68 Wash. 681 | Wash. | 1912
This action involves the rights of creditors of the vendee in an admitted fraudulent conveyance. The facts are these: Appellant was formerly the wife of one Gladding, from whom she had obtained a divorce. Subsequent to the divorce, the parties thereto again lived together
Some question is raised as to the court’s ruling on the admission of testimony as to conversations with James Mc-Neny at the time of the making of the first deed. Our statute, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1211, is so plain upon excluding testimony of this character, in actions where the adverse party defends as legal representative of a deceased person, that no discussion of the point is necessary to show the rulings complained of were correct.
The main contention of error, however, is based upon ap
We have a statute, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5292, particularly applicable to the facts in this case:
“In every case where any question arises as to the good faith of any transaction between husband and wife, whether a transaction between them directly or by intervention of a third person or persons, the burden of proof shall be upon the party asserting the good faith.”
Appellant hardly satisfies the rule of this statute in saying the deed to her husband was without consideration and only made to put the property beyond the reach of her first hus
“If a wife permits her husband to take title to her lands, and to hold himself out to the world as the owner of them, and to contract debts upon the credit of such ownership, she cannot afterwards, by taking title to herself, withdraw them from the reach of his creditors, and thus defeat their claims.” City Nat. Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq. 158.
See, also, Liebenthal v. Price, 8 Wash. 206, 35 Pac. 1078; Kemp v. Folsom, 14 Wash. 16, 43 Pac. 1100; Bates v. Drake, 28 Wash. 447, 68 Pac. 961.
Upon the trial, appellant’s counsel contended that the deed from appellant to her husband created a trust, in that he-was to only retain the title a limited time, and then, at her request, reinvest the title in her. If so, it was an express-trust, and under our decisions it cannot be established by parol.
Sufficient has been said to sustain the judgment of the-lower court, and the same is affirmed.
Dunbar, C. J., Ellis, Mount, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.