89 Minn. 380 | Minn. | 1903
Lead Opinion
June 22, 1901, defendant was the owner of a certain farm, upon which was a growing crop of wheat and oats, put in by a tenant upon shares; a one-third interest going to the owner. An arrangement was entered into on that day by which it was agreed that the land should be sold to- plaintiff, and pursuant to such arrangement, on July 1 of the same year, defendant executed a warranty deed in the usual form, and left it with a banker by the name of Broun, to whom plaintiff was to pay the money expressed in the
1. Error is assigned upon the order of the court in refusing to admit oral testimony to the effect that, in addition to the money consideration expressed in the deed, appellant was to retain his interest in the growing crops. The testimony was refused upon the ground that it tended to change the terms of the contract as expressed in the deed. In this ruling we think the court was correct. In this state the law is .settled that growing crops, such as wheat and oats, are attached to and become a part of the real estate, and are transferred by a conveyance of the land, unless expressly reserved. Erickson v. Paterson, 47 Minn. 525, 50 N. W. 699; Cummings v. Newell, 86 Minn. 130, 90 N. W. 311. The record is silent as to the nature of the preliminary contract, whatever it was, and.we must assume that it was merged into the deed, which, according to its terms, carried the crops. The parol testimony offered was not admissible upon the ground that an agreement to retain the crops by the grantor was part of the consideration of the conveyance. The true consideration may generally be shown, but, when evidence offered for such purpose will have the effect to restrict the legal operation of the covenants, it is incompetent. Rooney v. Koenig, 80 Minn. 483, 83 N. W. 399.
■ 2. On July 1 the deed was handed by appellant to Mr. Broun, and appellant offered to show by him his instruction as to when
But although the payments were made prior to the time the crops were harvested, payment was not completed until nineteen days after the deed was given to Mr. Broun, and in the meantime the crops had matured and had to be taken care of; and since, according to the offer of evidence, the deed was not handed to Mr. Broun to be delivered unconditionally upon payment, but only within a certain time, we are of the opinion that it was a question of fact whether the deed was intended to take effect on July 1, relating back, upon payment, or on the date when it was actually delivered to respondent. This question was for the jury to determine, and it was error for the court to hold that respondent was entitled to the crops. This conclusion is not altogether free from doubt, and it would appear from the record that the attorneys on both sides had strenuously endeavored to avoid trying the case upon its merits, and allowing all the facts to be presented to the court; but we are inclined to the view that the court
Order reversed and new trial granted.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the result. My understanding is that a deed takes effect only from its delivery, and not from its date. When deposited in escrow, nothing passes by it until the condition is performed, and the title of the grantee dates only from the final delivery of the deed to him, except in cases where it is shown that the intention of the parties was otherwise, or the ends of justice required the application of a different rule. Andrews v. Farnham, 29 Minn. 246, 13 N. W. 161; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26. Therefore it seems to me that the burden was upon respondent in this case to show that it was within the exception to the general rule stated.