When defendant Rodney Petersen removed a dead limb from a tree by attaching a rope and pulling it with his pickup, a piece of the limb struck the plaintiff, Ho-sien Kalell. Kalell sued Petersеn and his wife Betty, as well as Kalell’s own underin-sured motorist carrier, Mutual Fire and Automobile Insurance Company. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, which was the carrier for Petersen’s homeowners insurance, intervened and requested a ruling that its homeowners policy did not provide coverage. The district court, in the first stage of its bifurcated proceeding, held that Farm Bureau’s hоmeowners policy exclusion for occurrences “arising out of the use” of a motor vehicle did not relieve it from potential liability. Farm Bureau was granted leave to appeal, and we now affirm.
The district court resolved this legal issue on the basis of the parties’ stipulation of facts, Farm Bureau’s homeowners insurance policy, Mutual Fire’s automobile pоlicy, and depositions. The material facts are not disputed. Petersen cut approximately two-thirds of the way through the limb with a saw, attached a rope, and pulled it with his pickup. The limb brоke, and a portion of it struck Kalell on the head, causing serious injuries.
Farm Bureau’s exclusion clause provides:
Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
e. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of:
(2) a motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to any insured ....
The district court found that the “arising out of” language in the exclusion clause was ambiguous and resolved the issue against Farm Bureau.
Construction of an insurance policy,
i.e.,
the process of determining its legal effect, is always a matter of law fоr the court. The “interpretation” of language,
*867
i.e.,
the process of determining the meaning of the words used, is also a matter for the court to decide as a matter of law unless it depеnds on extrinsic evidence or a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from it.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte,
If an insurance policy provision is ambiguous, we construe it in the light most favorable to the insured; insurance policies are adhesion contracts, and exclusions will be strictly construed against the insurer.
IMT Ins. Co. v. Amundsen,
The phrase “arising out of” was not defined in the homeowners policy. When words are not defined in the pоlicy, we give them their ordinary meaning.
North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holty,
Courts construing
coverage
clauses give the words “arising out of” a broad, general, and comprehensive meaning. They are commonly understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and require only that there be some causal relationship between injury and risk for which сoverage is provided. G. Couch, 12
Insurance
§ 45:56, at 286-89 (2d ed. 1981); 6B J. Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice
§ 4317, at 359-63 (R. Buckley ed. 1979). As to an
exclusion
clause, however, a narrow or restrictive construction is required. That is why it is possible for the same words to be encompassed in the coveragе language of an automobile policy, yet not in the exclusion clause of a homeowners policy.
See, e.g., Eichelberger v. Warner,
In Eichelberger, the insured ran out of gas and pulled her car to the side of the road. Beсause of a guardrail, she could not pull completely off the road. Two people were helping the insured put gas in the car when the insured stepped back into the road. An оncoming automobile struck the insured, lost control, and ran into the insured’s automobile. The insured was killed, and the two people assisting her were injured.
At trial, both the insured and driver of the oncoming vehicle were found to be negligent. On appeal, the issue was whether liability was covered in the insured’s automobile or homeowners policy, or both. The language “arising out of the use” wаs contained in both the inclusionary clause of the automobile policy held by the insured and in the exclusionary language of the homeowners policy.
The court explained
coverage clauses are interpreted broadly so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the insured. Exceptions to an insurer’s general liability are accordingly to be interpreted narrowly against the insurer. These rules of construction are necessary because, as this court has noted, insurance policies are in essence contracts of adhesion. Bеcause of these canons of construction, it must be emphasized that a homeowner’s policy and an automobile policy are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Id.
at 275-76,
Applying thе above canons of construction, the Pennsylvania court held that both the automobile and homeowners policy covered the insured’s negligence. Under the automobile policy, “arising out of” meant that coverage existed if the injury was “causally connected” to ownership, mainte *868 nance, or use of the vehicle. Addressing the homeowners policy, the сourt said:
The exclusionary clause, although it says that the policy does not apply to bodily injury “arising out of” the ownership, etc., of any motor vehicle, does not state whether such injury must bе proximately caused by the auto or simply causally connected with the auto.... [W]e hold that for purposes of an exclusionary clause, when the words “arising out of” the use of an automobile are read strictly against the insurer, then it must be concluded that this clause acts to exclude only those injuries which are proximately caused by the automobile. This interpretation is consistеnt with the general rule that insurance policies are read to effect the policy’s dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured.
Id.
at 278,
In another case,
American Modern Home Ins. Co. v. Rocha,
We hold that, when two independent acts of negligence are alleged, one vehicle-related and one not vehicle-relatеd, coverage is still provided under the homeowners policy unless the vehicle-related negligence is the sole proximate cause of the injury. Under Iowa law, of course, morе than one proximate cause may exist.
See Davis v. Crook,
If a proximate cause of an injury is within the included coverage of an insurance policy, the included coverage is not voided merely because an additional proximate cause of the injury is a cause which is excluded under the policy. Thus, in order for an injury to be excluded from coverage under an insurance policy, the injury must have been caused solely by a proximate cаuse which is excluded under the policy. The insurance carrier has the burden of proof as to whether the injury was caused solely by a proximate cause which is excluded under the pоlicy.
United States Fidelity & Guar. v. State Farm,
In the present case, liability is alleged as a result of vehicular and nonveh-icular negligence. Removal of a limb with a rope could be negligence without regard to whether a motor vehicle was used to pull the rope. If neighbors had been called in to provide the necessary pulling force, and Kalell was injured, the homeowners policy would cleаrly apply. The use of a pickup to provide the force, we believe, does not excuse the insured from any negligence in his decision to remove the limb with the rope. This could be found to be an independent act of negligence and one which is covered by the policy. If Farm Bureau intended to exclude coverage of an incident simply because it involved a motor vehicle, it was incumbent on it to say so in its policy.
This case must be distinguished from
North Star Mutual Insurance Co. v. Holty,
Whether Kalell’s injuries came solely by the negligent use of the vehicle is an issue for the trier of fact to decide. Because a material issue of fact exists, the trial court correctly denied Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment. We therefore affirm. Other issues raised on appeal were not presented to the district court, and we therefore do not consider them.
AFFIRMED.