53 Kan. 272 | Kan. | 1894
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The Kansas & Colorado Pacific Railway Company asks for the reversal of a judgment for $800 obtained by Joshua Wright for land alleged to have been conveyed to the railway company for a right-of-way. The defendant in error insists that no authenticated case-made has been brought up to this court, nor any record which warrants us in reviewing the proceedings of the district court. The judgment was rendered November 1, 1889, when 60 days were given to the railway company in which to serve a case for the supreme court, and 10 days thereafter were given to Wright to suggest amendments to such case-made, and the order provided that the case-made should be settled on five days’ notice. The case-made was served on December 28,
The code provides that, when the term of office of a trial judge shall expire during the time fixed for making or settling and signing a case, it shall be his duty to certify, sign and settle the case in all respects as if his term had not expired. (Civil Code, §449.) This provision has been considered, and it has been held that the authority of a judge out of office, being special and limited, can only be exercised at such times and under such circumstances as the statute prescribes. (Railway Co. v. Corser, 31 Kas. 705.) The only contingency which warrants an ex-judge in settling and signing a case is, that at the expiration of his term the time was actually fixed for making or settling and signing the case. In this case, when the term of the judge who tried the case had expired, the case had been served, the time for suggesting amendments had expired, and no time had been fixed by the court or by the parties under its order for settling and signing such case. It is true the ca-e was to be settled on five days’ notice, but no notice was given prior to the expiration of the judicial term, and it was not given for more than five months afterward. If before the term expired notice had been given fixing the time for settling and signing the case, perhaps it might be said that the term of office of the trial judge had expired when the time was fixed for settling and signing the case, and that the ex-judge would therefore have authority to act in the premises. As it was, however, the term expired when no 'time had been fixed by the order of the court for settling and