52 Wis. 502 | Wis. | 1881
Treating the action as simply founded upon the alleged school-district orders, there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the judgment of the court below. There is no law which authorized the district board to issue such orders, or to bind the district by their provisions. The only authority we can find which authorizes the clerk of a school district to bind the district or authorize the payment by the treasurer, with the funds of the district, of orders drawn by
These provisions of the statute very clearly limit the power of the director and clerk of a school district to issue orders upon the treasurer of the district, to cases where the money is due and immediately payable to the person in whose favor the order is issued, and where the funds for the payment of such debt have been apportioned to such district, or have been voted by the district for the payment thereof. The inference to be drawn from these provisions of the statutes is, that it was not
It is claimed that this authority is clearly given by section 49, ch. 155, Laws of 1868 (Tay. Stats., 555, § 51). This section reads as follows: “The district board shall provide the necessary appendages for the school house, and keep the same in good condition and repair during the time a school shall be taught therein, and they shall keep an accurate account of all expenses incurred by them, and present such account for allowance to the qualified voters at a regular district meeting, and
The power conferred by this section is very clearly not an absolute power. It is necessarily limited by the restrictions imposed upon the district itself, in the matter of taxation. The statute having prohibited the district from voting a tax beyond a specific amount for the purchase of fuel and appendages for the school house in any one year, it would seem to follow as a necessary sequence that the board could not bind the district for any sum in excess of that amount for such purchases, under the provisions of the section above quoted. It will be seen by an examination of section 19, ch. 155, Laws of 1863, as amended by chapter 111, Laws of 1866, chapter 162-, Laws of 1868, and chapter 66, Laws of 1867 (Tay. Stats., 545, § 19, subd. 5), that the power of the district is restricted as to sums which may be raised by tax for the purchase of fuel and appendages for the school house. Subdivision 8 authorizes the district “ to impose such tax as may be necessary to discharge any debts or liabilities of the district lawfully
But the section itself, in conferring the power upon the board to make purchases of appendages, etc., is conditional. No such purchases are to bind the district, or to compel it to levy a tax for the payment of the purchases made, until the account thereof shall be presented for allowance to the qualified voters of the district, at a regular district meeting; and when the account is allowed at such meeting, by the voters of the district, then the district becomes liable for the payment, and may levy a tax for that purpose, and not before. All purchases made by the board, under the section of the statute above cited, are clearly conditional purchases, and do not bind the district until the account for the same has been presented, and allowed by the voters of the district, or until the district has, by some other act or acts, clearly ratified the contract by the board made under the authority of such section. Persons who deal with the district board are bound to take notice of their powers; and when they sell property'for the use of a school district to the district board, they are presumed to know that the district will not be bound to pay for such purchases until the account therefor has been presented to a regular district meeting, and allowed by the voters thereof; and that no tax can be levied in the future for such payment until after the account has been so allowed. A different question would
The evidence in the case shows that the district has retained the seats purchased, and has paid through its officers the contract price, but has refused to pay any interest on such price; that the account was never presented to or allowed by the voters of the district at any time; and that the only question ever presented to the voters upon the subject was, whether interest on the purchase price should be paid, and the district refused to pay.
It is urged that the district has ratified the contract made by the boai’d, by retaining and using the seats; but we find no evidence in the case showing that the contract was ever presented to the voters of the district, or that they knew what the terms of it were. The proofs undoubtedly show that the district has sanctioned the payment of the purchase price without interest, but they do not show that it has ratified the contract made by the board; on the contrary they show it has refused to ratify it as to the interest, that being the only ques
The statute having designated the purposes for which the district may borrow money upon interest and charge the payment thereof, with interest, upon the tax-payers, it would seem to be a fair inference that in all other cases the district and its officers should be limited in their expenditures to the sums lawfully voted for taxes on the property of the district for the year in which the expenditure is made. To extend the authority to contract debts to be paid with interest in future years, would be an indirect evasion of the limited right to borrow money by the district. If a school district has the power to charge the property of the district for expenditures made by the district and its officers in former years, for the payment of which they had not levied a tax as provided by law, it would seem very clear that such charge can only be made by showing that the district has approved and ratified the former expenditure; and the only way such ratification and approval could be shown would be by a vote of the electors of the district at some regular meeting, approving the expenditure and directing payment of the same. The mere fact that the district officers had paid a portion of the expenditure out of the funds
The orders sued upon being unauthorized and void, and the plaintiff having failed to show that his claim for the seats purchased by the board was ever presented to the voters of the district at a district meeting for allowance or approval (except as to the interest, which the district refused to allow), and having failed to give any sufficient evidence that the district had ratified the contract made by the district board, the court properly ordered judgment in favor of the defendant upon the merits of the action.
In looking at the bill of exceptions, it would seem that the plaintiff failed to show any title in himself to the claim sued upon. The orders or contracts upon which the action was founded, do not appear to have been made payable to the plaintiff by any indorsement appearing thereon, although in the printed brief they appear to have been so indorsed. We do not, however, consider this as a ground for affirmance of the judgment, as the ownership does not seem to have been contested upon the trial or in the brief of the counsel for the respondent.
The claim that the court erred in the rejection of evidence offered to show that the seats purchased had been constantly used by the district since the purchase, can have no effect upon the rights of the district. That fact had been already proved by the witness Phelps, without objection; but, in our view of the case, that fact would not bind the district. The vendor could only bind the district by showing that the account had been presented at a regular meeting and approved, or by some other acts equivalent to such action on its part. If the evidence had shown that the terms of the contract had been made known to the voters of the district at some meeting thereof, and that they failed to • take any action thereon and afterwards authorized the district officers to make use of the
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.