de1ivei~ed the opinion of the Court.
The case presents the effect of a condition in a free pass issued by petitioner to respondent and used by hеr in transportation in interstate commerce-whether determined by the provisiOns of § 1 of the llepbur~i Aát (34 Stat. 584) or by the laws of Kansas and Missouri.
There is ~praotica11y IIQ dispute about the facts. The pass was authoritatively and gratuitously issued and she sustained injuriеs in Missouri while using it in an interstate journey. This injury she alleged, and prayed judgment against the Railway Cornpany in the sum of ~25.OOO.
The. Railway Compаny opposed the pass to the action. It contained the, following condition: "The person ac-. cepting аnd using it, thereby assumes all risk of accident and, damage to person and baggage."
The company averred that it was an interstate carrier by rail and issued the pass "under Art. 5 of the Federal Law, known a~ the Interstate Commerce Act," and it was to be "interpreted and controlled in its e1~eet and operation by decisi~ns of t]ie Federal Courts" construing the act.
To the defense respondent replied that at the time of receiving the pass she resided in Kansas, and that in accеpting it "she did not and coulct not assume the risk of acèident or damage to her person and baggage, caused by the nеgligence ~` of the company, and that the condition upon the pass expressing such effect was void under the provisions of Art. 3, c. 98, of the General Statutes of *467 the State of Kansas, 1915, relating to railroads and other carriers, and that, under the statutes and the common law of Kansas, the condition was against public policy. .
She further pleaded that under' the laws of Missouri the condition was also against public policy and void, and" that the action was not, and is not, brought “ upon any Federal Statute or any Federal law, but upon the common law liability in force ” in Missouri and that “ the action was and is brought in the Cirсuit Court of Jasper County, Missouri, under the laws of the State of Missouri,” and that the company’s liability to her was to'be deterrnined by the laws of that State.
The trial coprt took and expressed the view that the condition upon the pass was void under thе laws and' public policy of both States, and ruled that the condition upon it constituted no defense to the action and excluded it from the case. Declarations of law recognizing the relevancy and controlling effect of the condition were refused.
The court thereupon found for respondent (plaintiff) and fixed her damages at $8,000—that amount having bеen' stipulated as representing her injury. Judgment was entered for that amount, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.
Thе Supreme Court discussed at some length the Hepburn Act, the extent-of its regulation, and what it permitted to state powers or excluded from them, and said, adopting the' language of a- Supreme Court Commissioner of the State, “ Our own conclusion is‘thаt Congress has not legislated on .the subject of the rights and liabilities of the parties in cases of interstate carriage оf passengers under free passes, not coming within the prohibition of the Hepburn Act, or respecting the validity of stipulatiоns or conditions annexed to such passes exempting the carrier from liability and that, therefore, these matters remаin the subject of regulation by the several States.”
*468 The comment concedes the supremacy of federal'cоntrol, and leaves only the inquiry, Has control been exerted in the Hepburn Act?
The act was passed June 29, 1906, and was an amеndment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It was, as the act it amended was, a regulation of carriers in interstate commerce, and it provided that “ no common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall,' after January first, ninetеen hundred and seven, directly or indirectly, issue or give any interstate free ticket, free pass, or free transportation for passengers, except to its employees and their families. . . .” And a carrier violating the act is subject to a рenalty, and any person not of those excepted, who uses the pass, is also subject to a penalty.
. The provision for passes, with its sanction in penalties, is a regulation of interstate commerce to the completion оf which the determination of the effect of the passes is necessary. We think, therefore, free passes in their entirеty are taken charge of, not only their permission and use, but the limitations and conditions upon théir use. Or to put it another way, аnd to specialize, the relation of their users to the railroad which issued them, the fact and measure of responsibility thе railroad incurs by their issue, and the extent of the right the person to whom issued acquires, are taken charge of. And that responsibility and those rights, this Court has decided; the railroad company can control by conditions in the passes. Antecedеntly to the passage of the Hepburn Act, we decided that a passenger who accepts' a free pass mаy exempt a carrier from responsibility for negligence, and ño public policy is violated thereby.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v.
Adams,
Those cases were considered and applied as giving validity to the stipulations of passes issued under the act
*469
in
Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co.
v.
Thompson,
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.