions used as a weapon of attack against these or
The police power, as wаs said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn. v. Illinois,
Aрplying these principles to the matter here in controversy we find an excellent illustration of the rule which we have stated. It appears from the appellant’s brief that the corporation which he represents is the owner of apрroximately 50001 feet of frontage along the sidewalk mentioned in the record. Some of the lands which originally belonged to him have been sold and are occupied by others representing the purchaser. The street as well as the sidewalk werе like all public highways brought into being by the exercise of the police power of the State. It is the exercise of this power that has given the lands their urban character, and by which the whole people have assumed the responsibility for prоviding means by which these ways may be maintained for the use of all, and for the benefit such use confers upon the land of adjoining proprietors. The same governmental principle by which the Legislature may improve its streets, and construct sidewalks and rеconstruct or repair them when they have fallen into natural decay, at the expense of adjoining proprietors, applies with equal force to the removal of such temporary obstructions as are the motif of this case. The
Laws of this class rest largely, although not entirely, upon these and оther special benefits to those upon whom their burden is imposed. The matter of public convenience which, as we have already said, all must consider in the use of their property, is also an element in the imposition of the burden. A snow storm spreads itself as an obstruction over an entire city and the remedy must instantly spread itself over the same area to meet the emergency. It would be impossible otherwise than through the action of the law directly upon all in whose hands the remedy lay tо meet the emergency. 'When this is done by the distribution of the burden upon those specially interested in the result the problem would seem to be well solved and public convenience and justice in the distribution of the burden are combined for the good of all. We need not wait until some Utopian scheme can be devised which would meet, with mathematical certainty, the conditions of every particular case. This duty of selection is necessarily inherent in the lawmaking department of every
This is the same рower by which the citizens may be compelled, at the direction of a peace officer, to come to his assistance in the suppression of riot, to aid in the extinguishment of fire, or to suffer his building to be demolished for that purpose. His persоn and his property are at the disposal of the State whenever the circumstances require that he, of all others, should be selected for the service, either by reason or propinquity or special interest or both. This relation is to be dеtermined by the Legislature, subject to those limitations prescribed by the Constitution for the protection of private, rights.
In Ford v. Kansas City,
“While there is respectable authority for the proposition that a municipal corporation cannot impose upоn the citizen the obligation to keep the public sidewalk in front of his premises free from obstruction by snow, etc., at his own expense (Gridley v. City of Bloomington,88 Ill. 554 ; Chicago v. O'Brien,111 Ill. 532 ), the weight of authority is, however, the other way, and in favor of the position tentatively stated in the foregoing dicta, as to such power.”
Examining these authorities, we find that the Illinois cases cited have little or no support except in State v. Jackman, 60 N. H. 318. On the other hand, the cases, sustaining such ordinances are numerous, and the logic of some of the opinions strikes us as unanswerable. Among these are the following: Goddard, Petitioner,
The ordinance in question is, in our opinion, a valid exercise of the police power of the State and constitutes no violation of any provision of the State Constitution to which our attention has been directed. The judgment of the criminal court for Jackson County is affirmed.
PER CURIAM: — The foregoing opinion of Bsowsr, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.