Kaje v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co.

57 Minn. 422 | Minn. | 1894

Canty, J.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner of a city lot, 25 feet wide, the rear end of which abuts on a public alley, 20 feet wide, running through the block from street to street, and that prior to June 1, 1891, said alley was open for public use throughout its full extent, and was a means of access to plaintiff’s lot; that, at said time, defendant erected across the end of said alley a building-used as a roundhouse, and machine and repair shops, and has ever since maintained the same, and kept said alley closed; that, for the last three years, plaintiff has occupied his said lot, and resided in his dwelling house thereon, and said acts of defendant have cut off his access to the rear of said lot; that said obstructions completely cut off access to said alley from one of said streets, and that the alley is so narrow that it does not permit of the turning in it of a vehicle drawn by beasts of burden; that plaintiff was damaged by reason of said acts in a sum named, and demanded judgment.

It appeared by the complaint that the plaintiff’s lot fronted on a street, and also that one end of the alley was open, and for this reason it is contended by appellant that it does not appear that plaintiff has sustained any special or peculiar damage not common to the general public.

We are not of that opinion. What constitutes special or peculiar damage, for which the private owner may maintain an action, is not always easy to determine. No general rule for determining it has been laid down which can readily be applied to every case. Where to draw the line between cases where the injury is more general or more equally distributed, and cases where it is not, where, by reason of local situation the damage is comparatively much greater to the special few, is often a difficult task. In spite of all the refinements and distinctions which have been made, it is often a mere matter of degree, and the courts have to draw the line between the more immediate obstruction or peculiar interference, which is a ground for special damage, and the more remote obstruction or interference, which is not. It seems to us that in this case the obstruction is sufficiently immediate, and the interference sufficiently peculiar to plaintiff, to constitute special damage to him.

It can readily be seen that obstructing at one point an alley only 20 feet wide may render it practically useless at all other points in the same block, as it is too narrow to drive in and turn around in it. To say that the abutting owner is not specially damaged by obstructing access to his lot in the rear when he has access to it by a street in the front is much the same as saying that he is not damaged by obstructing the back door to his house when he has a front door. The rear entrance to the lot is generally used for different purposes from the front entrance. Besides, a public alley is generally used more by the abutting owners, and less by the public, than an ordinary street. As held in Aldrich v. Wetmore, 52 Minn. 164, (53 N. W. 1072,) it is not necessary that access to the street be wholly and completely cut off to cause the abutting owner special damage. We cannot see that the allegation that the roundhouse and other structures partly on this alley emit smoke, dirt, and soot alleges any element of damage. As far as appears by the complaint, the defendants are carrying on a lawful business, partly on other premises, and we cannot see that the fact that the structures in which the business is carried on are partly on this alley will render this business itself unlawful.

The order appealed from should be affirmed. So ordered.

Collins and Buck, JJ., absent.

(Opinion published 59 N. W. 493.)