Plaintiff has been employed as a sewer for defendant Lane Upholstery (“Lane”) since 1969. Over a period of several years, plaintiff began experiencing numbness in her hands. However, she never reported any of these problems to either her employer or her regular *622 physician. Finally, in the Spring of 1997, the pain intensified, and she reported the pain and numbness to her gynecologist, Dr. Paul Caporossi. Dr. Caporossi referred her to Dr. John L. de Perczel, a general orthopedic surgeon.
Prior to seeing Dr. de Perczel, plaintiff informed various supervisors at work about her symрtoms and her upcoming appointment with Dr. de Perczel. No one objected to her seeing Dr. de Perczel. Anne Story, Lane’s Director of Human Resources, however, did inform plaintiff that, if her condition was work-related, she would need to seek treatment from a physician approved by Lane.
On 6 May 1997, plaintiff presented herself to Dr. de Perczel. Dr. de Perczel diagnosed her as having bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, caused by her work. Upon learning of this diagnosis, Lane arranged for plaintiff to see its physician, Dr. Robert Hart of the Hart Industrial Clinic. Dr. Hart eventually concurred in Dr. de Perczel’s diagnosis. He assigned plaintiff to light duty work pending further evaluation. On 3 June 1997, Dr. Eric Hart, also of the Hart Industrial Clinic, referred plaintiff to Dr. Carl Michael Nicks for a surgical evaluation of her condition. Dr. Nicks recommended that plaintiff undergo carpal tunnel release surgery. Dr. Nicks scheduled this surgеry for 12 June 1997.
Two days before the scheduled surgery, plaintiff unilaterally canceled her appointment with Dr. Nicks. She informed her employer that she wished to have Dr. de Perczel perform the surgery instead. She stated that she had no specific objection to Dr. Nicks; she just felt more comfortable with Dr. de Perczel. Ms. Story explained to plaintiff that Lane would not pay for the surgery because only Dr. Nicks had been authorized to perform the surgery — Dr. de Perczel was not one of its authorized physicians.
On 1 July 1997, Lane’s claims adjuster wrote a letter to plaintiff’s counsel, advising plaintiff that Lane had accepted her claim as com-pensable. The letter again informed plaintiff that Lane had only authorized the carpal tunnel release surgery with Dr. Nicks and thus would not voluntarily pay for her surgery with Dr. de Perczel. A copy of this letter was forwarded to the Industrial Commission.
Notwithstanding her employer’s refusal to pay for the surgery, plaintiff presented herself to Dr. de Perczel on 7 July 1997. Two days later, on July 9, Dr. de Perczel performed a right carpal tunnel release, and a few weeks later, he followed up by performing *623 a carpal tunnel release on the left hand. Follоwing the first surgery, Dr. de Perczel ordered plaintiff to cease work. She has not returned to work since then.
In addition to refusing to pay for her surgery with Dr. de Perczel, Lane has also refused to provide plaintiff with any disability compensation. This apparently stems from conflicting treatment plans. Dr. Nicks testified that, had he performed the carpal tunnel surgeries, he would have assigned plaintiff to light duty work, but would not have removed her from work for more than seven days. Thus, under his plan, plaintiff would not have been entitled to any disability compensation, only reimbursement for the costs of her medical trеatment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-28 (1999) (“No compensation . . . shall be allowed for the first seven calendar days of disability resulting from an injury, except [medical expenses].”)- Dr. de Perczel, however, opined that plaintiff was unable to perform any work whatsoever and thus removed plaintiff from work indefinitely. Under his рlan, therefore, plaintiff would be entitled to some disability compensation.
Plaintiff filed a Form 33 Request for Hearing with the Industrial Commission, seeking the authorization of Dr. de Perczel, reimbursement of the medical expenses associated with the carpal tunnel surgeries, and disability compensation. The deputy commissioner concluded Lane never had the authority to control plaintiff’s medical treatment because it had never officially accepted liability. As such, the deputy commissioner awarded plaintiff past and future medical expenses, as well as temporаry total disability benefits in the amount of $252.15 per week from the period of 9 July 1997 forward.
The Full Commission reversed. It concluded that Lane had indeed accepted liability and thus had the right to control plaintiffs medical treatment. It further denied plaintiffs request to have Dr. de Perczel authorized as her trеating physician. Accordingly, the Full Commission denied her claims for medical expenses and disability compensation. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court.
Plaintiff first contests Lane’s right to select her treating physician for purposes of her carpal tunnel release surgeries. In particular, plaintiff argues that Lane had no right of control prior to the surgeries because it never formally accepted liability until it filed a Form 60 after the surgeries. We reject this argument.
Generally speaking, the employer has the right to direct the medical treatment for a compensable injury.
Schofield v. Tea Co.,
299 N.C.
*624
582, 586,
As soon as the employee claims he or she is entitled to compensation, the employer has the right to require the employee to submit to an examination with one of its authorized physicians. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-27(a) (1999). One of the implicit purposes of this requirement is to enable the employer to ascertain whether the injury is work-related оr not and thus whether the claim is indeed compensable. At this point, however, the statute only confers upon the employer the right to require its employee to submit to an examination. We do not believe this limited right can be equated with a right to direct medical treatment in general. Were thаt the case, an employer could ostensibly force its employee to undergo treatment with one of its physicians and then still turn around and deny liability. We do not believe our Legislature intended such a result by enacting section 97-27.
