Opinion by
Raymond E., Vivian I., Robert H. and Sally Wisner have petitioned for our review of an adjudication of the Board of Property (Board) which resolved a title dispute between the Wisners and the Commonwealth regarding an approximately 419-acre tract of land located in Fair-field and Derry Townships, Westmoreland County. The Board concluded that the Commonwealth, acting through the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, possesses good title to the property and is the fee simple owner of the subject tract. We affirm. 1
The first issue raised by the Wisners is whether the Board erred in placing the burden of proof on them in this matter. The Wisners’ claim was filed within the Board’s jurisdiction “to hear and determine cases involving the title to land or interest therein brought by persons who claim an interest in the title to lands occupied or claimed by the Commonwealth.”*
2
We think it is clear that, as the moving party, the Wisners must bear the burden of establishing their claim to title. The Board regarded the petition before it as one in the nature of ejectment.
3
While we believe that the requested relief
Turning to the merits of the case, we will first review the Wisners’ chain of title to determine its prima facie sufficiency. The Wisners’ chain begins with a patent granted by the Commonwealth on July 12, 1973 to Christian Eby. The property is described in the patent by metes and bounds and is further described as:
BEING the, same tract which was surveyed in pursuance of a warrant dated 22 September 1790, granted to Benjamin Myer who by deed dated 27 May 1793, conveyed the same to Christian Eby, in consideration of the monies paid by Benjamin Myer in to the Recorder General’s Office of the Commonwealth at the granting of the warrant, and of the sum of two pounds, four shillings and eight pence, lawful money now paid by Christian Eby into said office.
The Board found. insufficient evidence to link the Wisners’ grantors to the property at issue. We must agree that the uncorroborated recitals in the four deeds regarding the grantors’ relationship to Christian Eby are inadequate to prove kinship. “[Kjinship which carries with it a claim of property against the claim of the State should be proved by something more than a guess, it should be built on a sound basis.”
Link’s Estate (No. 1),
Moreover, even if it is assumed that the grantors are direct descendants of Christian Eby, the record contains no further connection between them and the subject property. As observed by the Board, “there are no deeds of record or evidence of inheritance through pro-, bate of will or the administration of an estate in this period of approximately one hundred and seventy-seven (177) years.” Board adjudication at 8. We, accordingly, find no error in the Board’s conclusipn that the Wisners have foiled to establish prima facie evidence of their own good title to the property.
The Wisners have attempted in this matter to challenge the validity of the tax sale in 1823. Wé agree with the Board, however, that the time for challenge has long since passed. At the time of the tax sale, a five year statute of limitations existed for challenges thereto. Act of March 13, 1815, 6 Smith L. 299. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1843 that:
[W]here the- warrantee or owner of unseated land, after an irregular sale-made of it on account of taxes in arrear upon it, lies by for twenty-one years, without making any claim to it' by paying the taxes assessed, or exercising acts of ownership on it, but suffers the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, at the tax sale, to pay the taxes assessed during that period, it may fairly be presumed that he has waived his right to object to the sale; or . . . that he has abandoned -his right to the land in favour of the purchaser at the tax sale.
Bunting v. Young,
5 Watts & Serg. 188, 197 (1843);
see also Northrup v. Pennsylvania Game Commission,
We additionally observe that even if the original patent to Christian Eby is regarded as remaining outstanding, we believe that the. passage of time would now prevent the Wisners from relying on that title. The Commonwealth can point to a long chain of title with tax assessments to the grantors in that chain dating from 1847. In all that .time no heirs or descendants of Christian Eby made any claim to the property until the purported conveyances in the early 1970s. As our Supreme Court stated pertinently in
Dougherty,
The final issue which we must resolve involves the Wisners’ argument that even if the Commonwealth’s chain of title is not defective, they nevertheless own the subject property by virtue of their status as bona fide purchasers for value. Having determined that the purported grantors of the subject property had no existing property interest to convey, however, we fail to see
We, accordingly, will order that the decision of the Board of Property be affirmed.
Order
The Commonwealth’s motion for partial summary relief is granted as to Robert H. and Sally Wisner.
The order of the Board of Property in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.
Notes
The Commonwealth has filed a motion for partial summary relief as to Robert and Sally Wisner based on their failure to separately, participate in this appeal. The record reflects that Raymond and Vivian Wisner own the Fairfield Township portion of the tract at issue comprising approximately 263 acres. Robert and Sally Wisner own the Derry Township portion of the tract. It is evident that Robert and Sally Wisner have not participated in this
We further note that although Kaiser Energy, Inc. is listed in the case caption, it has not appealed from the Boards adjudication and, thus, is not a party to the instant petition for review.
Section 1207, of The Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 PS. §337.
The Board initially determined that declaratory judment relief is not available before the Board. We note that Section 35.19 of the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, 1 Pa. Code §35.19, provides for “petitions for the issuance, in the discretion of an agency, of a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.” Thus, it would appear that there is no general bar to the grant of declaratory relief by the Board. Regardless of the form of the petition presented to the Board, the analysis and result reached in this case would remain unchanged.
We, accordingly, reject the Boards imposition of the more stringent burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence in this case.