Instead, we conclude the right to direct medical treatment is triggered only when the employer has accepted the claim as compen-sable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25 confers upon the employer the duty to provide all medical compensation. This medical compensation includes the providing of medical supplies, services, and treаtment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19). But until the employer accepts the obligations of its duty, i.e., paying for medical treatment, it should not enjoy the benefits of its right, i.e., directing how that treatment is to be carried out.
Having concluded that Lane’s right to direct medical treatment and thereby select plaintiff’s carpаl tunnel surgeon attached upon acceptance of liability, we must next address when that acceptance occurred here. Plaintiff claims Lane’s acceptance did not occur until it filed a Form 60 with the Industrial Commission — after her carpal tunnel surgeries had been perfоrmed. Lane counters that acceptance occurred prior to the surgeries, when it notified plaintiff both orally and in writing that it was treating her claim as compensable. The Commission ultimately agreed with Lane, as do we.
*625
Our statutes nowhere set forth exclusive methods of accepting liability. The employer’s filing of a Form 21 agreement (if approved by the Commission) has repeatedly been held to constitute an acceptance of liability.
See, e.g., Kisiah v. W.R. Kisiah Plumbing,
Lane did so here. Prior to the surgeries, Lane verbally notified plaintiff it was accepting her claim. Lane thereafter also sent plaintiff’s counsel written notification of its acceptance. Plaintiff even understood that acceptance had occurred, as she admitted that, going into surgery, she knew her medical expenses would not be covered by workers’ compensation. On these facts, we conclude that Lane acted sufficiently to accept liability prior to the carpal tunnel surgeries.
Cf. Craver v. Dixie Furniture Co.,
Although Lane had the right to select the surgeon to perform the carpal tunnel surgeries, this right is not unlimited. There are a few recognized exceptions to the employer’s general right to direct medical treatment. First, an employee may prоcure his own physician when the employer has failed to direct medical treatment in a prompt
*626
and adequate manner.
Schofield,
Third, even in the absence of an emergency or the employer’s failure to direct timely and adеquate treatment, an employee still may select his or her own physician if such selection is approved by the Commission.
Id.; Schofield,
Here, the Full Commission denied authorization of Dr. de Perczel based upon two grounds. First, it concluded that plaintiff’s request for authorization was not filed within a reasonable time because her request came after her surgeries with Dr. de Perczel. As just stated, this reasoning is flawed; the request for approval need not be filed before treatment is actually administered. Were this the only ground upon which the Commission denied authorization, we would be constrained to hold that the Commission abused its discretion. However, the Commission also denied authorization on the ground that plaintiff did not have good cause to refuse treatment by Dr. Nicks. We find no abuse of discretion as to this ground. The evidence reflects Dr. Nicks was both well-qualified and competent to perform the carpal tunnel release surgeries. In fact, plaintiff never questioned his abilities. Her only explanation for wanting Dr. de Perczel was she “didn’t like Dr. Nicks’s attitude and the way he did not explain stuff to [her].” (Tr. at 38). Given that this was her only reаson, we cannot say the Commission abused its discretion in refusing to authorize treatment *627 with Dr. de Perczel. Accordingly, we conclude the Commission properly denied plaintiffs claims for medical expenses associated with her carpal tunnel surgeries.
Plaintiff also contests the Commission’s denial of her claim for disability compensation. Specifically, she contends the Commission made insufficient findings to support its denial of her claim. We agree and therefore vacate and remand that portion of the opinion and award denying plaintiffs disability compensation claim.
In dеnying her claim, the Commission summarily concluded, “Any inability by plaintiff to earn wages subsequent to 9 July
1997
[the date of her first carpal tunnel surgery with Dr. de Perczel] was not related to her occupational disease and she is, therefore, not entitled to any disability compensation after that date.” The Commission, however, never made any findings explaining its basis for denying disability compensation. Perhaps the Commission based its denial on plaintiffs refusal to undergo medical treatment with Dr. Nicks: If so, this is not a valid reason for denial. Although medical expenses are not covered when an employee refuses to see an authorized physician, disability compensation may not be cut off unless the Commission has first ordered the employee to undergo treatment with that physician. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25;
Deskins v. Ithaca Industries, Inc.,
Alternatively, the Commission might have based its denial of disability compensation on Dr. Nicks’ treatment plan, in which he determined that plaintiff would not have missed more than a week of work due to her injury. If that were the case, this basis would be lawful. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-28 (“No compensation ... shall be allowed for the first seven calendar days of disability resulting from an injury, except [mеdical expenses].”). But because the Commission never made any specific findings, we simply do not know whether it denied disability compensation on a lawful or unlawful basis. We therefore remand to the Commission to reconsider plaintiff’s claim for disability compensation and to make explicit findings with respect to this claim.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.